IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
NAVOS, No. 87633-3-I
Respondent,
v. DIVISION ONE
JUSTYN MYLES BUSCH, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
CHUNG, J. — This is an appeal of an unlawful detainer action. The landlord, Navos, issued tenant Justyn Busch a notice of eviction that did not include a notice of the rights of individuals protected under the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and an accompanying certification form, as VAWA requires to evict tenants in federally subsidized housing. Busch sought dismissal of the unlawful detainer action for inadequate notice under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), ch. 59.18 RCW. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Navos was not required to include the VAWA forms with the notice because Busch did not allege he was a victim of domestic violence, and granted Navos a writ of restitution. Busch appealed. We conclude that VAWA requires covered housing providers to serve the HUD forms with all notices of eviction. However, based on the record here, the trial court did not err in denying Busch’s motion to dismiss because Navos substantially complied with VAWA’s notice requirements under the RLTA. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Justyn Busch began renting a unit from Navos at the Burien Heights Residences in 2021, subsidized by the federal government through the “Section 8 Project-Based Assistance Rental Voucher” program within the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See 34 U.S.C. § 12491; 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.1-.643 (establishing federal housing choice voucher program). In October 2022, Busch was arrested for felony threats with a weapon, assault, and aggravated assault at the apartment complex.
On June 2, 2023, Navos issued Busch a “30-Day Notice to Quit for Waste, Nuisance, or Unlawful Use of Premises” (30-day notice), identifying his October 2022 conduct and arrest as the reason for the notice. The 30-day notice that Navos provided to Busch included the following language concerning VAWA rights:
Under applicable HUD Regulations you are hereby notified of your legal rights as follows:
1. You have the right to defend this action in a court of law.
2. You have 10 days to discuss this termination with the landlord. The 10-day period begins on the date this notice is delivered to you.
3. If the lease violation(s) detailed herein is/are the result of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault or stalking, we want to insure that you understand your protections under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). VAWA protections are not only available to women, but are available equally to all individuals regardless of sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation. HUD’s Notice of Occupancy Rights under VAWA (form HUD-15380) [sic]
and HUD’s Certification of Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault or Stalking and Alternate Documentation (form HUD-5382) are attached to this notice. If this is applicable to you and you wish to exercise your rights under VAWA, you may do so by completing and submitting the Certification for (or other form of Alternate Documentation as specified in the Notice and Certification for) so it is received in the management office no later than 14 business days from the date of your receipt of this notice.
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The 30-day notice also included excerpts from the city of Burien “Renting in Burien Handbook,” a guide for landlords and tenants that included legal resources.
Busch did not vacate the premises, and Navos initiated an unlawful detainer action. At the show cause hearing, Busch argued that the action should be dismissed because the notice he received did not include the notice of rights required under the VAWA, specifically form HUD-5380, 1 and a certification form developed by the secretary of HUD, form HUD-5382. 2 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Navos was not required to include the VAWA forms in the notice because Busch did not allege he was a victim of domestic violence. The court found Busch in unlawful detainer and authorized a writ of restitution on December 17, 2024. Busch timely appeals. 3 DISCUSSION
An unlawful detainer action is “a statutorily created proceeding that provides an expedited method of resolving the right to possession of property.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 370-71, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). If a landlord succeeds in an unlawful detainer action, they may obtain a writ of restitution, which restores their right of possession. See RCW 59.18.370; see also RCW 59.20.040 (“RCW 59.18.370, and 59.18.380 through 59.18.410 shall be applicable to any action of . . . unlawful detainer
1 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Notice of Occupancy Rights Under the Violence Against
Women Act: Housing Rights for Victims, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/5380.pdf (HUD-5380).
2 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Certification of Domestic Violence, Dating Violence,
Sexual Assault, or Stalking, https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/5382.pdf (HUD-5382).
3 Navos filed three statements of additional authorities. Busch filed a response to the second
statement of additional authorities. Busch also filed a motion to strike the first statement, to which Navos responded, and Busch replied. Although Navos’s first statement of authorities response failed to “include a pinpoint citation . . . to a point argued orally,” as required by RAP 10.8(b), Navos did so in its response to Busch’s motion to strike. We therefore deny the motion to strike, but caution counsel to comply with RAP 10.8.
4
arising from a tenancy under the provisions of this chapter.”). “Chapters 59.12 and 59.18 are statutes in derogation of the common law and thus are strictly construed in favor of the tenant.” Randy Reynolds & Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 156, 437 P.3d 677 (2019).
