1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NAVEAH GARCIA, No. 1:25-cv-01096 JLT EGC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v. (Doc. 8) 14 FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, VICE PRINCIPAL WILLIAMS, and DOES 15 1 through 25, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Naveah Garcia brings this action against Defendants Fresno Unified School District 20 (“FUSD”), Edison High School Vice Principal Thomas Williams, and unnamed Doe Defendants 21 for defamation and various civil rights claims. (Doc. 6.) FUSD moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s 22 second and fifth causes of action for invasion of privacy and violating California Constitution, 23 article I, § 31, respectively, as time barred. (Doc. 8.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion 24 is GRANTED. 25 II. BACKGROUND 26 During the 2022–23 school year, Plaintiff was a student at Edison High School in FUSD. 27 (Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 7, 10.) On January 15, 2023, Plaintiff made and posted a video of herself at home 28 on Instagram. (Id. at ¶ 10.) In the video, Plaintiff used racial epithets to describe what she 1 perceived to be a double-standard concerning race between her and her classmates. (Id.) 2 Plaintiff’s video elicited a strong reaction from several of her classmates, and on January 24, 3 2023, Defendants suspended Plaintiff from school because of the “negative impact [Plaintiff] had 4 on [Edison High School].” (Id. at ¶¶ 12–15.) On January 25, 2023, another Edison student 5 informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff could not attend percussion practice for two weeks because of her 6 suspension, which led Plaintiff to believe Defendants were not treating her suspension with 7 confidentiality. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 8 On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff and her mother, Joanna Henry, spoke to the FUSD school 9 board at a school board meeting.1 (Id. at ¶ 20.) During the meeting, FUSD school board 10 member, K. Thomas, informed Plaintiff that she was “batting” for Plaintiff because “her son had 11 experienced something similar and would support [Plaintiff], especially at school.” (Id.) After 12 the meeting, a FUSD administrator named Gomez escorted Plaintiff and her mother to a private 13 room and told them he would “overturn the suspension as it was unlawful and against school 14 policy.” (Id.) Board member Thomas then entered the room and reiterated her support for 15 Plaintiff. (Id.) 16 On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff heard from a friend that an Edison High School teacher 17 falsely recounted Plaintiff’s video to his class, whereby he identified Plaintiff by name and 18 explained that students were not allowed to record on their phones because of Plaintiff’s conduct. 19 (Id. at ¶ 25.) On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff transferred to another high school, but there learned 20 that her suspension remained on her permanent file. (Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.) 21 On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff presented a government claim seeking monetary damages to 22 FUSD (the “Government Claim”.) (Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 8-2 at 4–8.) FUSD rejected the Government 23 Claim on July 26, 2024. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 8; 8-2 at 10–11.) On January 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 24 complaint in Fresno County Superior Court. (Doc. 6 at 1.) Plaintiff removed the case to federal 25 court on August 28, 2025, and filed an amended complaint on October 3, 2025. (Docs. 1, 6.) On 26 1 It is unclear from Plaintiff’s filings if the “matter” or “issue” that Plaintiff and her mother raised before 27 the school board was Plaintiff’s suspension, Defendants’ breach of confidentiality, or both. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 20; 9 at 5.) Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court assumes 28 for the purposes of this motion that Plaintiff raised both issues. 1 October 17, 2025, FUSD moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and fifth causes of action for failure 2 to state a claim. (Doc. 8.) 3 III. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 5 the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 7 complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, 8 the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 9 level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). In deciding a motion to dismiss, 10 “all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 11 non-moving party.” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 601 (9th Cir. 12 2020). 13 If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give leave” to 14 amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The “underlying purpose of Rule 15 15 [is] to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 16 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up). However, a court has 17 discretion to deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of 18 the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue 19 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of 20 amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 IV. ANALYSIS 22 A. Plaintiff’s Second and Fifth Causes of Action are Time-Barred 23 In her second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges FUSD invaded her privacy when an Edison 24 High School teacher, acting in his official capacity, disclosed Plaintiff’s conduct and suspension 25 to a group of students. (Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 25, 32; see also Doc. 9 at 8 (explaining typo in dates.)) 26 Plaintiff also states that she learned FUSD invaded her privacy when a classmate told her on 27 January 25, 2023, that Plaintiff was not allowed to attend percussion practice during her 28 suspension. (Doc. 9 at 9.) Plaintiff alleges both disclosures violated Cal. Educ. Code § 49076 1 and 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 32; 9 at 9.) 