Neal Technologies Incorporated v. Baxter Auto LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00669
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Neal Technologies Incorporated, No. CV-24-00669-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Baxter Auto LLC,

13 Defendant. 14 15 The parties have filed a stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal 16 with prejudice. (Doc. 26.) Thus, the parties seek a consent decree. “A consent decree is 17 a hybrid; it is both a settlement and an injunction.” Conservation Nw. v. Sherman, 715 18 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Enforma Nat. Prods., Inc., 19 362 F.3d 1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] consent decree is no more than a settlement that 20 contains an injunction . . . .”); United States v. State of Or., 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 21 1990) (“A consent decree is essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial 22 policing.”). 23 Under Ninth Circuit law, “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or 24 unreasonable, it ought to be approved.” S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 25 1984). 26 The Court has no basis on which to deny the parties’ request for a consent decree. 27 United States v. Denali Water Sols. LLC, 2025 WL 69918, *2 (D. Ariz. 2025) (“The Court 28 will confess that, because it has had exactly zero involvement overseeing any contested 1 || litigation in this case, it is difficult to evaluate whether the proposed consent decree is 2|| unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable. ... At any rate, in light of the highly deferential || standards set forth in Randolph and State of Oregon, and because nothing on the face of 4|| the proposed consent decree seems out of the ordinary, the Court concludes that the 5 || standard for approval has been satisfied.”’). 6 Accordingly, 7 IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and 8 || dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 26) is granted. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consent decree (Doc. 26-1) is entered as an 10 || order of the Court. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and fees. 13 Dated this 4th day of March, 2025. 14 15 Lm ee” 16 f t _o—— Dominic W, Lanza 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

_2-