The unlawful detainer statute “enumerates seven different ways that a tenant of real property may unlawfully detain the premises.” Indigo Real Est. Servs., Inc. v. Wadsworth, 169 Wn. App. 412, 420, 280 P.3d 506 (2012) (citing RCW 59.12.030). In five of those circumstances, the tenant’s liability for unlawful detainer is conditioned on whether the landlord served written notice. See RCW 59.12.030(2)-(6). Specifically, as relevant here, a landlord may evict a tenant if
[t]he tenant continues in possession after having received at least three days’ advance written notice to quit after he or she commits or permits waste or nuisance upon the premises, unlawful activity that affects the use and enjoyment of the premises, or other substantial or repeated and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises by the landlord or neighbors of the tenant.
RCW 59.18.650(2)(c).
“The notice period provides a tenant ‘with an opportunity to correct a breach before the commencement of an unlawful detainer proceeding.’ ” Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d 664, 679, 521 P.3d 212 (2022) (quoting Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 377). Therefore, “until the notice requirements are met, the tenant cannot be said to be unlawfully detaining the premises.” Sherwood Auburn LLC, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 680.
Accordingly, if a landlord provides inadequately clear notice, it may not “ ‘avail itself of the superior court's jurisdiction’ ” through an unlawful detainer action. Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle v. Bin, 163 Wn. App. 367, 374, 260 P.3d 900 (2011) (quoting
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Tacoma Rescue Mission v. Stewart, 155 Wn. App. 250, 254 n.9, 228 P.3d 1289 (2010)). If notice is deficient, the landlord cannot prove a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Hous. Auth. of City of Everett v. Terry, 114 Wn.2d 558, 564, 789 P.2d 745 (1990) (“Because it gave deficient notice, the Housing Authority could not prove a cause of action for unlawful detainer.”).
“Federal, state, and local governmental regulations may affect a landlord’s ability to evict tenants.” Hous. Auth. of County of King v. Knight, 4 Wn.3d 324, 330, 563 P.3d 1058 (2025). Under VAWA, an individual residing in a “covered housing program” “cannot lose housing, housing assistance, or homeless assistance . . . or be evicted just because [the individual is or was] a victim of VAWA violence/abuse.”4 The parties do not dispute that as a Section 8 housing provider, Navos is a “covered housing program” under 34 U.S.C. § 12491(a)(3). At issue here are VAWA requirements regarding notice of rights to tenants in a covered housing program.
VAWA requires covered housing programs to provide notice of VAWA rights in certain circumstances, including with notice of eviction, using forms developed by the HUD, 5 as follows:
(2) Provision Each public housing agency or owner or manager of housing assisted under a covered housing program shall provide the notice developed under paragraph (1), together with the form described in subsection (c)(3)(A), to an applicant for or tenants of housing assisted under a covered housing program—
....
4 See HUD-5380, supra note 1, at 3. For example, “a victim of VAWA abuse/violence that directly
results in repeated noise complaints and damage to property” cannot be evicted due to those noise complaints or property damage. Id.
5 Under VAWA, “[t]he Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall develop a notice of the
rights of individuals under this section.” 34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(1). The notice and forms described in 34 U.S.C. § 12491(c)(3)(A) and (d) were developed into forms HUD-5380 and HUD-5382, respectively. See HUD-5380, supra note 1, at 3; HUD-5382, supra note 2, at 3.
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(C) with any notification of eviction or notification of termination of assistance.
34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(2) (emphasis added). See also 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(a)(1), (2)(iii) (requiring covered housing providers to provide such notices “[w]ith any notification of eviction or notification of termination of assistance”).
Busch contends the court should have dismissed the unlawful detainer action because Navos failed to provide him with the required HUD-developed forms, HUD- 5380 and HUD-5382. 6 Navos responds that service of the forms is required only if the tenant is a victim of domestic violence. Navos argues in the alternative that it was required only to substantially comply with the notice requirement of VAWA and that the notice it provided satisfied this standard. We address each argument in turn.
I. Tenants Entitled to Notice of VAWA Rights Busch challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to notice of his VAWA rights because VAWA requires such notice only to victims of domestic violence (DV). We agree with Busch that this conclusion was erroneous.
