Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-23-00109-CV
NEC NETWORKS, LLC d/b/a CaptureRx, Appellant
v.
Brooke GILMARTIN, Independent Court Administrator of the Estate of J. Edward Charles Gilmartin, Deceased, Appellee
From the Probate Court No. 1, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018PC3985 Honorable Oscar J. Kazen, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 29, 2023
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REMANDED
Appellant NEC Networks, LLC d/b/a CaptureRx challenges the trial court’s denial of its
motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act. We affirm the trial court’s order in
part, reverse it in part, and render judgment dismissing appellee Brooke Gilmartin’s counterclaim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We remand this cause for a determination of
CaptureRx’s court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against Brooke’s
intentional infliction counterclaim. 04-23-00109-CV
BACKGROUND
In 2000, Edward “Jake” Gilmartin and Christopher Hotchkiss co-founded CaptureRx. In
2016, Jake married Brooke. In 2018, Jake died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Brooke was
eventually appointed independent administrator of Jake’s estate.
This dispute revolves around the parties’ competing claims to Jake’s interest in CaptureRx.
After Jake died, CaptureRx contended that a 2012 “Company Agreement” he had signed entitled
it to purchase his interest in the company. CaptureRx valued Jake’s interest at $356,764.20 under
the terms of the Company Agreement, and it made an offer in that amount to Jake’s estate. Brooke,
as the independent administrator of Jake’s estate, declined CaptureRx’s offer because she believed
it did not fairly value Jake’s interest.
At some point after it made the initial offer, CaptureRx discovered a 2014 “Profits Interests
Agreement Letter” that Jake purportedly signed and which CaptureRx contended was relevant to
the valuation. Both CaptureRx and Jake’s estate subsequently hired their own valuation appraisers
to review the relevant documents. CaptureRx’s valuation appraiser concluded that under the terms
of the Profits Interests Agreement Letter and the Company Agreement, Jake’s interest had no
monetary worth. Based on this valuation, CaptureRx offered Jake’s estate $10,000 “in a gesture of
goodwill[.]” The valuation appraiser hired by Jake’s estate also considered both the Company
Agreement and the Profits Interests Agreement Letter, but he concluded Jake’s interest was worth
between $19,157,000 and $33,900,000.
During the valuation dispute, Hotchkiss—who was CaptureRx’s CEO at that time—openly
denigrated Brooke in front of CaptureRx’s employees and executives. He referred to her as “a slut,
a cunt, a prostitute, a bitch,” expressed a desire to do physical harm to her, and asked CaptureRx’s
then-general counsel, Jose Padilla, “to find someone . . . that could rape” her. Hotchkiss told
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“everyone” at CaptureRx that he “wanted to make sure that [Brooke] got nothing” from Jake’s
interest in the company.
On August 12, 2019, the board of CaptureRx accepted Hotchkiss’s resignation, and Padilla
and another individual took over as co-CEOs of the company. Two weeks later, on August 26,
2019, CaptureRx sued Brooke in her individual capacity for breach of contract, money had and
received, and claims under the Theft Liability Act. CaptureRx also asserted the same claims
against Brooke “as assignee” of Jake’s interest. CaptureRx filed its claims against Brooke in Kerr
County district court.
In her capacity as independent administrator of Jake’s estate, Brooke filed her own lawsuit
against CaptureRx in Bexar County statutory probate court. CaptureRx’s Kerr County claims were
eventually transferred by agreement to the Bexar County probate court, and the lawsuits were
consolidated. Multiple discovery disputes that are not directly relevant to this appeal ensued, and
CaptureRx changed attorneys several times. At some point during this litigation, Hotchkiss
rejoined CaptureRx as CEO, and he made representations on CaptureRx’s behalf during a June
2022 hearing before the probate court.
