Neal v. State of Oregon Sheriff's Office

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJune 3, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-00307
StatusUnknown

This text of Neal v. State of Oregon Sheriff's Office (Neal v. State of Oregon Sheriff's Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Neal v. State of Oregon Sheriff's Office, (D. Or. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BRET WYATT NEAL, Case No. 3:21-cv-00307-JR Plaintiff, ORDER TO DISMISS v.

STATE OF OREGON SHERIFFS OFFICE; THE D.A. OFFICE OF HOOD RIVER COUNTY; KATE BROWN; RICHARD PRINCEHOUSE; and CARRIE RASMUSSEN

Defendants.

HERNÀNDEZ, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, an adult in custody at the NORCOR Adult Corrections Facility, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to an Order entered this date, the Court granted plaintiffs Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. However, for the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses plaintiffs Complaint.

1 - ORDER TO DISMISS BACKGROUND Plaintiff appears to allege that defendant Officer Princehouse violated plaintiff s due process rights by failing to properly investigate unidentified charges against plaintiff. He alleges defendant Rasmussen, who appears to be a private citizen, violated his rights in connection with testimony given to a grand jury. Finally, plaintiff alleges defendant Governor Kate Brown signed a Governors warrant against him without ensuring the Hood River County District Attorney s office had sufficient proof to justify the warrant. Plaintiff does not specify the relief sought, nor has plaintiff signed the Complaint.1 STANDARDS

A district court must dismiss an action initiated by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee, if the Court determines that the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover, before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the court supplies the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint s deficiencies. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se litigant will be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is clear that

1It appears plaintiff may have failed to submit the entirety of his Complaint, as the Court received only pages one through four of what is generally a six-page form Complaint.

2 - ORDER TO DISMISS the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). DISCUSSION 1. Procedural Deficiencies Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint shall include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Each allegation must be simple, concise and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). If the factual elements of a cause of action are scattered throughout the complaint but are not organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a) is proper. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court may dismiss an action with prejudice due to a litigant’s failure to comply with Rule 8(a) if meaningful, less drastic sanctions have been explored); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) (“each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct”). Likewise, the failure to indicate what in particular a plaintiff seeks by way of relief is in itself a failure to state a claim. Conkey v. Reno, 885 F.Supp. 1389, 1392 (D.Nev. 1995). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), every pleading, motion and other paper submitted by an individual proceeding pro se shall be signed by the plaintiff. “The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the ... party’s attention.” Id Here, as noted, plaintiff did not sign his Complaint and did not allege the relief sought. Accordingly, plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint curing these deficiencies.

3 - ORDER TO DISMISS

Il. Substantive Deficiencies To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege that a defendant, while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights. 42 U.S.C.§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). A § 1983 plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate (i.e., legal) causation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). Allegations regarding § 1983 causation “must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “Sweeping conclusory allegations [regarding causation] will not suffice[.]” Id. (citation omitted). As to defendant Officer Princehouse, plaintiff fails to allege facts substantiating a claim that he violated plaintiff's due process rights. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff claims that Princehouse denied plaintiff a fair trial by failing to adequately investigate, that claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Under Heck, a § 1983 claim for damages may not be asserted if a judgment in the plaintiff's favor on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence which remains outstanding against the plaintiff. Id. at 486. Plaintiff cannot bring such a claim in a § 1983 action unless and until he has successfully invalidated his conviction on appeal, in a habeas action, or by other appropriate means. Plaintiffs claim against defendant Rasmussen fails as well. A private citizen who appears as a witness before the grand jury does not act “under color of state law” as required by § 1983. See Price v.

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Briscoe v. LaHue
460 U.S. 325 (Supreme Court, 1983)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Wilkinson v. Dotson
544 U.S. 74 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Chauncey Marvin Holt v. Richard Modesto Castaneda
832 F.2d 123 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
Edward G. Eldridge v. Sherman Block
832 F.2d 1132 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
John Badea v. Harvey Cox
931 F.2d 573 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
Harper v. City of Los Angeles
533 F.3d 1010 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Conkey v. Reno
885 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Nevada, 1995)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Taylor v. List
880 F.2d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Price v. Hawaii
939 F.2d 702 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Neal v. State of Oregon Sheriff's Office, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neal-v-state-of-oregon-sheriffs-office-ord-2021.