Neal v. Meink

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-2403
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ISAIAH NEAL, Nos. 24-1286, 24-2403 D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02281-JAD-NJK Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* TROY E. MEINK, Secretary of the Air Force; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE; DAVID S. CRUIKSHANK; DOUGLAS C. FITZPATRICK; KYLE KOWALCHUK; ELIZABETH ANNE MCDUFFIE; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 12, 2025**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Isaiah Neal appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and

dismissal order in his action alleging Title VII violations arising from his

employment with the Air Force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo. Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch., 12 F.4th 960, 965 (9th Cir.

2021) (decision on cross-motions for summary judgment); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Neal’s retaliation

claim because Neal failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

defendants’ legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating his employment were

pretextual. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.

2005) (explaining that when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to show

pretext, the evidence must be “specific and substantial to defeat the employer’s

motion for summary judgment” (citation omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Neal’s discrimination and hostile work

environment claims because Neal failed to allege facts sufficient to state the

requirements of either claim. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

640-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of discrimination and hostile work

environment claims under Title VII).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Neal’s motions to

2 24-1286 compel discovery because Neal did not demonstrate actual and substantial

prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that a district court’s decision to deny discovery

will not be disturbed except upon a clear showing that denial of discovery results

in actual and substantial prejudice).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs against Neal

because Neal did not establish a reason to deny costs. See Dawson v. City of

Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining that “[u]nder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), there is a

presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded its taxable costs” and “[t]o

overcome this presumption, a losing party must establish a reason to deny costs”).

Neal’s motion (Docket Entry No. 47 in Appeal No. 24-1286; Docket Entry

No. 41 in Appeal No. 24-2403) to expedite is denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-1286