Navaretta v. Duong

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: N24C-01-024 DJB
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOHN NAVARETTA, individually and ) as Personal Representative of the ) ESTATE OF SABRINA ) NAVARETTA, MARA NAVARETTA, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N24C-01-024 DJB ) BRITNEY DUONG, PHI SIGMA ) SIGMA, INC., STATE OF ) DELAWARE, UNIVERSITY OF ) DELAWARE, et al., ) ) Defendant.

Submitted: August 8, 2025 Decided: November 6, 2025

Memorandum Opinion On Defendant State of Delaware’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED

Gary S. Nitsche, P.A., James Gaspero, Jr., Esquire, Nitsche & Fredricks, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Plaintiffs

Zachary Collins, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for the State of Delaware

BRENNAN, J.

1 This civil action arises from a motor vehicle collision in which Sabrina

Navaretta (“Navaretta”), a University of Delaware student, was killed while driving

home from a University sponsored Greek life event called “Airband.” Navaretta

was a member of the Phi Sigma Sigma, Inc. sorority at the University. While a

passenger in a vehicle driven by Defendant Britney Duong, the two were struck by

a vehicle driven by Defendant David Sullivan. This collision occurred at the

intersection of Library Avenue and Wyoming Road in Newark, Delaware.

Tragically, Navaretta passed away from her injuries she suffered in the crash. 1 0F

Navaretta’s family brought suit against the two drivers involved in the crash, 21F

the vehicle’s manufacturer, the University of Delaware, the Greek organization Phi

Sigma Sigma, Inc. (hereinafter “Phi Sigma Sigma”), and the State of Delaware

(hereinafter “the State”) for each party’s allegedly negligent contribution to the fatal

collision. 3 The Amended Complaint brings a wrongful death claim and a survival 2F

action against all Defendants. 4 The State faces an allegation of gross negligence for 3F

its alleged failure to implement a protected arrow at the intersection where the crash

1 Navaretta v. Duong, et al., N24C-01-024 DJB, D.I. 1, ¶¶12-16. For purposes of a Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes all well pled allegations are true. Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings, LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011). 2 Because one of the drivers, David Sullivan, was under 18 at the time of the crash, Plaintiffs assert his negligence is attributable to Kelly M. Scott pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 6105 and 21 Del C. §6104. 3 See D.I. 115. 4 Id. 2 occurred. 5 4F The State initially moved to dismiss the claims against it, and

alternatively sought summary judgment, arguing the State is immune from liability. 6 5F

Following an afforded period of discovery to explore the issue of immunity, for the

following reasons, the State’s motion is GRANTED as it is immune from

prosecution of this suit.

I. Relevant Facts

On April 28, 2023 Navaretta attended a Greek life event promoted by the

University of Delaware called Airband. 7 Airband is a large dancing competition 6F

involving many of the University’s Greek organizations, including Phi Sigma

Sigma. 8 The University advertised and sponsored Airband to students, requiring the 7F

event to comply with all University procedures. 9 Airband was located at the Bob 8F

Carpenter Center in Newark, Delaware, which is not directly on the University’s

campus. 10 The University did not provide transportation for students attending 9F

Airband and instead delegated the responsibility to third parties, one being Phi

5 The remaining claims in this action are for willful and wanton misconduct (against Defendants Duong and Sullivan), negligent design, manufacture, and lack of crashworthiness (against the Toyota Defendants), and punitive damages (against the Toyota Defendants). 6 See State’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, D.I. 168. 7 D.I. 115, ¶ 12. 8 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18. 9 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19. 10 Id. at ¶ 17. 3 Sigma Sigma. 11 The University offered shuttle bus transportation to its students, 10F

however, those buses were not operating after the Airband event. 12 11F

Navaretta traveled from the event as a belted passenger in a 2021 Toyota

Corolla driven by Phi Sigma Sigma member Duong. 13 At the intersection of Library 1 F

