Ndm Corporation v. Hayes Products, Inc., and Joseph H. Johnson

641 F.2d 1274, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1084, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 16, 1981
Docket77-3900
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 641 F.2d 1274 (Ndm Corporation v. Hayes Products, Inc., and Joseph H. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ndm Corporation v. Hayes Products, Inc., and Joseph H. Johnson, 641 F.2d 1274, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1084, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. 1981).

Opinion

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge.

NDM Corporation appeals from a judgment in a patent infringement action that various claims of medical electrode patents which had been assigned to NDM were invalid for obviousness. We affirm.

NDM began, 1 in 1969, to develop medical electrodes for use in the electrocardiographic monitoring of heart patients. Initially, NDM attempted to manufacture a “dry” electrode that would be activated by moisture in the patient’s skin, rather than by application of a “wet” electrode gel. These efforts proved unsuccessful and NDM subsequently decided to develop an improved “wet” electrode.

The first product of these efforts was U.S. Patent No. 3,696,807 (“the ’807 patent”), filed on February 13, 1970, issued on October 10, 1972. In laymen’s terms, the ’807 medical electrode patent was a rigid, nonconductive electrode gel cup which had a snap fastener mounted in its base. An elastic sheet covered the cup. This elastic, when pressed against a patient’s skin, would adhere, forming a seal. Because of this seal, electrolyte gel remained in the cup, rather than leaking and causing the electrode to become loose. The snap fastener provided conduction. Increased adhesion facilitated long-term cardiac monitoring. The ’807 design was not “pre-gelled.” Electrolyte gel had to be added to the electrode cup at the time it was applied to the patient.

NDM’s next development was a “pregelled,” “ready-to-use” electrode, U.S. Patent No. 3,701,346 (“The ’346 patent”), filed on January 4, 1971. In addition to the elements of the ’807 patent, the ’346 patent had an absorbent pad prefilled with electrolyte gel. The attached pad, which remained out of the electrode cup during storage, compressed into the cup when the electrode was applied to a patient. This created a stable gel column between the patient’s skin and the electrode’s snap conductor, insuring accurate monitoring. The ’346 patent also included a cover to protect the gel pad during storage.

The ’346 patent enjoyed immediate and substantial commercial success. In the last quarter of 1970, NDM sold a quarter million of the ready-to-use electrodes. In 1973, NDM sold 18 million electrodes; by 1976, when this action was tried, NDM had annual sales of thirty million electrodes.

In 1973, NDM brought this action against Hayes Products for patent infringement. 2 *1276 Hayes Products counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that NDM’s patents were invalid for obviousness.

The district court evaluated Hayes products’ assertion of obviousness 3 under the criteria described in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). It used ten references to define the scope and content of the relevant prior art. 4 Five of the references, 5 had not been before the patent examiners when the ’807 and ’346 patents were granted.

After reviewing all the references before it, the district court invalidated the patents on the grounds of obviousness. NDM appealed.

The Presumption of Validity.

Patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. *1277 This presumption dissipates, however, by a showing that pertinent prior art was not cited to the patent examiners. Hewlett-Packard Company v. Tel-Design, Inc., 460 F.2d 625, 628-629 (9th Cir. 1972); Ceco Corp. v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc., 557 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1977). 6 Prior art is pertinent if it discloses something not disclosed by the other prior art; in other words, it may not be cumulative. Speed Shore Corp. v. Denda, 605 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1979).

NDM argues that the trial court improperly denied its patents the benefit of the presumption. NDM concedes that five pieces of prior art were not considered by the patent examiners. It argues, however, that the “prior pertinent art not considered” exception should not invalidate the statutory presumption because four pieces of the prior art were not pertinent and the other was inadmissible. NDM’s argument is not convincing.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court’s failure to make an express finding that the statutory presumption had been overcome was not prejudicial error. Hewlett-Packard Company v. Tel-Design, Inc., supra, 460 F.2d at 628.

The district court correctly believed that the two British articles 7 describing a “Devices Electrode” were prior pertinent art not considered by the patent examiners. The Devices Electrode, described by the British Publications, had a snap fastener remote from the rim of the cup member of the electrode, projecting through and supported by the base of the cup member. 8 Yet, during the prosecution of the ’807 patent, NDM’s attorney stated the following to the examiner:

“. . . it is submitted that there is no teaching in ... [the] prior art of record that the snap fastner be remote from the mouth or rim of the cup member, or that the snap fastner project through and be supported by the base of the cup member.” (Exh. A-5 p. 53).

Thus, these British articles, which appeared before the ’807 patent was issued and were not before the patent examiners, were pertinent prior art. They were not cumulative in describing an electrode with a snap fastener remote from the rim.

Therefore, substantial evidence exists for the trial court to have denied NDM the benefit of the presumption. The presumption was overcome by prior pertinent art not before the patent examiners.

Obviousness.

Although obviousness is a legal determination, it is based on a three part factual test set forth in the landmark ease of Graham v. John Deere, Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). The trial court must determine (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) ascertain the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and (3) measure their differences by the level of ordinary skill possessed by a person familiar with the pertinent art. Relevant subconsiderations include the commercial success of the invention, the extent to which it resolved long-felt needs, and the difficulty of the problem solved by the invention.

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641 F.2d 1274, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1084, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ndm-corporation-v-hayes-products-inc-and-joseph-h-johnson-ca9-1981.