Naylor v. Glasier

5 Duer 161
CourtThe Superior Court of New York City
DecidedDecember 31, 1855
StatusPublished

This text of 5 Duer 161 (Naylor v. Glasier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering The Superior Court of New York City primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Naylor v. Glasier, 5 Duer 161 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).

Opinion

By the Court. Hoffman, J.

Upon the appeal from the judgment in this case, two questions arise. First, whether the permit granted by the deputy street commissioner, to encumber the street by allowing the bricks to be placed upon the carriageway, was a lawful permit. This question arises under the excep- ' tion of the plaintiffs, to the charge of the Judge.

Next. Whether the notice to remove the bricks was sufficient; and whether the charge of the Judge was in this particular correct.

It is obvious, that if the permit was lawful, the removal was illegal. It must be so even if the defendant was ignorant of the permit.

On the 22d of May, 1854, a permit was granted by Charles Turner, deputy street commissioner, as follows:—“ Permission is given to Joseph Naylor, to place material on the carriage-way of the street in front of the building to be erected S. W. comer of [163]*163Broadway and Chambers street, for three months, provided such materials do not occupy more than one-third of the carriage-way in width, to be not more than ten feet in height, and one hundred feet in length of such carriage-way; and also, that the gutter along the sidewalk be kept clear and unencumbered to the breadth of two feet, and that the street remain so encumbered during the pleasure of the street commissioner.”

It is in evidence that the street commissioner is in the habit of giving such permits to builders to encumber streets during the progress of tearing down old buildings.

On the 27th of May, 1854, before twelve o’clock at noon, the notice to remove the bricks was posted upon the pile. It directed the removal on or before the 28th, at twelve o’clock, or the bricks would be taken to the public yard, to be disposed of, as the ordinances of the corporation direct, and was signed by the defendant, as commissioner of streets and lamps.

On the 29th of May, and between seven and eight o’clock in the evening, the bricks were delivered to the keeper of the corporation yard.

On the 7th of July, the plaintiff, for the first time, communicated with the defendant as to the removal of the bricks. The son of the plaintiff then went to the office to inquire where the bricks were; he was informed they were in the corporation yard. He asked for a bill, which was given him, dated Thursday. The charges are for cartage of 210 loads, and storage for forty days, $504.

It is plain that the plaintiff knew where to apply for his bricks, and that the amount of the last item is attributable to his own neglect or speculation.

The defendant, in his answer, justifies his removal of the bricks, under the 318th and 325th sections of the ordinance organizing the department, passed May 30th, 1849. The defendant was, at the time, commissioner of streets and lamps, the chief officer in the department of streets and lamps. ° In this department is a bureau, denominated “ The Bureau of Cleaning Streets,” charged with the duty of cleaning the streets,% and removing encumbrances therefrom, the chief officer of which is the superintendent of streets.

He then states, that the bricks were encumbering and obstruct[164]*164ing the streets, and that Erastus W. Glover, being at that time superintendent of streets, and chief officer of the bureau, did, in conformity with the ordinance aforesaid, order the bricks to be removed from the street, and on the failure of the owner to remove them, the said Glover did remove them to the public yard.

The charter of the 2d of April, 1849, provided, (§ 12,) that there should be an executive department, under the denomination of “The Street Department,” which shall have cognizance of opening, regulating, and paving streets, building and repairing wharves and piers, digging and building wells, and the construction of public roads when done by assessment: the filling up of sunken lots, under the ordinances of the common council, from the city inspector’s department. It shall also have cognizance of collecting the assessments connected with such expenditures. The chief officer shall be called the street commissioner. (Davies Laws, p. 206.)

The 11th section provided, that there shall be an executive department, to be denominated “ The Department of Streets and Lamps," which shall have cognizance of procuring the necessary supplies for, and of lighting the public streets and places lighted at the expense of the corporation, and of cleaning the public streets, and of collecting the revenue arising from the sale of manure, and also of transferring the butchers’ stalls in the public markets, the commissioner of streets and lamps. “ There shall be three bureaus in this department, and the chief officers thereof shall be called the superintendent of lamps and gas, superintendent of streets, and superintendent of markets.”

By the 19th section, it is declared lawful for the common council to establish such other departments and bureaus as they may deem the public interest may require, and to assign to them and those herein created, such duties as they may direct, not inconsistent with this act.

It would be very difficult to say to which department, under the charter, the power of removing obstructions on streets had been conferred. If upon the street department, it is solely by force of the word, “ regulating,” in the 12th section.

In the history of laws and ordinances respecting the streets of New York, I apprehend the received meaning of the word “regulating,” was the patching, grading, levelling, raising, or amending [165]*165the streets. These are the phrases used in the act of 1813, (section 175,) copied from former statutes.

If the department of streets and lamps claims the right, it is only by force of the power of supervising the cleaning of the public streets. This is, perhaps, a still slighter foundation.

I have not a doubt that an ordinance of the corporation, giving the power of removal, or of permission to obstruct, to either of these departments, or to any other department, would be perfectly valid.

The ordinances of May 30th, 1849, were adopted to carry out the new organization of' the city government.

Title 4 is entitled, “of the street department,” in the first article, and repeats, verbatim, the powers given in the 12th section of the charter.

The second article is entitled, “ of the street commissioner, his deputy, and clerks.”

By the 163d section, power is given to the street commissioner to direct the removal of any article or thing whatsoever, which may encumber or obstruct a street, wharf, or pier, in the city.

The second chapter of this article regulates the office of deputy street commissioner. No authority is given to him to direct the removal. The only section which bears upon the point, is the 184th, directing that he may perform such, duties as shall be assigned to him by the street commissioner. This means, that he may be authorized to perform a power vested in the commissioner; but there must be a regular written delegation, or such a custom known to the commissioner, as is equivalent to it.

The 286th section, under title 4, of the department of streets and lamps, repeats the language of the 14th section of the charter, but adds, after the words, “ cleaning the public streets,” &c., the clause, “ and removing encumbrances therefrom. ”

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Bluebook (online)
5 Duer 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/naylor-v-glasier-nysuperctnyc-1855.