Neal Technologies Incorporated v. Baxter Auto LLC

D. Arizona

Neal Technologies Incorporated v. Baxter Auto LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided March 4, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-00669·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Neal Technologies Incorporated, No. CV-24-00669-PHX-DWL

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Baxter Auto LLC,

Defendant. The parties have filed a stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal with prejudice. (Doc. 26.) Thus, the parties seek a consent decree. “A consent decree is a hybrid; it is both a settlement and an injunction.” Conservation Nw. v. Sherman, 715 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Enforma Nat. Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] consent decree is no more than a settlement that contains an injunction . . . .”); United States v. State of Or., 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A consent decree is essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial policing.”). Under Ninth Circuit law, “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.” S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court has no basis on which to deny the parties’ request for a consent decree. United States v. Denali Water Sols. LLC, 2025 WL 69918, *2 (D. Ariz. 2025) (“The Court will confess that, because it has had exactly zero involvement overseeing any contested 1 litigation in this case, it is difficult to evaluate whether the proposed consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable. ... At any rate, in light of the highly deferential standards set forth in Randolph and State of Oregon, and because nothing on the face of the proposed consent decree seems out of the ordinary, the Court concludes that the standard for approval has been satisfied.”’). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 26) is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consent decree (Doc. 26-1) is entered as an order of the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and fees. Dated this 4th day of March, 2025. Lm ee” f t _o—— Dominic W, Lanza United States District Judge

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WO

Neal Technologies Incorporated, No. CV-24-00669-PHX-DWL

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Baxter Auto LLC,

Defendant. The parties have filed a stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal with prejudice. (Doc. 26.) Thus, the parties seek a consent decree. “A consent decree is a hybrid; it is both a settlement and an injunction.” Conservation Nw. v. Sherman, 715 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Enforma Nat. Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] consent decree is no more than a settlement that contains an injunction . . . .”); United States v. State of Or., 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A consent decree is essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial policing.”). Under Ninth Circuit law, “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.” S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court has no basis on which to deny the parties’ request for a consent decree. United States v. Denali Water Sols. LLC, 2025 WL 69918, *2 (D. Ariz. 2025) (“The Court will confess that, because it has had exactly zero involvement overseeing any contested 1 litigation in this case, it is difficult to evaluate whether the proposed consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable. ... At any rate, in light of the highly deferential standards set forth in Randolph and State of Oregon, and because nothing on the face of the proposed consent decree seems out of the ordinary, the Court concludes that the standard for approval has been satisfied.”’). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 26) is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consent decree (Doc. 26-1) is entered as an order of the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and fees. Dated this 4th day of March, 2025. Lm ee” f t _o—— Dominic W, Lanza United States District Judge

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Neal Technologies Incorporated v. Baxter Auto LLC, (D. Ariz. 2025).

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