Nazar Rozyyev v. Pamela Bondi, et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Nazar Rozyyev, No. CV-26-00371-PHX-KML (JFM)

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Pamela Bondi, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Petitioner Nazar Rozyyev is a citizen of Turkmenistan who applied for admission 16 and asylum at the Brownsville Port of Entry in February 2024. (Docs. 1 at 15; 4 at 2.) He 17 “was granted discretionary parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).” (Doc. 4 at 2.) That parole 18 was set to expire on April 18, 2025. (Doc. 6-2 at 2.) Rozyyev did not depart prior to the 19 expiration of his parole and, in January 2026, “was re-encountered by ICE” and arrested. 20 (Doc. 6-2 at 2.) Rozyyev is currently being held at the Eloy Detention Center. (Doc. 6-2 at 21 2.) 22 On January 21, 2026, Rozyyev filed a habeas petition seeking release from custody. 23 (Doc. 1.) That petition was premised on Rozyyev’s assertion that he was “subject to the 24 detention authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226,” not the detention authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 25 (Doc. 1 at 11.) On that basis, Rozyyev alleged he was entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 1 26 at 3-4.) Respondents filed a response arguing Rozyyev instead “presented at a Port of Entry 27 and was designated as an arriving alien,” so “is subject to mandatory detention under 8 28 1 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) until his removal proceedings conclude.” (Doc. 4 at 3.)1 Rozyyev 2 then changed his arguments significantly on reply. 3 The reply claimed respondents ignored the “dispositive feature of this case”: that 4 Rozyyev had been paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 5 at 5 2.) Rozyyev argued that “[o]nce the Government confers liberty through parole, it may not 6 recapture that liberty through summary arrest and conclusory labels.” (Doc. 5 at 2.) “The 7 Due Process Clause and the parole statute”—according to Rozyyev—“require lawful, 8 individualized procedures before re-detention, including notice, a reasoned explanation 9 tied to individualized facts, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. 5 at 1-2.) In 10 other words, the reply changed the focus of Rozyyev’s claims and arguments from an 11 alleged entitlement to a bond hearing as an alien detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 to an 12 alleged constitutional and statutory entitlement to pre-revocation procedures as an alien 13 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and subsequently paroled. 14 The same day Rozyyev filed his reply, respondents filed a motion seeking leave to 15 file a declaration outlining Rozyyev’s immigration history. (Doc. 6.) That declaration 16 included the fact that Rozyyev’s parole expired on April 18, 2025. (Doc. 6-2 at 2.) Rozyyev 17 did not respond to respondents’ motion to file the declaration. Instead, three months later 18 he filed a motion to expedite. That motion acknowledges respondents’ declaration but does 19 not object to its filing or address any of its contents. (Doc. 8.) 20 The claims in the original petition were based on the allegation that Rozyyev was 21 “subject to the detention authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) Rozyyev appears to 22 have abandoned that position. At the very least, the evidence provided by respondents 23 establishes Rozyyev is not subject to the procedures provided in § 1226. Rozyyev therefore 24 has not carried his burden of proving he is entitled to relief under the claims asserted in his 25 petition. See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In . . . federal 26 habeas proceedings, it is the petitioner who bears the burden of proving his case.”). 27 The court will assume Rozyyev was entitled to change his theory of relief to one 28 1 Respondents later provided exhibits supporting that assertion. (See Doc. 6-2 at 4.) 1 that his current detention is unlawful because he was not provided pre-revocation 2 procedures. But even that theory fails because the Ninth Circuit has determined the 3 applicable parole statute does not create a protectable liberty interest in temporary parole, 4 and the parole regulations did not create a protectable liberty interest under the uncontested 5 facts. 6 In Wong v. United States, Kwai Fun Wong had been paroled into the country under 7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See 373 F.3d 952, 958 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other 8 grounds as recognized by Pettibone v. Russell, 59 F.4th 449, 452-53 (9th Cir. 2023). 9 Shortly afterwards, an official revoked Wong’s parole and she was removed from the 10 United States. Id. at 959. Wong later filed a damages suit alleging, among other claims, 11 that “officials violated her procedural due process rights by revoking her temporary parole” 12 before resolving a pending “adjustment of status application.” Id. at 967. The Ninth Circuit 13 rejected this claim because it could “discern no substantive liberty or property interest . . . 