Neal v. Gilmore

104 N.W. 609, 141 Mich. 519, 1905 Mich. LEXIS 824
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 2, 1905
DocketDocket No. 38
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 104 N.W. 609 (Neal v. Gilmore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Neal v. Gilmore, 104 N.W. 609, 141 Mich. 519, 1905 Mich. LEXIS 824 (Mich. 1905).

Opinion

Blair, J.

Plaintiff is the owner of the N. E. i of the N. E. J of section 28, and the S. E. £ of the S. E. £ of section 21, in township 14 N., of range 7 E. Plaintiff pur-' chased his north 40 in 1875, and constructed a fence on the south side thereof, about two rods distant from the east and west section line between sections 21 and 28. In 1877 plaintiff circulated a petition for the laying out and establishing of a highway commencing at the State road, [521]*521some 80 rods east of the common corner of sections 27, 22, 28, and 21, and running west one mile to Saginaw Bay. Plaintiff obtained the signatures of seven freeholders of the township to this petition, and delivered it to the highway commissioner for action thereon, informing him, as he claims, that, if he did not lay out all of the proposed highway, he did not want any of it. The township records show that on September 4,1877, a survey was made for the proposed highway, and that on September 5th the same was laid out, except that part between sections 22 and 27. It was conceded at the trial that the records produced did not show a lawful laying out of the highway. About 1879 the then owner of plaintiff’s south 40 constructed a fence along the north side thereof, about 8 rods distant from the plaintiff’s fence, and thenceforth the east 80 rods of the alleged highway was inclosed by such fences. Some time in 1902 or 1903 plaintiff purchased his south 40 of one Bradford, and soon thereafter constructed three fences across the east 80 rods of the alleged highway. In June, 1903, the highway commissioner made an order, and served a copy thereof on plaintiff, requiring him to remove the obstructing fences in accordance with the provisions of the statute relating to the obstruction of highways and encroachments thereon. In response to this order, the plaintiff served notice on the commissioner, denying the existence of the highway, etc. No further steps to enforce his order were taken by the commissioner, but in December, 1903, he, with the other defendants herein, cut down and removed the fences. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this action of quare clausum fregit, to which the defendants pleaded the general issue, with notice that the close where the injuries were alleged to have been committed was a public highway, that defendant Gilmore was highway commissioner, and the other defendants were acting under his direction, in pursuance of the provisions of chapter 6 of Act No. 243 of the Public Acts of 1881, entitled “ The Obstruction of Highways and Encroachments Thereon.” The verdict of the jury was in favor of [522]*522defendants, and plaintiff brings the record to this court for review.

The important questions presented by the assignments of error, and the only ones to which we think it necessary to refer in this opinion, are as follows:

(1) That the statute relating to obstructions and encroachments is exclusive of all other remedies, and, defendants not having proceeded under the statute, verdict should have been directed for plaintiff as requested.
(2) That there was no evidence of user by the public or as to the acceptance of the highway by the public authorities, and particularly as to the east 80 rods thereof, and therefore plaintiff was entitled to recover.
(3) That the court erred in refusing requests, and in giving instructions as to what facts would warrant the finding of the establishment of the highway by user.

1. This precise question was before the supreme court of New York in Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 250. It was there held that the statute authorizing commissioners of highways to order the removal of fences by the erection of which highways have been encroached upon does not abrogate the common-law remedy of abatement of nuisance by the mere act of individuals. The remedy given by the statute is cumulative. We fully concur in the reasoning and the result reached in this decision. The case before us is not one where the highway is only partially encroached upon or obstructed, but where the highway is entirely obstructed and closed to travel. In such a case, as said by Mr. Justice^ Champlin in Pontiac, etc., Plank-Road Co. v. Hilton, 69 Mich. 115.

“ An unauthorized obstruction across a public street is a public nuisance, which any citizen desiring to travel along the street may abate.”

If it were necessary to show a special grievance on the part of the individual abating the nuisance, we think such grievance exists in the case of the highway commissioner by virtue of his office, which gives to him “the general care and superintendence of highways ” in the township.

[523]*523See Hart v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 589.

2. The evidence of an acceptance of this highway by the doing of work thereon by the public authorities is not very convincing, and, if it lay within our province to determine the question of fact, we might arrive at a different conclusion from that reached by the jury; but we cannot say that there was no evidence tending to support the verdict in this regard. Mr. Lark, who owned some 60 acres of land west of plaintiff, testified that he had done most of his highway labor since 1887 upon this road:

The overseers allowed me to do my highway labor on that road. I can’t say what year. Mr. Gould, who is dead, allowed me the road work there a number of years. I can’t remember what years. I wouldn’t say, because I don’t know. It must be 12 or 15 years ago, maybe 10. * * * Whether it was Mr. Gould or somebody else, they always allowed me to do my road work on that road there, because I wanted to use it for a highway. He allowed me for my road work. I graded and dug ditches. In order to make the grades, I had to dig the ditch on the north side of the road. I don’t say on the disputed part of the highway; it was west. I never did any work on the disputed part of the highway; it was west. What Gould allowed me was for doing work on that road, but west of the disputed part, west of Neal’s. I did the work at my quarter line east and west, a little west, up to where the land was a little higher, in order to raise the road up, so that I could draw stuff over that part of the road.”

He also testified that at his request the highway commissioner put in a box drain at the east end of the road, where plaintiff had dug out the ditch so he could not cross it.

When the box was put in, there was dirt enough put over it so I could get over it; that made a connection between the two highways. Before the box was put in I couldn’t travel it at all. After it was put in I could get across it.”

Charles Daniels testified:

“I was overseer of highways there I think three years [524]*524ago, and this year I. caused statute labor to be worked out on that highway. I think it was three years ago Mr. Bradford did six or eight days’ work on that road. I talked with Mr. Bradford before he' did the labor. I allowed him for the work on his highway labor. There was enough of the work done so that I accepted it. I went over it. I called it a good fair job of road work. I can’t tell you what he used, but he did a good job. He graded up the road the same as any road work. I allowed Mr. Lark for doing labor on that highway, I think it was three years ago. They were the only two in there interested to do work on that highway.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
104 N.W. 609, 141 Mich. 519, 1905 Mich. LEXIS 824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neal-v-gilmore-mich-1905.