VAWA is a federal statute. When we interpret federal statutes, our objective is to ascertain Congress’s intent. Hous. Auth. of the County of King v. Knight, 30 Wn. App. 2d 95, 99, 543 P.3d 891 (2024), aff’d, Knight, 4 Wn.3d 324 (2025). “ ‘[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then [we] must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’ ” Sherwood Auburn LLC, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 670 (alterations in original) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). To determine the plain meaning of a statute, we consider
6 There is no evidence in the record that Navos served Busch with forms HUD-5380 or HUD-5382 along with the 30-day notice.
7
“ ‘the ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of grammar, and the statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided for in the statute and related statutes.’ ” Linville v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 11 Wn. App. 2d 316, 321, 452 P.3d 1269 (2019) (quoting In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 839, 215 P.3d 166 (2009)). “ ‘Common sense informs our analysis, as we avoid absurd results in statutory interpretation.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345 (2008)). “If the statute is unambiguous after a review of the plain meaning, the court’s inquiry is at an end.” State v. Gray, 174 Wn.2d 920, 927, 280 P.3d 1110 (2012). Ambiguity “must arise from the language of the statute itself, not from considerations outside the statute.” Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d 194, 203-04, 142 P.3d 155 (2006).
The plain language of VAWA is clear: “[A] covered housing program shall provide the notice . . . to . . . tenants of housing assisted under a covered housing program . . . with any notification of eviction.” 34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(2)(C). The statute does not limit the tenants to whom notice must be provided to only survivors of DV. Rather, the unambiguous statutory language requires the housing program to provide such notice “with any notification of eviction.” Id. (emphasis added).
By contrast, in Knight, our Supreme Court held that the plain language of a provision of the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act” (CARES Act) 7 that required 30 days’ notice of eviction was limited in its coverage to evictions based on failure to pay rent. 4 Wn.3d at 326. The CARES Act provision at issue explicitly stated,
During the 120-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the lessor of a covered dwelling may not . . . make, or cause to be made, any filing with the court of jurisdiction to initiate a legal action to recover
7 See Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); see also 15 U.S.C. § 9058 (temporary moratorium on eviction filings under the CARES Act).
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possession of the covered dwelling from the tenant for nonpayment of rent or other fees or charges.
15 U.S.C. § 9058 (emphasis added). Thus, 30 days’ notice was required “when evicting a tenant only for failure to pay rent.” Knight, 4 Wn.3d at 326 (emphasis added). Section 12491 of VAWA, on the other hand, contains no such limiting language as to which tenants must receive the notice of VAWA rights. 8 Nevertheless, Navos argues that because “VAWA’s housing protections are only meant to benefit victims of domestic violence” and because VAWA creates a civil cause of action for relief from “crimes of violence motivated by gender,” it would “be beyond an absurd result” to read the statute to require notice of VAWA rights to a tenant who is not a victim of domestic violence. But it is Navos’s interpretation of VAWA, not Busch’s, that would yield absurd results. Navos’s argument presupposes that a landlord would know which of its tenants are victims of DV and would know that the tenant is being evicted for “problems that [the tenant has] . . . as a direct result of being or having been a victim [of DV].” 9 But as a New York court addressing the same issue has reasoned, “[n]otably absent from statements in support of [the landlord] is any assertion of how [the landlord] is to know who is entitled to [VAWA] notice.” Sea Park E., L.P. v. Thompson, 85 Misc.
8 Busch notes in his briefing that courts in three other states similarly have interpreted VAWA to
require service of the notice with all notices of termination, regardless of whether the eviction is predicated on domestic violence. See DHI Cherry Glen Assocs., L.P. v. Gutierrez, 46 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 10-11, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 410 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019); Sea Park E., L.P. v. Thompson, 85 Misc. 3d 764, 767-68, 223 N.Y.S.3d 494 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2024); Hous. Auth. of City of Hartford v. Shahine, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 3 (Apr. 26, 2022). Navos argues that these cases are inapposite because unlike Washington, those states (California and, New York, and Connecticut) require strict compliance with their state’s unlawful detainer statutory notice requirements. However, this distinction does not alter these courts’ reading of the plain language of VAWA with regard to which tenants are entitled to receive VAWA notices. See also McIntire v. Hous. Auth. of Snohomish County, 731 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (in Section 1983 suit, housing authority’s “official practice” of “only providing notice to the head of household” violated plaintiff’s VAWA rights because VAWA “require[s] notice to be sent to each adult tenant”).
