Navid Khajeh Mahabadi v. United States Department of State, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-10508
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 NAVID KHAJEH MAHABADI, Case No. 25-cv-10508-LB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v. Re: ECF No. 16 14 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT 18 The plaintiff, who is representing himself, is a Swedish-Iranian dual citizen seeking a writ of 19 mandamus compelling the government to adjudicate his L-1B nonimmigrant visa application.1 He 20 submitted his application and had his consular interview in April 2024.2 Following that interview, 21 the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm refused the plaintiff’s visa application and placed it into 22 administrative processing under Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 23 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g).3 The plaintiff was informed that the applications of his spouse and daughter 24 “could not be adjudicated until Plaintiff’s administrative processing was resolved, effectively tying 25

26 1 Pet. – ECF No. 1 at 6 (¶ 15). Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 27 2 Id. at 5 (¶ 12). 1 the family’s visa applications to the outcome of Plaintiff’s delayed application.”4 He made multiple 2 follow-up inquiries before December 2025 but received only “generalized responses” that his case 3 “remains under administrative processing.”5 4 In December 2025, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the court to 5 compel adjudication of his visa application.6 The parties stipulated to a stay in February 2026 “to 6 allow for potential re-adjudication of Plaintiff’s visa.”7 During this stay, the U.S. State Department 7 refused the plaintiff’s visa application under Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and 8 Visa Entry Reform Act, which states that no nonimmigrant visa shall be issued “to any alien from 9 a country that is a state sponsor of international terrorism unless the Secretary of State determines, 10 in consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other appropriate United States 11 agencies, that such alien does not pose a threat to the safety or national security of the United 12 States.”8 8 U.S.C. § 1735(a). The stay was lifted in April 2026.9 13 The defendants assert that (1) the plaintiff’s petition is moot because his visa application has 14 been fully adjudicated through an initial refusal under INA § 221(g) and a later refusal under 15 § 306 of the Visa Entry Reform Act, (2) for the same reasons, he has not stated a claim for 16 withholding or delay, and (3) the voluntary-cessation doctrine does not apply because the conduct 17 the plaintiff seeks to remedy (delayed adjudication of his application) cannot recur because 18 adjudication of the application is complete.10 The plaintiff responds that (1) the record contains no 19 indication that the administrative processing has been completed, (2) the government’s supporting 20 affidavit is based on hearsay and does not meet its burden of demonstrating mootness, (3) the 21 22 23 4 Id. at 5 (¶ 12). 24 5 Id. (¶ 13–14). 25 6 Id. at 8. 26 7 Order – ECF No. 11 at 1. 8 Pl.’s Decl. & Refusals, Ex. A – ECF No. 17-1 at 2–3 (¶ 9), 6–7. 27 9 Order – ECF No. 13. 1 voluntary-cessation doctrine precludes mootness, and (4) the plaintiff has plausibly pleaded 2 unreasonable delay.11 3 The plaintiff’s visa application has been adjudicated, and thus, his petition is moot. 4 5 LEGAL STANDARDS 6 1. Rule 12(b)(1) 7 The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to cases and controversies. Genesis Healthcare 8 Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. 9 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. 10 Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). “A corollary to this case-or- 11 controversy requirement is that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 12 merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Genesis, 569 U.S. at 71 (cleaned up). “A claim is moot 13 when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 14 outcome.” Tate v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada, 606 F.3d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). 15 The defendant may challenge lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). A Rule 16 12(b)(1) challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 17 (9th Cir. 2004). “A ‘facial’ attack asserts that a complaint’s allegations are themselves insufficient 18 to invoke jurisdiction, while a ‘factual’ attack asserts that the complaint’s allegations, though 19 adequate on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 20 F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). Under a facial attack, the court “accept[s] all allegations of fact 21 in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Warren 22 v. Fox Fam. Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by 23 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 24 In a factual attack, the court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations” 25 and “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a 26 motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 27 1 2. Rule 12(b)(6) 2 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 3 entitled to relief to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It must plead enough 5 facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Threadbare recitals of 6 the elements of a claim, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v. 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court accepts factual allegations as true and construes them 8 favorably to plaintiffs. Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 886–87 (9th Cir. 9 2018). A complaint also must plead a cognizable legal theory. Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 10 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016). 11 ANALYSIS 12 The issue is whether the refusals under INA § 221(g) and § 306 of the Visa Entry Reform Act 13 show that the plaintiff’s visa application has been fully adjudicated, mooting his petition.12 14 “The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements.” Spokeo, 15 Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 16 (1992)). “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 17 challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 18 decision.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. 19 (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). “The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal 20 jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of 21 Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). 22 The related concept of mootness has been described (broadly speaking) as “‘the doctrine of 23 standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement 24 of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’” Friends of the 25 Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 26

27 12 The parties’ arguments about the plausibility of the plaintiff’s petition under Rule 12(b)(6) is largely 1 (1997)). “‘The doctrine of mootness, which is embedded in Article III’s case or controversy 2 requirement, requires that an actual, ongoing controversy exist at all stages of federal court 3 proceedings.’” Grand Canyon Tr. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 4 2012) (quoting Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2011)). “‘A claim is 5 moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy.’” Id. (quoting Am. Rivers v. Nat’l 6 Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997)). “‘If an event occurs that prevents 7 the court from granting effective relief, the claim is moot and must be dismissed.’” Id. at 1016–17 8 (quoting Am. Rivers, 126 F.3d at 1123). 9 “‘[T]he burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one.’” Feldman v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 10 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988)). 11 “Nonetheless, ‘a case or controversy exists . . . only when the challenged government activity is 12 not contingent, has not evaporated or disappeared, and, by its continuing and brooding presence, 13 casts what may well be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.’” Id. 14 (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘The 15 adverse effect . . . must not be so remote and speculative that there is no tangible prejudice to the 16 existing interests of the parties.’” Id. (quoting Headwaters, 893 F.2d at 1015). “‘The basic 17 question in determining mootness is whether there is a present controversy as to which effective 18 relief can be granted.’” Id. (quoting Gordon, 849 F.2d at 1244). 19 Here, the record indicates that the plaintiff’s visa application has been adjudicated. The parties 20 do not dispute whether the plaintiff’s visa application was refused under INA § 221(g) and § 306 21 of the Visa Entry Reform Act.13 The plaintiff states in his petition that he was informed that the 22 applications of his spouse and daughter “could not be adjudicated until Plaintiff’s administrative 23 processing was resolved, effectively tying the family’s visa applications to the outcome of 24 Plaintiff’s delayed application.”14 That his spouse’s and daughter’s applications were denied 25 26

27 13 Opp’n – ECF No. 17 at 7. ] immediately after the plaintiff's application was refused under § 306 indicates the plaintiff's 2 || administrative processing has been resolved. 3 The plaintiff points to the fact that the notice of refusal under § 306 did not include any factual 4 || findings, explanation, or supporting documents indicating that the administrative processing 5 concluded, but he identifies no authority requiring that he receive more than a refusal. 6 The plaintiff does not explain what adjudicative decisions remain once his and his dependents’ 7 || visa applications have been refused, and he provides only a conclusory argument that under these 8 circumstances, “the record does not establish that the administrative-processing function . . . have, 9 || in fact, concluded.”!> The voluntary-cessation doctrine does not apply here because the □□□□□□□□□□□ 10 || application has been adjudicated, which means the government cannot further delay its 11 adjudication. CONCLUSION 13 The court dismisses the plaintiffs petition with prejudice because amendment appears futile. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: June 24, 2026 LAE LAUREL BEELER 17 United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 || 'S Opp’n— ECF No. 17 at 9-10.