1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Daniel NDIZEYE, Case No.: 24-cv-0882-AGS-BLM
4 ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 5 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. (ECF 6), (2) DISMISSING ACTION, 6 (3) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT
7 OF MANDAMUS (ECF 9), AND Judge Carolyn CAIETTI, (4) DENYING MOTION FOR 8 Defendant. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION 9 (ECF 7)
10 Plaintiff Daniel Ndizeye, proceeding without an attorney, is suing a state-court judge 11 for denying a motion for her disqualification. He also requests to proceed in forma 12 pauperis, that is, without paying the court’s filing fees. As explained below, his IFP 13 application is denied because it does not provide sufficient detail. But even if his financial 14 situation qualified him, his claim would not survive mandatory screening. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. IFP Application 17 Parties instituting civil actions in United States district courts must pay $405 in filing 18 fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. 19 Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). But plaintiffs granted the right to proceed IFP need 20 not pay those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish 21 IFP status, applicants must allege poverty “with some particularity, definiteness and 22 certainty.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). 23 Ndizeye’s application states that his income is zero dollars. (ECF 6, at 4–5.) But this 24 contradicts his statement that he has “income derived from financial aid.” (Id. at 1.) His 25 application also surprisingly indicates that he has no expenditures, including a purported 26 zero dollars spent on food, clothing, and housing. (Id. at 4–5.) 27 While an income of zero dollars, even against no monthly expenses, would generally 28 qualify a party for IFP status, Ndizeye’s filing does not allege poverty with the required 1 “particularity, definiteness and certainty.” See Jefferson, 277 F.2d at 725. A particularly 2 pleaded application might, for example, list college financial aid support as an income 3 source alongside any corresponding expenditures. 4 Without a properly completed application, this Court “is left with questions that 5 could go to the accuracy and completeness of the affidavit.” See Peter J. v. Kijakazi, No. 6 23-cv-02240-JLB, 2023 WL 9111249, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2023) (denying IFP motion 7 “devoid of any information about the resources indicating how [plaintiff] supports 8 himself”). The Court therefore denies Ndizeye’s IFP motion. Despite the inadequacy of 9 Ndizeye’s IFP application, the Court addresses his complaint as well. 10 B. Screening and Dismissal 11 Courts must screen IFP claims and dismiss them when appropriate. 12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 13 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 14 complaint that fails to state a claim”). 15 1. Requested Relief 16 Ndizeye alleges that Judge Caietti violated state statutes when she “unjustly presided 17 over her own disqualification proceedings.” (ECF 1, at 1.) He is now suing Judge Caietti 18 in her “official capacity as a judge of the Superior Court of California” with four relief 19 requests. (ECF 1, at 1, 4, 9–10.) Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, he seeks 20 (1) “review and reversal of any procedural and substantive decisions made under the 21 influence of [Judge Caietti’s purported] bias,” (2) “an order enjoining [Judge Caietti] from 22 any further proceedings in Plaintiff’s [state court] case and any related actions,” 23 (3) declaratory relief that her actions were “unlawful and invalid,” and (4) unspecified 24 “damages.” (Id. at 4, 9–10.) Ndizeye also named the San Diego County Superior Court of 25 California as a “nominal defendant” “for the effective granting of the declaratory and 26 injunctive relief sought.” (Id. at 2.) 27 2. Judicial Disqualification and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.3(d) 28 The crux of Ndizeye’s complaint is Judge Caietti’s alleged determination of the 1 merits of her own disqualification. (Id. at 1.) But the only avenue to raise a judicial 2 disqualification challenge is by a writ of mandate from the state court of appeal within 3 10 days of the state court’s disqualification decision. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.3(d); see 4 also North Am. Title Co. v. Superior Ct., 308 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 785 (Ct. App. 2023), rev’d 5 on other grounds, 557 P.3d 1180 (2024) (“writ review is the exclusive method for seeking 6 review of claims of statutory disqualification,” such as “disqualification of a judge”). 7 Ndizeye has leveled his complaint in the wrong place at the wrong time, as this is not a 8 state appeals court, and more than 10 days have passed since the disqualification 9 determination at issue. (See ECF 1-3, at 2.) Moreover, Judge Caietti’s judicial immunity 10 and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar this Court’s review of his claims. 