Navarette v. Caternolo

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedOctober 15, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00541
StatusUnknown

This text of Navarette v. Caternolo (Navarette v. Caternolo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Navarette v. Caternolo, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8 JORGE NAVARETTE, 9 Petitioner, Case No. C24-0541-BHS-SKV 10 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 11 R. CATERNOLO, 12 Respondent. 13

14 Petitioner Jorge Navarrete is a federal prisoner confined at the Federal Detention Center 15 in SeaTac, Washington (FDC SeaTac). Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner’s 16 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he asserts his entitlement 17 to First Step Act (FSA) earned time credits to his sentence. Dkt. 5. Respondent submitted an 18 Answer and Return to the petition, refuting Petitioner’s contention and seeking dismissal. Dkt. 19 8. The Court, after consideration of the petition, response, and remainder of the record, 20 recommends the habeas petition be DENIED and this case DISMISSED without prejudice. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On March 10, 2023, Petitioner was sentenced to a 44-month term of imprisonment for 23 conspiracy to commit money laundering. See United States v. Navarette, No. CR20-120-RSM, 1 Dkts. 237 & 244. Petitioner, who had been admitted to FDC SeaTac as a pretrial detainee on 2 March 16, 2022, was remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals and returned to FDC SeaTac 3 while awaiting designation to a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility. See Dkt. 9, ¶3 & Ex. 1. On 4 September 15, 2023, Petitioner was designated to serve his sentence at FDC SeaTac. See id.

5 Petitioner filed his habeas petition on June 11, 2024. Dkt. 5. Petitioner alleges 6 “Respondent refuses to apply FSA time credit pursuant to the law and 9th Circuit court case 7 law.” Id. at 4. The petition otherwise, and as discussed further below, does not contain any 8 information specific to Petitioner and his assertion that he is entitled to FSA earned time credits. 9 Respondent, in a response dated July 22, 2024, asserts that Petitioner’s projected release 10 date, including FSA earned time credits, is November 21, 2024. Dkt. 8 at 2; Dkt. 9, ¶4 & Ex. 2. 11 Respondent provides an FSA Time Credit Assessment showing Petitioner has been earning FSA 12 time credits since his September 15, 2023 designation, including 120 days towards early release, 13 which has been applied to calculate his projected release date. Dkt. 9, ¶5 & Ex. 3. Respondent 14 argues Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because: (1) the petition fails to allege

15 with any specificity that Petitioner is being held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 16 United States; (2) the petition is not yet ripe for adjudication; (3) Petitioner failed to exhaust his 17 administrative remedies prior to filing the petition; and (4) Petitioner has no statutory right to 18 FSA credits before he receives risk and need assessments. Dkt. 8. 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 Petitioner filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to § 2241, this Court 21 has jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus to an individual “in custody in violation of the 22 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 23 1 Because Petitioner raises a challenge to the execution of his sentence, this matter properly 2 proceeds under § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 However, a petition for writ of habeas corpus must “specify all the grounds for relief available to 4 the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing

5 Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.1 “Notice pleading is not sufficient, for 6 the petition is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.” 7 Advisory Committee’s Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 4 (cleaned up). Accord Mayle v. Felix, 545 8 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). Also, while pro se habeas corpus petitions are liberally construed, Zichko 9 v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001), a petition with merely vague and conclusory 10 allegations is subject to dismissal. Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2024) 11 (“Our precedent, and that of the Supreme Court, has made clear that Rule 4 dismissal is required 12 on procedural grounds, such as failure to exhaust or untimeliness, or on substantive grounds 13 where the claims are ‘vague,’ ‘conclusory,’ ‘palpably incredible,’ or ‘patently frivolous or 14 false.’”) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1977), and Hendricks v. Vasquez,

15 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990)). The petition should not, however, be dismissed without 16 leave to amend “unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave 17 granted.” Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). 18 In this case, Petitioner asserts Respondent’s refusal to apply FSA earned time credits to 19 his sentence, but does not provide any factual support for this contention. See Dkt. 5. Petitioner 20 instead provides a one-page, typewritten document filed by multiple other federal inmates in this 21 district. Compare id. at 5, with Mezquita Vega v. Barron, C24-0605-KKE-GJL (Dkt. 4 at 5); 22

23 1 The Court properly applies the rules governing § 2254 cases to habeas corpus petitions filed pursuant to § 2241. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254; Lane v. Feather, 584 F. App’x 843 (9th Cir. 2014). 1 Eytcheson v. Caternolo, C24-0558-JNW-BAT (Dkt. 6 at 5); and Foletti v. Caternolo, C24-0542- 2 RSM-TLF (Dkt. 3 at 5). The document makes no reference to Petitioner’s individual 3 circumstances, and merely offers boilerplate language challenging how FDC SeaTac calculates 4 FSA earned time credits. See id. The boilerplate language also specifically addresses “FSA

5 Time Credit for days in-transit after sentencing.” Dkt. 5 at 5. The language is therefore 6 inapplicable to Petitioner, who was not in-transit after sentencing and has been held at FDC 7 SeaTac since his time as a pretrial detainee. Dkt. 9, ¶3. 8 In seeking dismissal, Respondent argues, inter alia, that the petition fails to allege with 9 any specificity that Petitioner is being held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 10 States. The Court agrees with Respondent that the petition lacks necessary specificity. Indeed, 11 and as stated above, the petition fails to provide any factual information specific to Petitioner’s 12 claim. Nor did Petitioner take the opportunity to reply to Respondent. Petitioner therefore again 13 failed to identify facts supporting his ground for relief or providing any suggestion as to the 14 existence of a real possibility of a constitutional violation. The petition is no more than vague

15 and conclusory and is, as such, properly dismissed.2 16 III. CONCLUSION 17 The Court recommends Petitioner’s habeas petition be DENIED and this action be 18 DISMISSED without prejudice. A proposed order accompanies this Report and 19 Recommendation. 20

21 2 The Court finds dismissal warranted on this basis alone. The Court also notes that, while Respondent asserts a November 21, 2024 projected release date, Dkt.

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Related

Blackledge v. Allison
431 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Robert J. Jarvis v. Louis S. Nelson, Warden
440 F.2d 13 (Ninth Circuit, 1971)
Mark Lane v. Marion Feather
584 F. App'x 843 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Hernandez v. Campbell
204 F.3d 861 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Patrick Neiss v. Pete Bludworth
114 F.4th 1038 (Ninth Circuit, 2024)

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Bluebook (online)
Navarette v. Caternolo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/navarette-v-caternolo-wawd-2024.