Nazario Chavez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 28, 2006
• Docket: 01-05-00647-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued September 28, 2006

Opinion issued September 28, 2006

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-05-00647-CR

NAZARIO CHAVEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 22195

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury found appellant, Nazario Chavez, guilty of the third-degree felony offense of possession of methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as ecstasy, in the amount of more than one gram and less than four grams.[1]  The trial court assessed punishment at five years’ confinement, suspended for five years’ community supervision, and fined him $3,500.  In one issue, Chavez contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance.  We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient and therefore affirm.

Background

          In July 2003, while patrolling Interstate 45 in Walker County, Trooper Jeff Fisher pulled over a pickup truck without a license plate light.  Fisher approached the truck and noticed four occupants: two adult males in the front seat and two minor females in the back.  Fisher identified the driver as Steve Robledo and the front passenger as Chavez.

Fisher recognized a package of zigzag rolling papers and a vitamin bottle in the vehicle’s front cup holder between Robledo and Chavez, and asked if there was any marihuana in the truck.  Robledo indicated that the vitamin bottle contained marihuana and handed it to Fisher.  Fisher testified that, as Robledo reached for the bottle, Chavez shook his head in the negative at Robledo.  Fisher opened the bottle and discovered a bag of marihuana, a small amount of cocaine, and a smaller bag containing pills.  Testing later confirmed that the pills were ecstasy, weighing 2.32 grams.  Fisher directed Robledo to exit the vehicle and then arrested him.  Fisher testified that, after his arrest, Robledo admitted ownership of the marihuana.  Fisher returned to the vehicle and questioned Chavez, who also indicated that the marihuana belonged to Robledo, but conceded that the pills belonged to him.  Fisher then arrested Chavez.  Neither Robledo nor Chavez admitted ownership of the cocaine.  

Analysis

Standard of Review

In a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  Although our analysis considers all of the evidence presented at trial, we may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.  King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Possession of a Controlled Substance

On appeal, Chavez contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for possession of ecstasy because the State failed to establish an affirmative link between Chavez and the ecstasy.  Specifically, Chavez maintains that Fisher’s testimony fails to establish such a link, but rather the State’s evidence more closely connects Robledo to the ecstasy than Chavez.

          A person commits third-degree felony possession if he knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance in an amount greater than one gram and less than four grams.  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.116(c) (Vernon 2003).  In order to establish the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must show that the accused (1) exercised care, custody, control, or management over the contraband and (2) knew that he possessed contraband.  Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Edwards v. State, 178 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).  If the accused did not exclusively possess the place where the contraband was found, we may not conclude that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless additional independent facts and circumstances affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.  Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406; Edwards, 178 S.W.3d at 143.  Factors that may establish an affirmative link include whether

(1) the contraband was in plain view; (2) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (3) the accused was the owner of the place where the contraband was found; (4) the accused was the driver of the automobile in which the contraband was found; (5) the contraband was found on the same side of the car seat as the accused was sitting; (6) the place where the contraband was found was enclosed; (7) the odor of [the contraband] was present; (8) paraphernalia to use the contraband was in view of or found on the accused; (9) conduct by the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt; (10) the accused has a special connection to the contraband; (11) occupants of the automobile gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; (12) the physical condition of the accused indicated recent consumption of the contraband found in the car; and (13) affirmative statements connecting the accused to the contraband.  

Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d); see also Edwards, 178 S.W.3d at 143.  The number of affirmative links present is not as important as the logical force that they collectively create.  Edwards, 178 S.W.3d at 144; Gilbert, 874 S.W.2d at 298.  We need not consider affirmative link factors that are absent from the evidence.  Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

          Here, the applicable factors establish a basis for a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Chavez possessed the ecstasy.  Fisher testified that Chavez made an affirmative statement in which he confessed to ownership of the contraband.  Chavez testified that he made no admission of guilt to Fisher.  On appeal, Chavez contends the evidence provided by the State lacks legal sufficiency because the testimony given by Fisher and Chavez conflicts, and the Department of Public Safety destroyed the only evidence affirmatively linking Chavez to the ecstasy when it recycled a videotape of the traffic stop and arrest.  In an appeal of legal sufficiency, however, we consider the evidence favorable to the verdict, even if it is disputed.  Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817.  The failure to preserve the videotape and Chavez’s denial are some countervailing evidence, but in a legal sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses, as the jury may accept or reject all or part of a witness’s testimony.  Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.  Fisher’s testimony provided a rational jury with sufficient evidence to conclude that Chavez knew of his possession.  See Reed v. State, 158 S.W.3d 44, 47–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding that testimony of appellant’s admission at time of arrest was strongest affirmative link to cocaine).

In addition to Chavez’s admission, the ecstasy’s location in the cup holder made it conveniently accessible to Chavez.  “Conveniently accessible” means that the contraband must be within close vicinity of the accused and easily accessible while in the vehicle so as to suggest that the accused had knowledge of the contraband and exercised control over it.  Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).  Chavez contends the State’s evidence establishes the strongest affirmative link to Robledo and not Chavez.  The fact that Robledo also had access to the ecstasy, however, does not necessarily associate the strongest or only affirmative link with him.  See Brazier v. State, 748 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (holding that affirmative link existed between front passenger and contraband found inside armrest situated between driver and passenger).  Even if an affirmative link also exists between Robledo and the contraband, the law does not require the State to prove Chavez’s exclusive possession for a conviction.  Cedano v. State, 24 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). 

  Finally, Chavez’s conduct during the traffic stop strengthens his association with the ecstasy.  When Robledo reached for the contraband to give it to Fisher, Chavez shook his head in the negative at Robledo.  The jury reasonably could have inferred that this behavior demonstrated Chavez knew the vitamin bottle contained contraband.  See Hurtado, 881 S.W.2d at 743 (holding that “appellant’s nervousness and unusual conduct in the manner of his frequent glances toward the particular place where the contraband was found” constituted affirmative link); see also Reed, 158 S.W.3d at 48 (explaining that appellant and partner established affirmative link by “put[ting] their heads down to the ground as if they were caught”).

Conclusion

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Chavez knowingly possessed the ecstasy.  We therefore hold that legally sufficient evidence supports the conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          Jane Bland

                                                          Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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[1] See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.116(c) (Vernon 2003).