9 See HUD-5380, supra note 1, at 3.
9
3d 764, 767-68, 223 N.Y.S.3d 494 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2024). DV notoriously happens behind closed doors, is hidden by abusers and survivors, and can be hard for even the survivor to identify due to emotional abuse. See Paige L. Sweet, The Politics of Surviving: How Women Navigate Domestic Violence and Its Aftermath, 18 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2021).
Moreover, the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative purpose. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). Navos’s interpretation limiting notice only to known survivors of domestic violence does not align with VAWA’s purpose. 10 “Problems arise when [DV] survivors do not know how to access housing remedies.” Olivia Alden, Housing Preservation Under VAWA: The Case for Treating Housing As an Immediate Safety Need, 25 Pub. Int. L. Rep. 5, 7 (2019). As VAWA’s legislative findings acknowledge, “Victims of domestic violence often return to abusive partners because they cannot find long-term housing.” 34 U.S.C. § 12471(7). Further, discrimination against DV survivors means that survivors “are more likely to hide the abuse they suffer rather than seek help, resulting in the
10 In turn, the purposes of VAWA’s housing protections themselves are:
to reduce domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, and to prevent homelessness by—
(1) protecting the safety of victims of domestic violence . . . who reside in homeless shelters, [and] public housing . . . and ensuring that such victims have meaningful access to the criminal justice system without jeopardizing such housing;
(2) creating long-term housing solutions that develop communities and provide sustainable living solutions for victims of domestic violence. . .
(3) building collaborations among victim service providers, homeless service providers, housing providers, and housing agencies to provide appropriate services, interventions, and training to address the housing needs of victims of domestic violence . . . and
(4) enabling public and assisted housing agencies . . . to respond appropriately to domestic violence . . . while maintaining a safe environment for all housing residents.
34 U.S.C. § 12472.
10
availability of far fewer resources to protect themselves and change their lives.” Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 377, 378 (2003).
Accordingly, we hold that VAWA requires covered housing providers to serve the HUD forms with all notices of eviction, regardless of whether the tenant is identified as a survivor of DV or if the eviction relates to conduct that constitutes DV. Therefore, the court erred by denying Busch’s motion to dismiss on the basis that it did.
II. Compliance with the VAWA Notice Requirement Navos argues that if it was required to provide Busch with notice of his VAWA rights, first, it was required only to substantially comply and, second, that it did so. We agree.
The RLTA itself declares that its notice requirements do not “abrogate any additional notice requirements to tenants as required by federal, state, or local law.” RCW 59.18.057(2). See also Terry, 114 Wn.2d at 565 n.16, 568 (federal statute for public housing that provided for a notice before termination of a lease of “ ‘a reasonable time, but not to exceed 30 days,’ ” did not preempt state statute, which required notice and a 10-day opportunity to correct a breach of covenant to avoid forfeiture of a lease (quoting 42 U.S.C. §1437d(I)(3)(A)). Thus, federal protections can “provide tenants with additional protections” beyond the “state’s notice requirements for residential evictions.” Sherwood Auburn LLC, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 677. “[W]here a landlord has accepted the substantial financial benefits of the federal section 8 program, the landlord must abide by the rules of that program in any unlawful detainer action.” Indigo Real Est. Servs., Inc., 169 Wn. App. at 422. This is so because requirements under federal statutes that
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provide federal financial assistance stem from the contractual relationship between Congress and a recipient of federal funding. Sherwood Auburn LLC, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 676.
For example, the court in Indigo Real Estate Services concluded that the trial court erred by determining the tenant had unlawfully detained the premises without first determining that her conduct constituted material noncompliance, as mandated by a HUD-required lease addendum. 169 Wn. App. at 422. Similarly, in Sherwood Auburn LLC, we held that landlords accepting certain federal financial benefits were subject to the notice requirements of the federal CARES Act, which exceeded the state requirement of 14 days’ notice by requiring 30 days’ notice to tenants prior to commencing an unlawful detainer action. 24 Wn. App. 2d at 679.