11 3. Judicial Immunity 12 “A judge is absolutely immune from liability for [her] judicial acts even if [her] 13 exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. 14 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Judicial immunity shields judges in all but two 15 circumstances: (1) when a judge’s actions are “nonjudicial,” meaning the actions are “not 16 taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” and (2) when a judge’s actions, “though judicial in 17 nature, [are] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Acres Bonusing, Inc v. 18 Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 915 (9th Cir. 2021). Courts “broadly construe the scope of 19 immunity,” and “exceptions to immunity should be narrow.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 20 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 n.1 (5th Cir. 21 1985)). 22 First, when assessing whether a judge’s behavior was “nonjudicial,” courts look to 23 whether the act “is a function normally performed by a judge,” and whether the parties 24 “dealt with the judge in [her] judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). 25 Here, the alleged behavior involved Judge Caietti deciding a disqualification motion’s 26 merits. (ECF 1, at 1.) This is squarely within the bounds of “a function normally performed 27 by a judge.” See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. And Ndizeye “dealt” with Judge Caietti by filing 28 court motions, so he “dealt with the judge in [her] judicial capacity.” (ECF 1, at 6–7); see 1 Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Judge Caietti’s behavior was, therefore, “judicial” in this case.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Daniel NDIZEYE, Case No.: 24-cv-0882-AGS-BLM
4 ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 5 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. (ECF 6), (2) DISMISSING ACTION, 6 (3) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT
7 OF MANDAMUS (ECF 9), AND Judge Carolyn CAIETTI, (4) DENYING MOTION FOR 8 Defendant. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION 9 (ECF 7)
10 Plaintiff Daniel Ndizeye, proceeding without an attorney, is suing a state-court judge 11 for denying a motion for her disqualification. He also requests to proceed in forma 12 pauperis, that is, without paying the court’s filing fees. As explained below, his IFP 13 application is denied because it does not provide sufficient detail. But even if his financial 14 situation qualified him, his claim would not survive mandatory screening. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. IFP Application 17 Parties instituting civil actions in United States district courts must pay $405 in filing 18 fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. 19 Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). But plaintiffs granted the right to proceed IFP need 20 not pay those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish 21 IFP status, applicants must allege poverty “with some particularity, definiteness and 22 certainty.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). 23 Ndizeye’s application states that his income is zero dollars. (ECF 6, at 4–5.) But this 24 contradicts his statement that he has “income derived from financial aid.” (Id. at 1.) His 25 application also surprisingly indicates that he has no expenditures, including a purported 26 zero dollars spent on food, clothing, and housing. (Id. at 4–5.) 27 While an income of zero dollars, even against no monthly expenses, would generally 28 qualify a party for IFP status, Ndizeye’s filing does not allege poverty with the required 1 “particularity, definiteness and certainty.” See Jefferson, 277 F.2d at 725. A particularly 2 pleaded application might, for example, list college financial aid support as an income 3 source alongside any corresponding expenditures. 4 Without a properly completed application, this Court “is left with questions that 5 could go to the accuracy and completeness of the affidavit.” See Peter J. v. Kijakazi, No. 6 23-cv-02240-JLB, 2023 WL 9111249, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2023) (denying IFP motion 7 “devoid of any information about the resources indicating how [plaintiff] supports 8 himself”). The Court therefore denies Ndizeye’s IFP motion. Despite the inadequacy of 9 Ndizeye’s IFP application, the Court addresses his complaint as well. 10 B. Screening and Dismissal 11 Courts must screen IFP claims and dismiss them when appropriate. 12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 13 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 14 complaint that fails to state a claim”). 15 1. Requested Relief 16 Ndizeye alleges that Judge Caietti violated state statutes when she “unjustly presided 17 over her own disqualification proceedings.” (ECF 1, at 1.) He is now suing Judge Caietti 18 in her “official capacity as a judge of the Superior Court of California” with four relief 19 requests. (ECF 1, at 1, 4, 9–10.) Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, he seeks 20 (1) “review and reversal of any procedural and substantive decisions made under the 21 influence of [Judge Caietti’s purported] bias,” (2) “an order enjoining [Judge Caietti] from 22 any further proceedings in Plaintiff’s [state court] case and any related actions,” 23 (3) declaratory relief that her actions were “unlawful and invalid,” and (4) unspecified 24 “damages.” (Id. at 4, 9–10.) Ndizeye also named the San Diego County Superior Court of 25 California as a “nominal defendant” “for the effective granting of the declaratory and 26 injunctive relief sought.” (Id. at 2.) 27 2. Judicial Disqualification and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.3(d) 28 The crux of Ndizeye’s complaint is Judge Caietti’s alleged determination of the 1 merits of her own disqualification. (Id. at 1.) But the only avenue to raise a judicial 2 disqualification challenge is by a writ of mandate from the state court of appeal within 3 10 days of the state court’s disqualification decision. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.3(d); see 4 also North Am. Title Co. v. Superior Ct., 308 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 785 (Ct. App. 2023), rev’d 5 on other grounds, 557 P.3d 1180 (2024) (“writ review is the exclusive method for seeking 6 review of claims of statutory disqualification,” such as “disqualification of a judge”). 7 Ndizeye has leveled his complaint in the wrong place at the wrong time, as this is not a 8 state appeals court, and more than 10 days have passed since the disqualification 9 determination at issue. (See ECF 1-3, at 2.) Moreover, Judge Caietti’s judicial immunity 10 and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar this Court’s review of his claims. 11 3. Judicial Immunity 12 “A judge is absolutely immune from liability for [her] judicial acts even if [her] 13 exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. 14 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Judicial immunity shields judges in all but two 15 circumstances: (1) when a judge’s actions are “nonjudicial,” meaning the actions are “not 16 taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” and (2) when a judge’s actions, “though judicial in 17 nature, [are] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Acres Bonusing, Inc v. 18 Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 915 (9th Cir. 2021). Courts “broadly construe the scope of 19 immunity,” and “exceptions to immunity should be narrow.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 20 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 n.1 (5th Cir. 21 1985)). 22 First, when assessing whether a judge’s behavior was “nonjudicial,” courts look to 23 whether the act “is a function normally performed by a judge,” and whether the parties 24 “dealt with the judge in [her] judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). 25 Here, the alleged behavior involved Judge Caietti deciding a disqualification motion’s 26 merits. (ECF 1, at 1.) This is squarely within the bounds of “a function normally performed 27 by a judge.” See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. And Ndizeye “dealt” with Judge Caietti by filing 28 court motions, so he “dealt with the judge in [her] judicial capacity.” (ECF 1, at 6–7); see 1 Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Judge Caietti’s behavior was, therefore, “judicial” in this case. 2 Second, when determining whether “the judge acted with jurisdiction, courts focus 3 on whether the judge was acting clearly beyond the scope of subject matter jurisdiction.” 4 Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076. And “[w]here not clearly lacking subject matter jurisdiction, 5 a judge is entitled to immunity.” Id. So, for example, “if a probate judge, with jurisdiction 6 over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear 7 absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action.” Stump, 8 435 U.S. at 357 n.7. But if “a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a 9 nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be 10 immune.” Id. 11 Here, Ndizeye has presented no evidence suggesting that Judge Caietti is anything 12 but a civil judge who issued a civil ruling in his civil case, so she also “acted with 13 jurisdiction.” See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076. Thus, Judge Caietti is “absolutely immune 14 from liability for” the claims that Ndizeye alleges. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 359. 15 But even if Judge Caietti were not immune from the claims Ndizeye presents, the 16 Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court’s review of those claims. 17 4. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 18 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs that federal district courts are without 19 jurisdiction to hear direct appeals from the judgments of state courts.”1 Cooper v. Ramos, 20 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). District courts are also barred from reviewing “de facto 21