2 In her fifth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges FUSD violated California Constitution, article 3 I, § 31, by “suspending Plaintiff for asking a question about why it was acceptable to say 4 derogatory words about one race but not another race.” (Doc. 6 at ¶ 56.) California Constitution, 5 article I, § 31 provides in relevant part: “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant 6 preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 7 national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.” 8 Cal. Const., art. I, § 31. Plaintiff alleges her suspension and FUSD’s failure and refusal “to 9 protect Plaintiff from threats and harassment” violated article I, § 31. (Doc. 6 at ¶ 56.) 10 “The California Tort Claims Act [Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 900 et seq.] requires as a condition 11 precedent to suit against a public entity, the timely presentation of a written claim and the 12 rejection of the claim in whole or in part.” Mangold v. California Pub. Utils.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NAVEAH GARCIA, No. 1:25-cv-01096 JLT EGC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v. (Doc. 8) 14 FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, VICE PRINCIPAL WILLIAMS, and DOES 15 1 through 25, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Naveah Garcia brings this action against Defendants Fresno Unified School District 20 (“FUSD”), Edison High School Vice Principal Thomas Williams, and unnamed Doe Defendants 21 for defamation and various civil rights claims. (Doc. 6.) FUSD moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s 22 second and fifth causes of action for invasion of privacy and violating California Constitution, 23 article I, § 31, respectively, as time barred. (Doc. 8.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion 24 is GRANTED. 25 II. BACKGROUND 26 During the 2022–23 school year, Plaintiff was a student at Edison High School in FUSD. 27 (Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 7, 10.) On January 15, 2023, Plaintiff made and posted a video of herself at home 28 on Instagram. (Id. at ¶ 10.) In the video, Plaintiff used racial epithets to describe what she 1 perceived to be a double-standard concerning race between her and her classmates. (Id.) 2 Plaintiff’s video elicited a strong reaction from several of her classmates, and on January 24, 3 2023, Defendants suspended Plaintiff from school because of the “negative impact [Plaintiff] had 4 on [Edison High School].” (Id. at ¶¶ 12–15.) On January 25, 2023, another Edison student 5 informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff could not attend percussion practice for two weeks because of her 6 suspension, which led Plaintiff to believe Defendants were not treating her suspension with 7 confidentiality. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 8 On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff and her mother, Joanna Henry, spoke to the FUSD school 9 board at a school board meeting.1 (Id. at ¶ 20.) During the meeting, FUSD school board 10 member, K. Thomas, informed Plaintiff that she was “batting” for Plaintiff because “her son had 11 experienced something similar and would support [Plaintiff], especially at school.” (Id.) After 12 the meeting, a FUSD administrator named Gomez escorted Plaintiff and her mother to a private 13 room and told them he would “overturn the suspension as it was unlawful and against school 14 policy.” (Id.) Board member Thomas then entered the room and reiterated her support for 15 Plaintiff. (Id.) 16 On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff heard from a friend that an Edison High School teacher 17 falsely recounted Plaintiff’s video to his class, whereby he identified Plaintiff by name and 18 explained that students were not allowed to record on their phones because of Plaintiff’s conduct. 19 (Id. at ¶ 25.) On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff transferred to another high school, but there learned 20 that her suspension remained on her permanent file. (Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.) 21 On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff presented a government claim seeking monetary damages to 22 FUSD (the “Government Claim”.) (Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 8-2 at 4–8.) FUSD rejected the Government 23 Claim on July 26, 2024. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 8; 8-2 at 10–11.) On January 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 24 complaint in Fresno County Superior Court. (Doc. 6 at 1.) Plaintiff removed the case to federal 25 court on August 28, 2025, and filed an amended complaint on October 3, 2025. (Docs. 1, 6.) On 26 1 It is unclear from Plaintiff’s filings if the “matter” or “issue” that Plaintiff and her mother raised before 27 the school board was Plaintiff’s suspension, Defendants’ breach of confidentiality, or both. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 20; 9 at 5.) Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court assumes 28 for the purposes of this motion that Plaintiff raised both issues. 1 October 17, 2025, FUSD moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and fifth causes of action for failure 2 to state a claim. (Doc. 8.) 3 III. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 5 the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 7 complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, 8 the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 9 level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). In deciding a motion to dismiss, 10 “all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 11 non-moving party.” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 601 (9th Cir. 12 2020). 13 If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give leave” to 14 amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The “underlying purpose of Rule 15 15 [is] to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 16 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up). However, a court has 17 discretion to deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of 18 the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue 19 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of 20 amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 IV. ANALYSIS 22 A. Plaintiff’s Second and Fifth Causes of Action are Time-Barred 23 In her second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges FUSD invaded her privacy when an Edison 24 High School teacher, acting in his official capacity, disclosed Plaintiff’s conduct and suspension 25 to a group of students. (Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 25, 32; see also Doc. 9 at 8 (explaining typo in dates.)) 