On August 15, 2022, Brooke, acting “individually and allegedly as assignee,” sought
sanctions against CaptureRx. Brooke alleged CaptureRx’s lawsuit against her “ha[d] no basis in
fact or law [and] was brought in bad faith, for an improper purpose and maliciously[.]” In her
individual capacity, she also filed a counterclaim against CaptureRx for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In support of both claims, Brooke argued that CaptureRx initiated litigation
against her while she “was in a vulnerable and fragile mental state” after Jake’s suicide because it
wanted to intimidate her into selling Jake’s interest for an unfairly low price. Shortly after Brooke
filed her counterclaim, CaptureRx voluntarily non-suited the claims it had asserted against her in
her individual capacity.
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On October 14, 2022, CaptureRx filed a motion under the TCPA to dismiss Brooke’s
counterclaim and request for sanctions. After a hearing, the trial court denied the TCPA motion by
operation of law. CaptureRx then timely filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
In six issues we construe as three, CaptureRx argues the trial court erred by denying its
TCPA motion because: (1) the TCPA applied to Brooke’s claims; (2) Brooke did not present prima
facie evidence to support her claims; and (3) CaptureRx was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Brooke’s claims.
Did CaptureRx Bring Its Appeal Against the Wrong Party?
Before turning to the merits of the trial court’s ruling on CaptureRx’s TCPA motion, we
consider Brooke’s assertion that CaptureRx brought its appeal against the wrong party. Brooke
notes that CaptureRx’s docketing statement, motions for extension of time, and brief identified
“Brooke Gilmartin as the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Edward J. Gilmartin” as the
appellee in this dispute. She further notes that none of CaptureRx’s appellate filings identify her
as a party in her individual capacity. Because “[t]he errors asserted by CaptureRx in this appeal
could only impact” her in her individual capacity, Brooke argues this appeal “should be summarily
dismissed[.]” We decline to interpret our jurisdiction so narrowly.
“The filing of a notice of appeal by any party invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over
all parties to the trial court’s judgment or order appealed from.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1. It is
undisputed that Brooke was a party to the “order appealed from” in her individual capacity—
CaptureRx appealed the order denying its motion to dismiss the counterclaims Brooke asserted
against it in her individual capacity. CaptureRx’s notice of appeal was therefore effective to invoke
this court’s jurisdiction over her in that capacity. See id. Accordingly, we decline to dismiss this
appeal.
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CaptureRx’s TCPA Motion
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo. Robert B. James,
DDS, Inc. v. Elkins, 553 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied). In
reviewing a ruling on a TCPA motion, “[w]e view the pleadings and evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.” Id.
A motion to dismiss under the TCPA is subject to a three-part analysis. First, the movant
must demonstrate that the respondent’s “legal action is based on or is in response to [the movant’s]
exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association[.]” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a). “When it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is
covered by the [TCPA], the defendant need show no more.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467
(Tex. 2017). If the movant shows the TCPA applies, the burden shifts to the respondent to
“establish[] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the
claim in question.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c). If the respondent establishes
its prima facie case, the burden shifts back to the movant to “establish[] an affirmative defense or
other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
§ 27.005(d).
Application
A. Brooke’s intentional infliction of emotional distress counterclaim
The TCPA’s definition of “legal action” expressly includes counterclaims. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(6). Brooke’s live petition alleged that her intentional infliction of
emotional distress counterclaim arose from CaptureRx’s filing of a lawsuit against her. Because
filing a lawsuit involves “a communication in or pertaining to . . . a judicial proceeding,” that
action falls within the TCPA’s definition of “[e]xercise of the right to petition.” See id.
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§ 27.001(4)(A)(i). Brooke’s live petition therefore showed on its face that her counterclaim was
“based on” or “in response to” CaptureRx’s exercise of a right protected by the TCPA. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a); Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467. Accordingly, CaptureRx met its
burden under the first prong of the TCPA analysis as to that claim.
The second prong of the TCPA analysis asks whether Brooke established “by clear and
specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of” her counterclaim. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). The TCPA does not define “clear and specific evidence.” See
id.; In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 588 (Tex. 2015). However, this evidentiary standard neither
“impose[s] a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial” nor “require[s] direct
evidence of each essential element of the underlying claim to avoid dismissal.” In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d at 591. “Instead, a plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its
claim.” Id. The TCPA also does not define “prima facie case,” but that term “has a traditional legal
meaning.” Id. at 590. A TCPA respondent establishes a prima facie case by presenting “the
minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact
is true.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and
(4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144
S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004). To satisfy the required elements of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, the conduct in question must be “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212,
215–16 (Tex. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 609–10.