22 23 1 As far as the Court can tell, the state court issued a final judgment in Ndizeye’s case when “Judge Caietti dismissed the underlying case” “on purported grounds of the 24 statute of limitations”—so Rooker-Feldman provides the appropriate analytical 25 framework. (ECF 1, at 7.) To the extent the case was still ongoing, Younger abstention would likely require dismissal because “the ability of the courts” of each state “to 26 determine when recusal of a judge or justice is appropriate and to administer the recusal 27 decision process in accordance with state law operates uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Aaron v. O’Connor, 914 F.3d 1010, 28 1 appeal[s]” that involve a plaintiff who “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed 2 by the state court[] and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 3 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 First, Ndizeye’s request that this Court “review and revers[e]” “any procedural and 5 substantive decisions made under the influence of [Judge Caitti’s purported] bias” asks this 6 Court to do exactly what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. (ECF 1, at 4); see Cooper, 704 F.3d 7 at 777. Only the “United States Supreme Court, not the lower federal courts,” have 8 “appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 777. So this Court 9 cannot “review and revers[e]” the decision, and this claim fails. (See ECF 1, at 4.) 10 Rooker-Feldman also bars district courts from reviewing claims that are 11 “inextricably intertwined” with the prohibited direct or de facto appeal of a state court 12 judgment. Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778–79. Claims are “inextricably intertwined” when 13 “federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.” 14 Id. at 779 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., 15 concurring)). And the Ninth Circuit has found that claims are “inextricably intertwined” 16 when the requested federal action would “void” a state court ruling. Id. (quoting Fontana 17 Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)). 18 Here, Ndizeye’s reversal request is “inextricably intertwined” with his various 19 requests for a de facto appeal—that this Court “enjoin[ Judge Caietti] from any further 20 proceedings in Plaintiff’s [state-court] case,” issue declaratory relief that her actions were 21 “unlawful and invalid,” and order unspecified “damages.” (See ECF 1, at 4, 9–10.) For 22 example, Ndizeye is asking the Court to enjoin Judge Caitti’s participation in “any” of 23 Ndizeye’s “further proceedings.” (Id. at 10.) This would effectively “void” Judge Caietti’s 24 decision to continue presiding in the case. Similarly, declaring that Judge Caietti’s alleged 25 failure to refer the disqualification issue to another judge was “unlawful” or “invalid” 26 would also require this Court to declare her decision—a state-court decision—“void.” (See 27 id. at 9); Cooper, 704 F.3d at 779. The requests are therefore “inextricably intertwined” 28 with Ndizeye’s request that this Court “review and revers[e]” that state court decision. See 1 ||id. They fail under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the request for damages on account 2 || of the failed claims is correspondingly denied. 3 Finally, because all Ndizeye’s claims against Judge Caietti fail, his claims against 4 ||the San Diego County Superior Court as a “nominal defendant” “for the effective granting 5 || of the declaratory and injunctive relief sought” fail as well. (See ECF 1, at 2.) 6 ||C. Leave to Amend 7 “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless 8 is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 9 ||amendment.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). 10 || Although the Court considers it unlikely that Ndizeye can overcome his complaint’s 11 || deficiencies, that result is not “absolutely clear.” He therefore may amend his complaint to 12 || correct the deficiencies identified in this order. 13 CONCLUSION 14 Ndizeye’s IFP motion is DENIED, and his complaint is DISMISSED with leave to 15 ||}amend. His (1) petition for a writ of mandamus to promptly rule on his IFP motion and 16 motion for expedited consideration are both DENIED as moot. 17 By January 21, 2025, Ndizeye must file any amended complaint, remedying the 18 identified deficiencies. If he fails to do so by that date, the Court may enter a final order 19 || dismissing this case, based both on his failure to state a claim and his failure to prosecute 20 compliance with a court order requiring amendment. “If a plaintiff does not take 21 || advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal 22 || of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.” Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 23 || (9th Cir. 2005). 24 Dated: December 23, 2024 25 4 □ 26 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 27 28 6 _