“A challenge to the adequacy of notice presents a mixed question of law and fact, reviewed de novo.” Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels, 26 Wn. App. 2d 199, 215, 528 P.3d 834 (2023). “ ‘The provisions governing the time and manner of bringing an unlawful detainer action are to be strictly construed,’ ” and failure to strictly comply with time and manner requirements can be cause to dismiss an unlawful detainer action. Sherwood Auburn LLC, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 679 (quoting Cmty. Invs., Ltd. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 36 Wn. App. 34, 37-38, 671 P.2d 289 (1983)). See, e.g., Bin, 163 Wn. App. at 377 (affirming dismissal of unlawful detainer action where public housing authority held grievance hearing in absence of tenant’s counsel in violation of federal regulations); Cmty. Invs., Ltd., 36 Wn. App. at 36 (landlord did not give tenant 20 days to cure its default, as required by the lease, before commencing an unlawful detainer action); Hous. Auth. of City of Everett v. Kirby, 154 Wn. App. 842, 847, 851-52, 226
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P.3d 222, abrogated in part on other grounds by, Bin, 163 Wn. App. 367 (affirming dismissal based on housing authority’s summons that failed to notify tenant that he could respond by mail or by facsimile, as required by RCW 59.18.365).
However, Washington courts “have never adopted the strictest rule of construction as to the form or contents of such notices . . . chiefly for the reason, doubtless, that the statutes prescribe no form.” Erz v. Reese, 157 Wn. 32, 35, 288 P. 255 (1930). Thus, “ ‘[a]s to the form and contents of the [unlawful detainer eviction] notice or demand, a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient.’ ” Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn.2d 22, 32, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (quoting Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, 617, 285 P. 645 (1930)); see also Kelly v. Schorzman, 3 Wn. App. 908, 912-13, 478 P.2d 769 (1970) (“Since an unlawful detainer action is a special proceeding, there must be substantial compliance with the procedural requisites.”); Marsh-McLennan Bldg., Inc. v. Clapp, 96 Wn. App. 636, 640 n.1, 980 P.2d 311 (1999) (noting that courts have required only substantial compliance with the “form and content” of the notice). The notice “ ‘must . . . be sufficiently particular and certain so as not to deceive or mislead.’ ” Sherwood Auburn LLC, 24 Wn. App. at 671 (alteration in original) (quoting IBC, LLC v. Heuft, 141 Wn. App. 624, 632, 174 P.3d 95 (2007)).
“ ‘The purpose of requiring that notice be given to the tenant before the hearing is to [e]nsure that the tenant is adequately informed of the nature of the evidence against [them] so that [they] can effectively rebut that evidence.’ ” Hous. Auth. of King County v. Saylors, 19 Wn. App. 871, 874, 578 P.2d 76 (1978) (quoting Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862 (2d Cir. 1970)). 11 “In the end, we are concerned with
11 Navos argues that the “substantial compliance” standard requires “the party challenging the notice [to] demonstrate actual prejudice,” relying on SyHadley, LLC v. Smith, No. 80780-3-I (Wash. Ct.
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whether the defect precluded the court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction.” Sprincin King St. Partners v. Sound Conditioning Club, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 56, 62, 925 P.2d 217 (1996).
For example, in Foisy, the landlord’s three-day notice to pay rent or vacate substantially complied with the statute even though it defectively described the premises and overstated the amount of rent; “the fact that there was a dispute as to the amount of rent due [as stated in the notice] . . . [did] not invalidate the unlawful detainer proceeding.” 83 Wn.2d at 33. See also Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Wash. at 617 (owner substantially complied with the notice provisions of the unlawful detainer statute even though the notice overstated the amount of rent due, misidentified the address of the premises, and was signed by the agent without indicating the signature was as an agent).
More recently, in Kiemle & Hagood Co., 26 Wn. App. 2d at 215, this court applied the substantial compliance standard to an RLTA notice requirement that stated,
All written notices required under subsection (2) of this section must . . .
Identify the facts and circumstances known and available to the landlord at the time of the issuance of the notice that support the cause or causes with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to respond and prepare a defense to any incidents alleged. The landlord may present additional facts and circumstances regarding the allegations within the notice if such evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of the issuance of the notice.
RCW 59.18.650(6)(b) (emphasis added). Based on the statutory language, we determined “[t]he critical question here is whether the landlord’s notice provided enough facts to allow [the tenant] to ‘effectively rebut the conclusion reached.’ ” Kiemle &
App. Sept. 27, 2021) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/807803.pdf. However, SyHadley is unpublished and has no precedential value. GR 14.1(a).
14
Hagood Co., 26 Wn. App. at 215 (quoting Hous. Auth. of DeKalb County v. Pyrtle, 167 Ga. App. 181, 182, 306 S.E.2d 9 (1983)). Applying these rules, the court rejected the tenant’s arguments that the notice should have identified on which of the four bases for eviction under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) the landlord was relying and should have identified who was injured by her alleged misconduct. Id. at 215. The court reasoned,
A fair reading of the notice is that [the landlord] believed [the tenant] may have violated any of the four statutory clauses, while recognizing that only one such violation would be necessary to terminate her tenancy.