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The Texas Supreme Court has described the required elements of an intentional infliction
claim as “exacting.” Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 815 (Tex. 2005). “Meritorious
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are relatively rare because ‘most human
conduct, even that which causes injury to others, cannot be fairly characterized as extreme and
outrageous.’” Walgreens v. McKenzie, 676 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2023, no pet. h.) (quoting Kroger Tex. L.P. v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006)). Conduct
may be “callous, meddlesome, mean-spirited, officious, overbearing, and vindictive” and still fall
short of the high threshold required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 817–18.
Here, Brooke argued that CaptureRx’s decision to sue her in her individual capacity was
extreme and outrageous because: (1) CaptureRx sued her less than a year after Jake’s suicide; (2)
the lawsuit was part of a scheme to take advantage of her vulnerable state to intimidate her into
selling Jake’s 20% interest for an unfairly low price; and (3) CaptureRx knew there was no legal
or factual basis to assert its claims against her individually. She further argued that CaptureRx’s
decision to sue her in her individual capacity must be viewed in light of Hotchkiss’s “extreme
animosity” toward her, and she presented evidence of that animosity.
We are required to view the pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable to Brooke.
See, e.g., Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 603. We note, however, that Brooke has not argued that
CaptureRx’s claims against her in her representative capacity—which were identical to the claims
it asserted against her individually—were tortious or otherwise procedurally wrongful. 1 Stated
differently, Brooke has not disputed that she was a proper defendant in her representative capacity.
Furthermore, while Brooke argued that Padilla “had a plan to ensure that CaptureRx paid Brooke
1 Brooke has challenged the substantive merits of CaptureRx’s claims against her in her representative capacity, and we express no opinion on the merits of those claims or Brooke’s defenses against them.
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the lowest amount possible,” she has not argued or presented any evidence that this plan involved
suing Brooke in her individual capacity. Under these unique circumstances, even if we assume
CaptureRx’s initial choice to sue Brooke in her individual capacity instead of in her representative
capacity was wrongful, we do not believe a reasonable factfinder could conclude that choice was
so extreme and outrageous “as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” See Brewerton, 997
S.W.2d at 215–16; see also Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 818 (noting that even “heinous” acts “will
rarely have merit as intentional infliction claims”); Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 609. Accordingly, we
must conclude that Brooke did not establish a prima facie case for this essential element of her
intentional infliction counterclaim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c); In re Lipsky,
460 S.W.3d at 590.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order as to Brooke’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress counterclaim and render judgment dismissing that counterclaim. We also
remand this cause for a determination of CaptureRx’s “court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
incurred in defending against” that counterclaim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.009(a)(1). Based on our resolution of this issue, we need not consider CaptureRx’s contention
that it satisfied its burden on the third prong of the TCPA analysis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
B. Brooke’s request for sanctions
1. The TCPA applied to Brooke’s request for sanctions.
CaptureRx also sought a TCPA dismissal of Brooke’s request for monetary sanctions. That
request was a “legal action” as defined by the TCPA. See KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Gordon, 629
S.W.3d 649, 655–57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). And, like Brooke’s intentional
infliction counterclaim, her petition showed on its face that her request for sanctions was based on
CaptureRx’s exercise of the right to petition. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
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§§ 27.001(4)(A)(i), 27.003(a). CaptureRx therefore met its burden to show the TCPA applied to
that request. See Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467.
2. Brooke presented prima facie evidence of each required element of her claim for sanctions.
Brooke’s live petition sought sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. A trial
court may impose Rule 13 sanctions on an attorney who signs a filing, a represented party, or both.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. “Rule 13 precludes a signatory from signing any motion that is (1) groundless
and (2) brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.” KB Home Lone Star, 629 S.W.3d
at 658. Rule 13’s first prong requires the party seeking sanctions to establish that the challenged
filing lacked any basis in law or fact. Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Rule 13’s second prong—a showing
that a pleading or motion was filed in bad faith—“entails more than simply bad judgment or
negligence; rather, it is the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious
purposes.” In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d 807, 813–14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet.
denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained above, Brooke was required to establish
a prima facie case of both these elements to avoid a TCPA dismissal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 27.005(c); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590.