14 in temporary parole status.” Id. at 968. According to the court, the language of 15 § 1182(d)(5)(A) made “clear that whether and for how long temporary parole is granted 16 are matters entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General[,]” so Wong had no 17 “liberty interest in temporary parole that [was] protected by the Fifth Amendment.” Id. 18 There is no dispute Rozyyev was an arriving alien temporarily paroled into the 19 United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Doc. 5 at 1 (conceding in reply that 20 “the Government exercised its discretion to parole Petitioner into the United States under 21 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).”).) In that posture, Rozyyev was only entitled to the procedural 22 due process rights provided by statute. See Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 23 2015); accord Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138-40 (2020). 24 And the Ninth Circuit has squarely decided that the statute applicable to Rozyyev does not 25 confer a “substantive liberty or property interest” in temporary parole. Wong, 373 F.3d at 26 968. Wong’s determination that Rozyyev’s parole statute does not confer a liberty interest 27 protected by the Fifth Amendment forecloses the argument on which his reply rests. 28 In some circumstances, it could be possible for a regulation to confer a 1 constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest. See, e.g., Sterling v. Feek, 150 F.4th 2 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2025). Rozyyev only hints at that argument. (See Doc. 5 at 5-6 (citing 3 Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1145-46 (D. Or. 2025).) To the extent Rozyyev 4 intended to raise such a claim, the regulation that indisputably applied to him would not 5 support his position. 6 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) outlines procedures for the termination of parole, including 7 “written notice” in certain situations. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e); see also Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 8 3d at 1145-146 (discussing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i)). But that same regulation also makes 9 clear parole is “automatically terminated without written notice . . . at the expiration of the 10 time for which parole was authorized.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). Rozyyev has not disputed 11 that his parole expired April 18, 2025, long before he was encountered. The regulation did 12 not require he receive any written notice (or other form of advance notification) that his 13 parole had been revoked. 14 Neither the parole statute nor the regulation applicable to Rozyyev created a 15 constitutionally-protected interest. That means Rozyyev’s claim asserting entitlement to 16 pre-deprivation procedures fails at the first step, i.e. identification of “a liberty or property 17 interest which has been interfered with.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 18 454, 460 (1989). Rozyyev cites two orders from the District of Arizona that concluded a 19 temporary parolee had a liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.2 Other courts 20 have reached the same conclusion, although the factual situations in those cases may have 21 been different and most did not discuss Wong.3 At least one court outside the Ninth Circuit 22 has concluded an individual detained at the border and paroled in was not entitled to a 23 hearing before his parole was revoked. Palma v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 9340 (JPC), 2026 WL 24 697015, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2026). Here, the court need only analyze the potential 25 2 See, e.g., Osmonaliev v. Cantu, No. CV-25-03531-PHX-JJT, (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2025); 26 F.B. v. Noem, No. CV-25-04271-PHX-JJT (JZB), 2025 WL 3628652, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 4, 2025). 27 3 See, e.g., Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (no discussion of Wong); Y.M.M. v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-CV-02075, 2025 WL 3101782, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 28 Nov. 6, 2025) (same); Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (same). 1 || liberty interests created by the statutory and regulatory context applicable to Rozyyev, that 2|| 1s, to an arriving alien who was granted temporary parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), 3 || and whose parole had “automatically terminated without written notice” before he was 4|| arrested. In this situation, contrary to his only remaining argument, Rozyyev did not have 5 || a substantive liberty interest within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth 6 || Amendment. Wong, 373 F.3d at 968. His petition is therefore denied. 7 The court wishes to emphasize that its analysis is limited to the very specific facts 8 || of an alien whose documents accurately reflect he presented as “an arriving alien” at a port 9|| of entry, was granted parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and whose parole has expired || before he is encountered. Other factual and procedural postures will likely require different |) analysis and may result in a different outcome. 12 IT IS ORDERED the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion for Leave to File Exhibit (Doc. 6) is GRANTED. The document lodged at Doc. 7 shall be filed. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Expedite (Doc. 8) is DENIED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of || respondents and close this case. 18 Dated this 22nd day of May, 2026. 19 20 V, op A. G / Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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