NEC Corp. v. Department of Commerce

23 Ct. Int'l Trade 987, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1999 CIT 136, 23 C.I.T. 987, 21 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2191, 1999 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 130
United States Court of International Trade·Decided December 17, 1999·No. Slip Op. 99-136; Court 97-11-01967·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

OPINION

POGUE, Judge.

On December 15, 1998, the Court remanded this matter to the International Trade Commission (“Commission”). NEC Corp. v. DOC, 22 CIT —, 36 F.Supp.2d 380 (1998) (“NEC /”). In particular, the Court ordered the Commission to reconsider its threat determination in order to further explain how the subject less-than-fair-value (“LTFV”) imports themselves make a material contribution to the threatened material injury. NEC I, 22 CIT at -, 36 F.Supp.2d at 394.

Background

On July 29, 1996, Cray Research, Inc. (“Cray”), filed a petition with the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) alleging that vector supercomputers from Japan are being, or are likely to be sold in the United States at LTFV, and that such imports are materially injuring, or threatening material injury to an industry in the United States. See Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 61 Fed.Reg. 43,527 (Dep’t Commerce 1996) (initiation anti-dumping duty investig.).

Commerce published a preliminary determination, Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 Fed.Reg. 16,544 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (prelim.determination), and a final determination, Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 Fed.Reg. 45,623 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (final determination), concluding that Japanese vector supercomputers were being sold at LTFV in the United States.

On October 9, 1997, the Commission promulgated its final injury determination, concluding that the domestic industry is threatened with material injury by reason of LTFV imports of Japanese vector supercomputers. Vector Supercomputers from Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-750 (Final) (List No. 1, Doc. 223) (October 9, 1997); reprinted in 62 Fed.Reg. 53,801 '(Int’l Trade Commission 1997) (“Final Determination”). 1 The Commission, however, *1341 found no present material injury. Id. at 36.

Commerce published an antidumping order covering the subject merchandise on October 24, 1997. Vector Supercomputers from Japan, 62 Fed.Reg. 55,392 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (notice antidumping duty order). The margin found for Fujitsu was 173.08%. The margin found for NEC was 454%. Id. at 55,393.

The Commission’s Final Determination was appealed to this Court by Fujitsu Limited and Fujitsu America, Inc. (collectively “Fujitsu”), and NEC Corporation and HNSX Supercomputers Inc. (collectively “NEC”). Ruling on the consolidated action of Fujitsu and NEC (collectively “Plaintiffs”), this Court sustained in part and remanded in part. The Court sustained the Commission’s finding that vector supercomputers are a separate like product, see NEC I, 22 CIT at -, 36 F.Supp.2d at 390, but remanded for further explanation or reconsideration the Commission’s finding that the domestic industry is threatened with material injury by reason of LTFV imports of vector supercomputers from Japan. See id. at -, 36 F.Supp.2d at 394.

The Commission issued a remand determination in Vector Supercomputers from Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-750 (Final) (Remand) (Remand List No. 2R, Doc. 181) (March 16, 1999) (“Remand Determination”). The Court now reviews the Commission’s Remand Determination. 2

Standard of Review

The court will uphold a determination by the Commission unless it is not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record or is otherwise not in accordance with the law. See Section 516a(b)(l)(B)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (1994).

Discussion

1. On remand, did the Commission reconsider its threat of material injury finding in a way consistent with the requirement that the LTFV imports themselves must have made a material contribution to the threatened material injury?

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has articulated the following legal standard regarding present material injury determinations: “An affirmative injury determination requires both (1) present material injury and (2) a finding that the material injury is ‘by reason of the subject imports.” Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 21 CIT -, -, 132 F.3d 716, 719 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“Gerald Metals /”). This Court has held that “the ‘by reason of standard also applies to threat determinations.” Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 22 CIT -, -, 27 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1365 n. 17 (1998) (“Gerald Metals II”). In NEC I, this Court explained that to make a threat determination, “the statute requires adequate evidence to show that the [threat of] harm will occur by reason of the LTFV imports, not by reason of a minimal or tangential contribution to material harm caused by the LTFV goods.” 22 CIT at -, 36 F.Supp.2d at 391; see also 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)(A) (1994) (“The term ‘material injury’ means harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant.”); 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)(F)(ii) (“[A] [threat] determination may not be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition.”). In sum, the standard requires “ ‘a causal-not merely temporal-connection between the LTFV goods and the [threat of] material injury.’ ” Id. (quoting Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 720) (brackets in original).

In its Remand Determination, the Commission appears to have understood the applicable legal standard: “the Commission may not analyze subject imports in a vacuum. Instead, we fully consider other *1342 significant economic factors in determining that subject imports themselves contribute in a more than de minimis way to material injury or threat.” Remand Determination at 5. The Court had criticized the Commission in NEC I for its failure to “undertake any analysis to distinguish between the contribution to material harm caused by LTFV goods and these economic factors unrelated to the subject imports.” 22 CIT at-, 36 F.Supp.2d at 392. In its Remand Determination, the Commission attempts to explain more fully than it did in its Final Determination how, after considering the effects of “other factors,” the Commission is able to conclude that the subject imports themselves pose a threat of material injury. 3

In its Final Determination, the Commission found a threat of material injury. See Final Determination at 38. However, the Commission found no present material injury on the ground that the “other factors,” and not

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

NEC Corp. v. Department of Commerce, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 987, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1999 CIT 136, 23 C.I.T. 987, 21 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2191, 1999 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 130 (cit 1999).

23 Ct. Int'l Trade 987 (NEC Corp. v. Department of Commerce) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Elkem Metals Co. v. United States
32 Ct. Int'l Trade 938 (Court of International Trade, 2008)
Committee for Fair Beam Imports v. United States
27 Ct. Int'l Trade 932 (Court of International Trade, 2003)