Nazario v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico

98 P.R. 827
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedMarch 17, 1970
DocketNo. O-69-105
StatusPublished

This text of 98 P.R. 827 (Nazario v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nazario v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 98 P.R. 827 (prsupreme 1970).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Rigau

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On December 21, 1966, the Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico appearing “in representation and on behalf” of several employees of Hotel Americana in this city filed, in the Superior Court, San Juan Part, a complaint concerning a claim for wages. The claim covers the period from the year 1956 to the year 19 65.1

Respondent having filed a motion to dismiss, the Superior Court, by a well-grounded order of June 27, 1968, granted the motion by reason that the collective bargaining agreement which bounded the parties provided for the settlement of all the disputes which might arise out of said agreement [829]*829through arbitration. The court denied the complaint without prejudice that the petitioners would resort to the arbitration proceeding established in the collective bargaining agreement.

The Secretary of Labor filed a motion for reconsideration and by its order of March 13, 1969 the trial court set aside ■its previous order by which it had dismissed the complaint and granted the motion for reconsideration in part and denied it in part. It granted it as to the period from 1956 to January 25,1963, claim which it determined need not be submitted to arbitration, and denied it as to the period subsequent to said date, claim which it determined had to be submitted to arbitration. The court relied on the decision of this Court in Pérez v. Water Resources Authority, 87 P.R.R. 110 (1963), in Withington v. R.C.A. Communications, Inc., R-64-148, judgment of March 18, 1966, and on the text of the collective bargaining agreement. The court denied respondent’s second motion for reconsideration requesting that the court order that the claim as a whole should be submitted to arbitration.

Petitioner alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:

1. That it split the case submitting the claim to two forums.

2. That it failed to consider the summary nature of this type of claim and the plaintiff status of the Secretary of Labor.

3. That it failed to consider the public policy embodied in the Minimum Wage Act, in Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961 (32 L.P.R.A. § 3118 et seq.), in the mandatory decrees, and in the capacity of the Secretary in these claims.

4. That it erred in ordering part of the case to be settled by arbitration.

The errors assigned were not committed. Since the error committed concerning the Secretary is basically one of ap[830]*830proach, we shall make a recital of the situation and then we shall set forth specific conclusions on the case and on the errors assigned.

In Pérez, supra, we decided that the controversies concerning wages may be submitted to the procedure of arbitration, or excluded therefrom as agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement. In said case we decided that what was established therein would be prospectively applied only “In the belief that the arbitration provisions of the agreements already entered into were not drawn up and approved by the parties, having in mind the ruling [therein] announced.” The date of our decision in Pérez is January 25, 1968. The foregoing accounts for the fact that in the case at bar the trial court considered said date as the borderline date in its aforementioned order of March 13, 1969.

In Withington v. R.C.A. Communications, supra, in view of a situation quite similar to that of the case at bar, we stated that the claim covering periods prior to January 25, 1963 need not be submitted to arbitration, but that the claim arising out of an agreement subsequent to said date, and which was covered by an arbitration clause, would be submitted to arbitration.

We have already established that arbitration, as well as the grievance committees and the courts, are different mechanisms or forums proper for the elucidation of certain labor-management controversies and that said controversies may involve wages, if so agreed upon, but once they are elucidated in the forum established in the agreement, the laws shall determine the manner in which said salaries shall be paid. Therefore, the employees’ right to recover unpaid wages at the legal rate is not lost for having agreed to resort to arbitration. The provisions of law concerning working hours and wages embody the public policy of the country as to those matters, are part of the labor contract, and the arbitration [831]*831awards cannot violate them. Beauchamp v. Dorado Beach Hotel, ante, p. 622, decided February 12, 1970; Martínez v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 92 P.R.R. 673 (1965); Encarnación v. Jordán, 78 P.R.R. 481 (1955).

The Secretary considers that to decide in the sense the Superior Court did, upholding the strength and validity of collective bargaining — the agreement is the result thereof and arbitration is part of the same and it is its continuation— would be “taking a retrospective step in the well-deserved conquests of the working classes.” Let us examine this idea since it constitutes the underlying thought which apparently is the leitmotif of the contentions raised herein by the Secretary. Believing that to decide'upholding the supremacy, within the limits of the law, of course, of collective bargaining and its consequences, is a step backwards, implies, in our opinion, a superficial view of the problem and an improper concept of the function of arbitration in labor-management relations.

The relations between the working classes and the employer, insofar as said classes have conflicting interests (the determination of each class to obtain the most from its contribution), generate certain degree of tension. This tension may be sometimes meager and very serious at other times. Collective bargaining is a social and peaceful means to render said tension tolerable and to maintain the labor-management relations operating fruitfully. It is social because it is not individual. Experience has shown that the workers individually could not confront the economic force of the employer. But considering its vast number, within the democratic system, the workers constitute a great political force. When they acquired consciousness thereof, they were able to transform said political force into labor legislation. It is fair to point out that frequently they relied therefor, everywhere, on the leadership of persons from the upper classes, but having liberal ideas. Labor legislation guaranteed the right to unionize and negotiate collectively. But those rights, as .it happens with every [832]*832right, are not attained by' themselves. Somebody must assert, exercise, and defend them. That is the role of the labor movement and of the labor unions.

Without a labor movement sufficiently strong to invoke and exercise them, those rights would be barely effective. The existence of strong and active labor unions is already a reality in our medium. They can only be maintained like that if they are permitted to exercise their function.

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Bluebook (online)
98 P.R. 827, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nazario-v-superior-court-of-puerto-rico-prsupreme-1970.