CaptureRx asserted several claims against Brooke individually, including breach of
contract. To prevail on its breach of contract claim, CaptureRx was required to establish, inter alia,
that “a valid contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendant”—i.e., that a valid contract
existed between CaptureRx and Brooke in her individual capacity. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Builders
W., Inc., 565 S.W.3d 336, 342 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); cf. Elizondo
v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 974 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)
(individual acting in her individual capacity “is, in law, not the same person” as that individual
acting in her representative capacity). The evidence presented below showed that Brooke was not
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a signatory to the Company Agreement or the Profits Interests Agreement Letter in any capacity.
This evidence, if uncontroverted, would support a rational inference that CaptureRx’s breach of
contract claim against Brooke in her individual capacity had no basis in law or fact and was
therefore groundless as that term is defined by Rule 13. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Van Dyke, 565
S.W.3d at 342; see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
by concluding Brooke satisfied her prima facie burden on the first element of her Rule 13 sanctions
claim.
On the second prong of her Rule 13 claim—that CaptureRx sued her in her individual
capacity in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment—Brooke alleged that CaptureRx asserted
meritless claims against her to intimidate her into selling Jake’s interest for less than its fair value.
She also alleged that CaptureRx “authorized, acquiesced in and/or ratified” the actions of its on-
again off-again CEO, Hotchkiss. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a) (“In determining
whether a legal action is subject to or should be dismissed under [the TCPA], the court shall
consider the pleadings[.]”); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587 (same). As evidentiary support,
Brooke presented deposition testimony from Padilla, who was CaptureRx’s general counsel and
co-CEO when it filed suit against her individually and was one of the people who authorized the
filing of the lawsuit. Padilla testified that Hotchkiss repeatedly and openly vilified Brooke in front
of Padilla and other CaptureRx executives, blamed Brooke for Jake’s death, and “told everyone,
make sure [Brooke] gets nothing” from Jake’s interest in the company. See In re Estate of Aguilar,
492 S.W.3d at 814 (“[H]arassment focuses on the pleader’s intent to annoy, alarm, and abuse
another person through the pleadings.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Padilla also explained
that he and others at CaptureRx, including the outside counsel who signed the petition asserting
claims against Brooke in her individual capacity, were “scared” of Hotchkiss due to his erratic
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behavior. Moreover, it is undisputed that Hotchkiss did not depart his leadership role at CaptureRx
until two weeks before the company sued Brooke.
CaptureRx correctly notes that Padilla testified that he and CaptureRx took actions
intended to insulate the dispute with Jake’s estate from Hotchkiss’s influence. However, at this
stage of the litigation, the trial court was required to consider the pleadings and evidence in the
light most favorable to Brooke. See, e.g., Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 603. When considered under the
proper standard of review, the pleadings and evidence before the trial court would permit a
factfinder to rationally infer that CaptureRx’s individual claims against Brooke were motivated by
Hotchkiss’s malice against her and were therefore filed in bad faith or for the purpose of
harassment. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590; In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d at 813–14.
Consequently, Brooke met her burden to establish a prima facie case of each required element of
her claim for Rule 13 sanctions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c).
3. CaptureRx did not establish that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Brooke’s request for sanctions.
In its TCPA motion, CaptureRx argued that even if Brooke met her prima facie burden on
her claim for sanctions, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim for several
reasons. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d). First, it claimed that it believed in good
faith that Jake’s “outstanding debt, and/or a community portion thereof, transferred to” Brooke
upon Jake’s death. While Jake’s portion of the community estate may have been liable for his
debts, 2 see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 101.052, Brooke herself was not individually liable for Jake’s
debts unless: (1) she acted as Jake’s agent; or (2) Jake incurred the debt in question “for
2 CaptureRx’s own evidence showed that Jake signed the Company Agreement in 2014 but did not marry Brooke until 2016. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(1) (defining separate property as, inter alia, “the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage”). CaptureRx did not attempt to show what portion, if any, of Jake’s interest in CaptureRx was community property. See id.