Moreover, the real question regarding notice is whether [the tenant]
understood the factual allegations against her.
Id. at 216. The court concluded that the notice “sufficiently apprised [the tenant] of the facts that [the landlord] alleged rose to the level of waste, nuisance, or interference with enjoyment of the property.” Id. 12 Similarly, in Davis v. Jones, despite noting that “the notice [wa]s not to be commended,” the court deemed an unlawful detainer notice sufficient where it included a “sufficient description of the premises and appellant does not contend that she was misled or deceived by the language of the notice.” 15 Wn.2d 572, 576, 131 P.2d 430 (1942) (emphasis added).
By contrast, in Saylors, an unlawful detainer notice was insufficient where its “notification of [the tenants’] nondesirable conduct” detailed only “antisocial activities and arrests . . . constituting a threat to the peace and safety of the community” and “[i]llegal acts . . . having an adverse effect on the project and its tenants.” 19 Wn. App. at 874. We determined that “[t]he vague and conclusory notice . . . was inadequate to
12 Specifically, the notice provided “detailed descriptions, citing recent inspections . . . [that]
furniture and boxes were stacked inside [the tenant]'s residence, blocking ingress and egress; garbage had not been disposed of; spills and dirty paper towels had accumulated on the floor; and there was an excessive amount of personal property throughout the unit.” Id. at 205-06.
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provide the required opportunity to prepare for argument before the hearing panel.” Id. In another example of non-compliant notice, in Sherwood Auburn LLC, the landlord provided conflicting notices—a 14-day pay or vacate notice under RCW 59.12.030(3) and one entitled “30-DAY NOTICE (CARES Act).” 24 Wn. App. 2d at 680-81. Because the conflicting notices “were misleading and equivocal and failed to adequately, precisely, and correctly inform the tenants of the rights to which they were entitled,” the court lacked authority to issue a writ of restitution. Id. at 681.
Thus, the purpose of the RLTA notice requirements can be satisfied if “a person of ordinary understanding would have no difficulty in determining from [the] notice that he was required to vacate the premises.” Newman v. Worthen, 57 Wash. 467, 470, 107 P. 188 (1910). 13 As for the notice required in this case, VAWA prescribes an exact form. Indeed, through VAWA, Congress mandated HUD to develop the notice and certification form specifically for covered housing tenants and applicants in covered programs . Moreover, VAWA uses the verb “shall” with respect to providing the requisite forms:
Each public housing agency or owner or manager of housing assisted under a covered housing program shall provide the notice developed
13 As described above, the inquiry is whether the landlord may avail itself of the superior court's
jurisdiction. See Tacoma Rescue Mission v. Stewart, 155 Wn. App. at 254 n.9. In the landlord-tenant context, some courts have used the term “notice” with regard to service of process. See, e.g., Sprincin King St. Partners, 84 Wn. App. at 61 (“a summons confers jurisdiction upon the court when it gives notice according to the statutory requirements, with such particularity and certainty as not to deceive or mislead,” rejecting the tenant’s argument that the landlord’s failure to demand double damages in the summons precluded double damages recovery); Skinner v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City of Medina, 168 Wn.2d 845, 853-54, 232 P.3d 558 (2010) (using substantial compliance standard regarding service under RCW 41.12.090 because the statute “is silent as to the required means of service” and “substantial compliance with service requirements is generally sufficient to invoke a superior court’s appellate jurisdiction”). However, as this court has explained, “the state constitution vests the superior court with subject matter jurisdiction in unlawful detainer actions, and its jurisdiction remains constant regardless of procedural missteps by the parties.” Bin, 163 Wn. App. at 373-74. Thus, more precisely, rather than depriving the court of jurisdiction, “ ‘[t]he proper terminology is that a party who files an action after improper notice may not maintain such action or avail itself of the superior court’s jurisdiction.’ ” Id. at 374 (quoting Tacoma Rescue Mission, 155 Wn. App. at 254 n.9).
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under paragraph (1) [form HUD-5380], together with the form described in subsection (c)(3)(A) [form HUD-5382].