Avenue and Wyoming Road, Duong turned left directly into the path of a vehicle

operated by David Sullivan (hereinafter “Sullivan”). 14 The two vehicles collided, 13F

inflicting injuries to Navaretta that ultimately caused her death. 15 14F

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs’ initial complaint brings suit alleging wrongful death against Duong

for the negligent operation of her motor vehicle, 16 Phi Sigma Sigma under the 15F

doctrine of respondeat superior, 17 Sullivan for the negligent operation of his motor 16F

vehicle, 18 and the University for negligence in that they failed to “provide safe 17F

transportation to and from the Airband event.” 19 Plaintiffs also include a claim 18F

11 Id. at ¶ 20. 12 Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiffs allege the shuttle bus schedules were incomplete and unreliable; had the University ensured those buses were available after Airband, Plaintiffs contend the decedent would have utilized this option instead. 13 D.I. 115, ¶¶ 11, 13. 14 Id. at ¶14. 15 Id. at ¶16. 16 D.I. 1, ¶¶12-16. 17 Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23. 18 Id. at ¶ 24. 19 Id. at ¶¶ 19, 25. Given that Defendant Duong faced criminal charges related to the collision when the first complaint was filed, Duong filed an unopposed motion to 4 against all defendants for willful and wanton misconduct. 20 The initial Complaint 19F

did not bring any claims against the State of Delaware. 21 Plaintiffs amended their 20F

Complaint on November 7, 2024, to bring claims alleging gross negligence against

the State of Delaware. 22 21F

In lieu of an Answer, on February 14, 2025, the State filed its motion to

dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment asserting sovereign and qualified

immunity from the suit. 23 The State submitted an Affidavit from the State of 22F

Delaware’s Insurance Coverage Administrator demonstrating no insurance policy

exists waiving the afforded immunity. 24 23F

Plaintiffs filed an opposition on March 6, 2025, asserting the affidavit’s

submission necessitates converting the motion to one for summary judgment,

stay the civil proceedings against her until the resolution of her criminal charges. The stay was later lifted. D.I. 13 and 49. 20 D.I. 115, ¶¶ 33-35. 21 See Memorandum Opinion on the University’s Motions, D.I. 80. In lieu of an Answer, both Phi Sigma Sigma and the University filed a Motion to Dismiss; Plaintiffs opposed each motion. Before argument the parties agreed to withdraw the motion, then following argument a Stipulation of Dismissal was filed for then- Plaintiffs Nicolle Navaretta and Andrew Navaretta, siblings of Sabrina, regarding their respective mental anguish claims against all defendants. Also following argument, the University filed a Motion to Stay Discovery and a Motion for Protective Order requesting relief from taking Duong’s deposition considering the Court’s decision on Duong’s Motion to Dismiss. The University’s Motion was denied, rendering the Motion for Protective Order denied as moot. 22 See D.I. 115. 23 D.I. 168. 24 Id., Exhibit A. 5 because the Affidavit does not conclusively show no insurance coverage exists, nor

does it preclude discovery. 25 On March 11, 2025, the State replied in agreement 24F

with the motion’s conversion to summary judgment but notes conversion

requirements already consider discovery. 26 25F

Oral argument was heard on April 24, 2025. 27 At argument, the Court 26F

converted the Motion to Dismiss into one for Summary Judgment and the parties

were afforded until June 27, 2025, to compete discovery on the issues raised. 28 The 27F

parties were to provide the Court with an update no later than July 11, 2025, with

respect to the status of this motion post-discovery. 29 Counsel for the State, on behalf 28F

of both parties, duly updated the Court on July 11 and requested leave to file

supplemental responses to the motion. 30 This request was granted. Plaintiffs’ 29F

supplemental response in opposition to the current motion was due and filed on July

25, 2025; Defendant State of Delaware’s Reply was due and filed August 8, 2025. 31 30F

25 See Plaintiffs’ Opposition, D.I. 178. 26 State’s Reply, D.I. 188; see Furman v. Delaware Department of Transp., 30 A.3d 771, 774 (Del. 2011); Clouser v. Doherty, 75 A.3d 86 (Table) (Del. 2017); and Super. Ct. R. 56(f). 27 D.I. 200. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 D.I. 224. 31 Id., D.I. 229, 232. 6 The parties requested the Court decide the supplemental motions on the papers,

therefore this matter is now ripe for decision.

