Nechman v. Supplee

210 N.W. 323, 236 Mich. 116, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 805
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 4, 1926
DocketDocket No. 28.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 210 N.W. 323 (Nechman v. Supplee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nechman v. Supplee, 210 N.W. 323, 236 Mich. 116, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 805 (Mich. 1926).

Opinion

Steere, J.

Defendant Supplee appeals from a decree of the Wayne county circuit court, in chancery, permanently enjoining him from violating certain building restrictions imposed on Harry A. Bell’s Fern-dale Gardens subdivision of lot 4 and part of lot 5 of the subdivision of lot 9 of the Shipyard tract in town 2 south, of range 11 east, located in the southwesterly part of the city of Detroit. • The restrictions were embodied both in the officially approved and recorded plat of said subdivision and in contracts and deeds given purchasers of lots.

Lot 28 of this subdivision, in regard to which violation of restriction is claimed, is located on the south side of Mandale avenue. The fee title to it is owned by one William Ross with whom defendant Supplee had been associated in the building business. They had together erected other buildings in this subdivision, were familiar with its restrictions, and were known *118 by witnesses who had worked for them as the firm of Ross & Supplee, but both denied they were partners in the building project involved here. Ross, who said he owned “a good many lots in this subdivision,” denied that they ever were partners but admitted that they did have “two or three little joint ventures.” Supplee, who testified he was owner of the building he was erecting on lot 23, was asked and answered:

“Q. William Ross has the deed to the lot?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Yet he has no interest in this building that is going up ?

“A. Not at the present time.

“Q. ‘At the present time’ — what do you mean?

“A. No interest in the building, now nor ever. I have a contract. * * *

“Q. When did you get this contract from Mr. Ross?

“A. I can’t tell you the exact date. I bought the lot from Mr. Ross some time in April.

“Q. 1923 or this year?

“A. No, not this year. Before the building — before I started any building there of any kind.”

The material building restrictions on that subdivision applicable to lot 23 are as follows:

“No buildings or structures shall be erected upon said premises other than those stipulated for same and for the entire subdivision as follows, to wit:

“Upon any lot on either side of both Mandale avenue and Mason place, west of the alley crossing said streets in said subdivision. No buildings or structures shall be erected upon the front portion of same other tban a one (1) family residence, not more than thirty (30) feet in width nor more than two and one-half (2-%) stories in height, and to be constructed of brick, brick veneer, cement or stone construction, the extreme front portion of which (excepting open porches) must be located twenty-five (25) feet from the front lot line of said lot and the extreme westerly portion thereof (with no exceptions) must be located three (3) feet from the westerly line of said lot.”

The violations of restrictions complained of here are *119 persisting in the erection of a four-family flat on this lot in a subdivision restricted to one-family residences and inclosing the porches or sun parlors for each of the four flats projecting beyond the 25-foot limit, or building line for the extreme front portion of the building (excepting open porches).

Defendant admittedly prepared his plans, obtained a permit from the city authorities for, and started to build, a four-family flat on said lot 23. His explanation for thus violating the building restrictions is that he spoke to plaintiffs, “both of the gentlemen,” apparently referring to plaintiffs Nechman and Lentz, telling them that he “had in mind getting a permit for a four-room flat,” and they said they “would make no objections.” He then got a permit for a four-family flat and had the building ready for the second story joists, first learning of any objections when an injunction was served upon Ross, but did not change his plans until an injunction was served on him.

Plaintiffs deny any permission or waiver by act or deed. The residents and property owners in that part of the restricted district had previous experience with the building activities of Ross and Supplee in their vicinity. In the case of Nechman v. Ross, 225 Mich. 112, a bill was filed by interested property owners against Ross and Supplee to restrain them from violating these building restrictions on a nearby lot in this same subdivision and it there developed that Ross was the responsible party. Nechman and Lentz were, with others, also plaintiffs in that case. They first obtained a temporary injunction in this case against Ross in whose name the fee title of lot 23 stood, but were met with a reversal of the parties as to denial and assumption of responsibility and thereupon secured a temporary injunction against Supplee. Lentz testified to notifying both Supplee and Ross that the proposed building violated the restrictions, and Ross said he was going to break the restrictions if it *120 cost him $10,000; that “We had already started the injunction, but it wasn’t filed yet. I simply said to him we was going to file an injunction.” The participation by Nechman and Lentz as plaintiffs in the previous suit with Ross and Supplee, where the violation complained of was only construction of an inclosed porch beyond the building line, convincingly tends to confirm plaintiffs’ denial of any waiver of rights in the instant case.

Defendant also urges here, as was contended in the former case, that plaintiffs are estopped from claiming equitable relief by their own violations of these restrictions in various particulars. It was conclusively shown by plaintiffs’ testimony and photographs produced in evidence that all the buildings in this subdivision on Mandale avenue and on Mason place are as constructed single, private residences, except the partly constructed four-family flat in question here. The trial judge who heard the case and visited the premises so found and stated in his findings that the various violations charged against plaintiffs by defendant “are unworthy of notice and constitute no estoppel to plaintiffs.” If conceded, those violations are but minor departures from the restrictions distinctly different from the infractions charged against defendant, not sufficient to change the general appearance, conditions and character of the subdivision, and not of such moment as to be held a barrier to enforcement of plaintiffs’ rights.

This case shows a more aggravated violation of the restrictions in the same subdivision and no stronger defense than the record discloses in Nechman v. Ross, supra. The trial court rightly so held and made the preliminary restraining injunction permanent, with a further mandatory injunctive requirement that the partly constructed four-family flat should be entirely taken down.

The defense protest against the mandatory pro *121

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Bluebook (online)
210 N.W. 323, 236 Mich. 116, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nechman-v-supplee-mich-1926.