34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(2) (emphasis added). Generally, “[w]hen the legislature uses the word ‘shall,’ we deem it to be mandatory.” State Constr., Inc. v. City of Sammamish, 11 Wn. App. 2d 892, 920, 457 P.3d 1194 (2020). 14 Based on the “ ‘plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent,’ ” Knight, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. at 670), and “the ordinary meaning of words,” In re Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d at 839, VAWA mandates that when evicting a tenant in covered housing, the landlord must provide forms HUD-5380 and HUD-5382. Other jurisdictions interpreting the same provisions requiring VAWA notice in eviction proceedings have similarly read the use of “shall” to indicate an imperative, rather than discretionary, requirement. See DHI Cherry Glen Assocs., L.P., 46 Cal. App. 5th Supp. at 10-11; Sea Park E., L.P., 85 Misc. 3d at 767-68. 15
14 Navos posits that “[t]he word ‘shall’ here is directory not mandatory,” citing Niichel v. Lancaster,
97 Wn.2d 620, 624-25, 647 P.2d 1021(1982). But the Niichel court observed that “ordinarily, the word ‘shall’ when used in a statute, is imperative and operates to impose a duty which may be enforced.” Id. at 625. Niichel is factually inapposite, as it concerned the duties of tax assessors under RCW 84.40.040 and dealt extensively with rules of statutory construction specific to statutes describing duties of public officers, relying heavily on a treatise, 3 J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 5816 (3d ed. 1943). Id. at 623-24.
15 Additionally, other subsections of 34 U.S.C. § 12491 use the verb “may” instead of “shall.” See,
e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 12491(c)(2)(B) (“A public housing agency or owner or manager of housing may extend the 14-day deadline under subparagraph (A) at its discretion”) (emphasis added). “ ‘[W]hen a statute distinguishes between “may” and “shall,” it is generally clear that “shall” imposes a mandatory duty.’ ” In re Parental Rts. to K.J.B., 187 Wn.2d 592, 602, 387 P.3d 1072 (2017) (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. U.S., 579 U.S. 162, 172 (2016)).
Further, form HUD-5380 itself distinguishes when it must be provided and when it may be provided:
When should I receive this form? A covered housing provider must provide a copy of the Notice of Occupancy Rights Under The Violence Against Women Act (Form HUD-
5380) and the Certification of Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault, or Stalking (Form HUD-5382) when you are admitted as a tenant, when you receive an eviction or termination notice and prior to termination of tenancy, or when you are denied as an applicant. A covered housing provider may provide these forms at additional times.
HUD-5380, supra note 1, at 3 (emphasis added). See also 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(a).
Accordingly, VAWA’s mandatory language suggests that failing to provide the specific HUD-developed notice and forms would violate VAWA. See also McIntire, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 1227, 1228 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (municipal housing provider’s “official practice” of “only providing notice to the head of household,” as well as general “policy or custom of not providing VAWA Forms with termination notices,” violated the plaintiff’s VAWA rights, as VAWA and its accompanying regulations require notice to be sent to each adult tenant). 16 But here, the more precise question is whether under the RLTA, a notice must strictly or only substantially comply with the VAWA-required notice for an unlawful detainer action to proceed. And the VAWA requirements at issue here differ from those RLTA requirements that our courts have held require strict compliance. VAWA’s notice requirements do not address the reason why or when the tenant may be liable for unlawful detainer—for example, the basis for the eviction or by when the tenant must pay or vacate. See RCW 59.12.030(2)-(6). Thus, the VAWA notice requirements do not
16 In McIntire, after being evicted for unpaid rent, the plaintiff asserted a claim for violation of her
VAWA housing rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she did not receive notice of her VAWA rights. 731 F. Supp. 3d at 1222. Her family used a federal Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (VASH) voucher to pay for their rent based on her husband’s veteran status. Id. at 1216. The court held that the housing provider’s practice of “only providing notice to the head of household” was “inapposite to VAWA’s provisions and accompanying regulations, which require notice to be sent to each adult tenant.” Id. at 1227 (citing HUD PIH Notice 2017-08 at 18 (May 19, 2017) https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PIH- 2017-08VAWRA2013.PDF; 34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(2); 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005). The court continued:
VAWA’s text requires notice of “termination of assistance” to “tenants of housing” and is not limited to circumstances where a [VASH] voucher is terminated. 34 U.S.C.
§ 12491(d)(2). To ignore this requirement would allow a perpetrator of domestic violence to easily circumvent VAWA’s housing protection by simply removing their victim as a beneficiary of their housing program. Without knowledge of their rights, or even knowledge of their loss of assistance, a victim would be unable to exercise VAWA’s protections. . . . VAWA requires that the VAWA Forms are included “with any notification of eviction or notification of termination of assistance.” 34 U.S.C. § 12491(d)(2)(C).