III. Standard Of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party fails to meet its

burden to show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 32 If the motion is properly 31F

supported, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate there are

material issues of fact. 33 This Court will not grant summary judgment if it finds a 32F

reasonable indication of a material fact is in dispute after making all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 34 33F

IV. Analysis

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges the State is grossly negligent for

improperly maintaining the intersection of Library Avenue and Wyoming Road,

contributing to Navaretta’s death. 35 Plaintiffs assert the complaint adequately pleads 34F

facts showing the State knew of prior collisions, including fatal crashes involving

the left-turn lane, and nonetheless failed to implement a protected arrow in the left-

32 Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 33 Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979) (citations omitted). 34 See Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. 1962). 35 See D.I. 168. 7 turn lane at the intersection where Navaretta was killed, breaching the ministerial

duty to maintain safe public roadways. 3635F

The State of Delaware contends sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims

because it has neither consented to the suit, nor has immunity been waived. 37 The 36F

State argues that because no contract of insurance has been undertaken to cover the

risk of loss here, immunity has not been waived. The State further argues it is

entitled to immunity under the State Tort Claims Act (“STCA”).

a. Sovereign Immunity Sovereign immunity protects the State of Delaware, or one of its Agencies, from

being sued without its consent. 38 37F While this common law doctrine provides

immunity to the State, it can be waived by a legislative Act that clearly evidences

the General Assembly’s intent to waive immunity. 39 Title 18, Section 6511 of the 38F

Delaware Code does just that, and provides that sovereign immunity is waived when

an insurance policy exists protecting the State from claims cited in the complaint. 40 39F

Specifically, 18 Del. C. § 6511 reads:

The defense of sovereignty is waived and cannot and will not be asserted as to any risk or loss covered by the state insurance coverage program, whether same be covered by commercially procured

36 D.I. 115, ¶¶ 32, 35. 37 D.I. 168, Exhibit A. The State’s affidavit suggests no applicable insurance policy exists waiting sovereign immunity under 18 Del. C. § 6511 or any other statute. 38 Pauley v. Reinoehl, 848 A.2d 569, 573 (Del. 2009). 39 Id.; De. Const. art. I, § 9. 40 Chamberlain v. Pyle, 2018 WL 1536934, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 2, 2018). 8 insurance or by self-insurance, and every commercially procured insurance contract shall contain a provision to this effect, where appropriate. 41 40F

When no such policy exists, and in response to claims filed against the State,

it is common practice for the State to file an Affidavit of the Director of the State of

Delaware Insurance Office to this extent, which establishes sovereign immunity. 42 41F

As the originally filed Motion to Dismiss was converted into one of Summary

Judgment, the Court can now consider the Affidavit of Marcia Lundy, the Insurance

Coverage Administrator of the State of Delaware in determining whether immunity

was waived.

The Affidavit filed makes it clear that the State did not take out any additional

insurance policy that would cover the incident at bar. Not only does the record

include Ms. Lundy’s Affidavit, but Plaintiffs had the opportunity to depose Lundy

who confirmed this fact on the expanded record. In their supplemental submission,

Plaintiffs argue that the Insurance Determination Committee failed in its duties under

18 Del. C. § 6503 and therefore, this waiver of immunity should be excused. 43 They 42F

continue that § 6503 mandates the Insurance Determination Committee protect the

public from “wrongful actions of state officials and employees and failure or

41 18 Del. C. § 6511. 42 Parker v. Wireman, 2012 WL 1536934, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 2012). 43 D.I. 229, ¶ 3. 9 malfunction of state-owned property” and the State has the burden to show this was

satisfied here. 44 43F

The State correctly disagrees. There is no longer such a requirement placed

upon the State in the immunity determination. 45 Plaintiffs’ allegation that the 44F