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necessaries[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(a). CaptureRx did not attempt to show that either
was true here. See Martinek Grain & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms, Inc., 366 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding wife was not personally liable for her deceased husband’s
debts).
Next, CaptureRx argued Brooke was personally bound by the terms of the Company
Agreement because the agreement defined her as an “assignee” of Jake’s membership interest.
CaptureRx also argued Brooke should be bound by the terms of the Company Agreement because
she sought to benefit from it. CaptureRx did not, however, point to any portion of the Company
Agreement that made an assignee individually liable for the debts of her deceased assignor. Nor
did it present any evidence that Brooke sought benefits under the agreement in her individual
capacity as opposed to in her capacity as the administrator of Jake’s estate. See Elizondo, 974
S.W.2d at 931.
Finally, CaptureRx argued the evidence showed Hotchkiss resigned as its CEO
approximately two weeks before it filed its lawsuit against Brooke. On appeal, CaptureRx contends
Brooke “never made a connection between her feud with” Hotchkiss and CaptureRx’s decision to
sue her in her individual capacity. This appears to be a contention that Hotchkiss’s undisputed
animus toward Brooke cannot properly be imputed to CaptureRx for sanctions purposes. However,
Padilla testified that Hotchkiss resigned “about seven or eight times” during Padilla’s
approximately one-year tenure at the company, and that the resignation CaptureRx relies on here
“was just the first time that the board actually accepted it.” Moreover, the trial court took judicial
notice of the entire record of this case, and that record showed Hotchkiss reclaimed his position as
CEO during this litigation. Hotchkiss also personally appeared in the trial court during a June 24,
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2022 hearing, where he made representations on CaptureRx’s behalf. 3 CaptureRx itself identified
Hotchkiss as its “corporate representative” during a September 21, 2022 hearing that occurred
approximately one month after Brooke filed her counterclaim and request for sanctions. And, as
explained above, Brooke presented evidence that when Hotchkiss was CEO, he made it clear to
“everyone” at CaptureRx that he did not want Brooke to reap any benefit from Jake’s interest in
the company. Under these circumstances, reasonable people could disagree about whether
Hotchkiss’s short-lived resignation precluded his undisputed vitriol toward Brooke from being
imputed to CaptureRx for sanctions purposes. See, e.g., In re Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d
759, 762 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (corporations act through human agents);
Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019) (TCPA respondent may rely
on circumstantial evidence that supports reasonable inference).
To obtain a dismissal of Brooke’s sanctions claim under the third prong of the TCPA,
CaptureRx was required to conclusively establish its entitlement to judgment on that claim. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d); Graves v. Evangelista-Ysasaga, No. 14-22-00137-CV,
2023 WL 370589, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 24, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
CaptureRx argues its claims “were warranted by evidence known by CaptureRx at the time it filed
its pleadings,” and it points to evidence that arguably raised a fact issue on that point. However,
evidence that merely raises a fact issue will not support a dismissal under the third prong of the
TCPA. See Graves, 2023 WL 370589, at *6; cf. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816
(Tex. 2005). The trial court did not err by denying CaptureRx’s TCPA motion as to Brooke’s claim
for sanctions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d).
3 The June 24, 2022 hearing occurred at a time when CaptureRx did not have an attorney in this litigation. Hotchkiss told the trial court during that hearing that he had not yet been able to locate new counsel for CaptureRx.
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CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s denial of CaptureRx’s TCPA motion as to Brooke’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress counterclaim and render judgment dismissing that counterclaim.
We remand this cause for a determination of CaptureRx’s court costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees incurred in defending against Brooke’s intentional infliction counterclaim. We affirm the trial
court’s denial of CaptureRx’s TCPA motion as to Brooke’s request for sanctions.
Beth Watkins, Justice
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