26 Plaintiff also states that she learned FUSD invaded her privacy when a classmate told her on 27 January 25, 2023, that Plaintiff was not allowed to attend percussion practice during her 28 suspension. (Doc. 9 at 9.) Plaintiff alleges both disclosures violated Cal. Educ. Code § 49076 1 and 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 32; 9 at 9.) 2 In her fifth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges FUSD violated California Constitution, article 3 I, § 31, by “suspending Plaintiff for asking a question about why it was acceptable to say 4 derogatory words about one race but not another race.” (Doc. 6 at ¶ 56.) California Constitution, 5 article I, § 31 provides in relevant part: “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant 6 preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 7 national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.” 8 Cal. Const., art. I, § 31. Plaintiff alleges her suspension and FUSD’s failure and refusal “to 9 protect Plaintiff from threats and harassment” violated article I, § 31. (Doc. 6 at ¶ 56.) 10 “The California Tort Claims Act [Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 900 et seq.] requires as a condition 11 precedent to suit against a public entity, the timely presentation of a written claim and the 12 rejection of the claim in whole or in part.” Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 13 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861, 865 14 (1983)). “Where compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required, the plaintiff must allege 15 compliance or circumstances excusing compliance or the complaint is subject to general 16 demurrer.” Id. The Tort Claims Act provides “[a] claim relating to a cause of action . . . for 17 injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause 18 of action.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a). “When a claim that is required by Section 911.2 to be 19 presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within 20 that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim . . . 21 within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action.” Id. at 22 § 911.4(a)–(b). 23 Plaintiff admits more than six months passed from the suspension and invasion of privacy 24 in January 2023, to when she filed the Government Claim on June 12, 2024, but argues “equitable 25 estoppel tolls the running of the filing requirement [under § 911.2(a)] between the time that 26 FUSD told [Plaintiff] that the suspension would be overturned and the time she learned that this 27 had not occurred.” (Doc. 9 at 9.) “It is well-settled that a public entity may be estopped from 28 asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or 1 deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act.” Santos v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 2 17 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1075 (2017) (citation omitted.) “Estoppel as a bar to a public entity’s 3 assertion of the defense of noncompliance arises when the plaintiff establishes by a 4 preponderance of the evidence: (1) the public entity was apprised of the facts, (2) it intended its 5 conduct to be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of facts, and (4) the plaintiff 6 relied upon the conduct to his detriment.” Id. at 1076 (citation omitted.) “Estoppel most 7 commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim.” Id. 8 at 1075. However, “[e]quitable estoppel does not require factually misleading statements.” J.P. 9 v. Carlsbad Unified Sch. Dist., 232 Cal. App. 4th 323, 335 (2014) (noting estoppel may be found 10 where the public entity “engaged in some calculated conduct or made some representation or 11 concealed facts which induced the plaintiff not to file a claim or bring an action within the 12 statutory time” (citation omitted.)) “In the usual case, estoppel is a question of fact to be resolved 13 by the trier of facts. However, when ‘the facts are undisputed, the existence of an estoppel is a 14 question of law.’” Bertorelli v. City of Tulare, 180 Cal.App.3d 432, 440 (1986) (citation 15 omitted.) 16 Plaintiff alleges her reliance on the promises from Thomas and Gomez to support her and 17 “overturn the suspension” estopped the six-month filing deadline. (Docs. 6 at ¶ 20; 9 at 11–12.) 18 However, Plaintiff alleges only that she believed these promises would result in FUSD removing 19 the suspension from her record not that they would cure any harm she suffered from the alleged 20 invasion of privacy or compensate her for FUSD’s alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff 21 relying on these statements to not seek legal advice or commence litigation to overturn her 22 suspension does not extend to her invasion of privacy or California constitutional claims. 23 Moreover, Plaintiff cannot claim the delayed discovery doctrine saves her fifth cause of 24 action. “Under this doctrine, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or has 25 reason to discover, the cause of action.” S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 184 Cal. App. 26 4th 712, 717 (2010). “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she has 27 reason to at least suspect a factual basis for its elements.” Id. Plaintiff suspected that she was 28 discriminated against once she was suspended, not when she learned her suspension remained on 1 | her permanent record. Accordingly, equitable estoppel does not apply, and Plaintiff is time-barred 2 | from bringing her second and fifth causes of action. 3 | V. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons explained above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 8, is GRANTED 5 | with prejudice. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 | Dated: _ June 12, 2026 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28