Insurance Determination Committee failed to carry out its responsibilities and thus

cannot claim a waiver of immunity has been vetted and decided by this Court. In

Suter v. Taylor, this identical argument was presented and decided in favor of the

State. Suter concluded that the Supreme Court of Delaware, in its Doe v. Cates

decision, has abrogated the requirement previously placed upon the State to analyze

the efforts of the Insurance Determination Committee. 4645F

Having failed to present legal authority to the contrary, Plaintiffs’ argument

that a showing regarding the Committee’s efforts prior to finding a grant of immunity

is required fails. Following the period of discovery afforded to Plaintiffs to examine

this claim, the record does not support that sovereign immunity has been waived. 4746F

44 Id. 45 Suter v. Taylor, 2023 WL 2987104 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2023), citing Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d 1175 (Del. 1985). 46 Suter, 2023 WL 2987104 at *3. 47 Jackson v. State, 2000 WL 33115718, at *1 (Del. Super. July 7, 2000). 10 b. Immunity under STCA Analyzing the State’s immunity under STCA is only necessary if sovereign

immunity is waived. 48 The STCA alternatively immunizes the State from claims of 47F

negligence unless a plaintiff can show the State breached a ministerial duty, acted in

gross negligence, or acted in bad faith. 49 Ministerial acts are those “which a person 48F

performs in a prescribed manner without regard to his own judgment concerning the

act to be done,” 50 whereas discretionary acts “require some determination or 49F

implementation which allows a choice of methods, or, differently stated, those where

there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct.” 51 Delaware law has routinely 50F

found duties related to public safety, when mandated by law or policy, are ministerial

rather than discretionary. 52 51F

48 Parker, 2012 WL 1536934, at *1 (“if it is determined that the state has waived sovereign immunity under 18 Del. C. § 6551 or another statute, then it is appropriate to next determine whether the limitation on civil liability set forth in the State Tort Claims Act bars the action”). 49 Horvat v. State Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 2017 WL 5068574, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 30, 2017) aff’d sub nom. Horvat v. State of Delaware Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 189 A.3d 186 (Del. 2018). 50 Gutierrez v. Advanced Student Transportation, Inc., 2015 WL 4460342, at *4 (Del. Super. July 14, 2015) quoting Simms v. Christiana Sch. Dist., 2004 WL 344015, at *8 (Del. Super. Jan 30, 2004). 51 Id. 52 See O’Connell v. Lebloch, 2000 WL 703712 (Del. Super. Apr. 19, 2000) (finding inspecting and maintaining the windows of a public school is ministerial not discretionary); see also Scarborough v. Alexis I. duPont High Sch., 1986 WL 10507 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 1986) (holding inspecting bleachers on a high school’s property is a ministerial duty). 11 However, because sovereign immunity was not waived, there is no need for

the Court now to decide whether the STCA applies. Once again, the guidance

received from the Doe Court is instructive:

At the time the State Tort Claims Act was enacted, the State Insurance Act, including 19 Del C. § 6511 … was already in existence. When the General Assembly enacted the State Tort Claims Act it is presumed to have been aware of the existing law which included 18 Del C. § 6511. DuPont v. DuPont, Del. Supr. 87 A.3d 394 (1952) waived immunity only as to risks covered by the State Insurance Program. If 10 Del. C. § 4001 were interpreted [to waive immunity], it would have the effect of waiving immunity even in cases where no insurance coverage had been provided under the Insurance Act of 18 Del. C. ch. 65. Such an interpretation would expand the liability the State has agreed to under 18 Del. C. ch. 65, and therefore, would be inconsistent with the stated purpose and the title of the Tort Claims Act, including liability. 53 52F

The State Tort Claims Act does not act to satisfy a waiver of immunity under the

standards delineated above, which would be Plaintiffs only avenue for relief in suit

against the State, therefore the State is immunized from this civil action.

53 Doe, 499 A.2d at 1181. 12 V. Conclusion As a result of the above findings, summary judgment is be GRANTED in the

State’s favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________ Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

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