Id. at 1227-28.
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serve the purpose of adequately informing the tenant of the nature of the evidence against them so that they can effectively rebut that evidence. Rather, the VAWA notice requirements inform tenants of their rights under VAWA, as well as of a possible defense to eviction. Accordingly, the purpose of VAWA’s notice requirements can be accomplished without using the exact forms prescribed by VAWA, just as the purpose of notice under the RLTA can be realized through substantial compliance even if the notice has deficiencies in other aspects. 17 Here, because the trial court concluded VAWA did not apply to Busch because he was not a DV survivor, it did not address whether Navos’s notice substantially complied with the RLTA’s and VAWA’s notice requirements. Nevertheless, the parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Navos’s notice informed Busch that he had “the right to defend this action in a court of law.” It told Busch that he may want to exercise his rights under VAWA if the lease violation conduct was “the result of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault or stalking.” The notice named the applicable HUD forms, 18 though it did not provide them, and stated that the tenant could exercise his rights under VAWA by “completing and submitting” the forms “so it is received in the management office no later than 14 business days” from the tenant’s receipt of the notice. On its face, this notice informed Busch of his rights and defenses under VAWA and the RLTA such that he could respond to the unlawful detainer action and defend himself in court.
17 Regardless of our holding here, providing the VAWA-prescribed forms HUD-5380 and HUD-
5382 is the best way to properly inform all tenants of their rights under VAWA.
18 The court notes that Navos’s notice mis-identified form HUD-5380 as form “HUD-15380.” While
this typo is “not to be commended” and should be remedied, we do not hold that the impact of the typo eviscerates the effectiveness of the notice. See Davis, 15 Wn.2d at 576.
Thus, we hold as a matter of law that Navos’s notice effectuated the purpose of applicable notice requirements. The purpose of the notice in this case was “ ‘to [e]nsure that the tenant is adequately informed of the nature of the evidence against [the]m so that [they] can effectively rebut that evidence’ ” and is aware of their rights under VAWA, including possible defenses to the unlawful detainer action. Saylors, 19 Wn. App. at 874 (quoting Escalera, 425 F.2d at 862).
We may affirm the lower court’s decision on any basis. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v.
Routsen, 69 Wn. App. 148, 150, 848 P.2d 733 (1993). Because Navos’s notice to Busch substantially complied with the RLTA and VAWA notice requirements as to form and content, 19 the trial court properly allowed Navos to pursue its unlawful detainer action against Busch.
III. Attorney Fees Finally, Busch sought attorney fees in this matter. RAP 18.1(a) authorizes an award where “applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review.” The RLTA authorizes an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, with limited exceptions. See RCW 59.18.290(2). Because Busch does not prevail, we do not award him attorney fees.
Nonetheless, we take this opportunity to note that contrary to Navos’s contention, Busch would have been eligible for the award had he prevailed. 20 This court has
19 Busch did not challenge the notice for failure to comply with timing and service or other
requirements that require strict compliance.
20 Navos contended that Busch would not be entitled to attorney fees, arguing that Busch’s
counsel was appointed by the State under RCW 59.18.640(1), and “th[is] court held publicly appointed attorneys are not entitled to reimbursement that would have been available to a private attorney,” citing State v. Jones, 92 Wn. App. 555, 565, 964 P.2d 398 (1998). But Jones is inapposite, as there, Jones
20
awarded attorney fees under the RLTA to tenants represented by legal service providers, including Busch’s counsel, the Housing Justice Project. See, e.g., Skinner v. InCity Props. Holdings, Inc., 35 Wn. App. 2d 436, 457, 580 P.3d 986 (2025). Pro bono and court-appointed attorneys are prohibited from receiving attorney fees under the RLTA only for unlawful retaliation claims. Council House, Inc. v. Hawk, 136 Wn. App. 153, 160, 147 P.3d 1305 (2006) (denial of fees to a defendant in unlawful detainer action based on the fact that her attorneys represented her pro bono would be untenable). Accordingly, Busch would have been eligible for attorney fees had he prevailed on the merits, but he did not.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s decision and decline to award attorney fees to Busch.
WE CONCUR:
sought attorney fees for counsel whom Jones had privately retained while he also had court-appointed counsel. See id. at 566.