Naugher v. Mallory

631 S.W.2d 370, 3 Educ. L. Rep. 1145, 1982 Mo. App. LEXIS 3829
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 23, 1982
DocketWD 32477
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 631 S.W.2d 370 (Naugher v. Mallory) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Naugher v. Mallory, 631 S.W.2d 370, 3 Educ. L. Rep. 1145, 1982 Mo. App. LEXIS 3829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

CLARK, Presiding Judge.

By petition in mandamus, appellants sought a compulsory directive that respondents, the Commissioner of Education of Missouri and the State Board of Education, implement procedures leading to an election for establishment of a six-director school district in the city of St. Peters. Relief was denied by the trial court and this appeal followed.

The case is presented here on a joint stipulation of facts. The growing community of St. Peters, located south and west of metropolitan St. Louis, is served by three school districts, each of which also includes rural areas of sizable proportions beyond the St. Peters city limits. With the stated intention of creating a new St. Peters School District, residents of St. Peters presented a petition bearing 625 signatures to the Commissioner of Education in July 1978. The petition contained the following recitation:

“We the undersigned residents of the R-2 Fort Zumwalt School District of St. Charles County, Missouri are petitioning the Board of Education to establish the appropriate procedure [sic] in order to consider the question of creating a St. Peters School District as taken from the existing R-2 Fort Zumwalt School District.”

In addition to the R-2 District, the city of St. Peters was also served at the times *372 material hereto by the Francis Howell R-3 District and the St. Charles R-6 District with the result that children in St. Peters would attend one of three separately administered schools, the choice being dependent on where the child’s residence was located. In their petition to the state, however, appellants made no reference to the R-3 or R-6 districts. The petitioners described themselves as residents of the Fort Zumwalt District and the petition expressed concern at a perceived failure of the district to meet the educational needs of children in St. Peters.

The petition was received at the State Department of Education and was returned with a letter dated July 27, 1978. The petitioners were advised that no statutory method existed whereby a new St. Peters School District could be created from a portion of the Fort Zumwalt District. Additional correspondence followed, to no avail, and this action in mandamus followed.

The thrust of appellants’ contention, which surfaces in this record for the first time when the mandamus action was filed December 27, 1979, is that §§ 162.211 and 162.221, RSMo 1978 1 cover the situation in St. Peters, a city divided by school district lines not located in a county of the first class. Appellants argue that the Commissioner of Education is chargeable with knowledge of these facts and, when confronted with their petition, although inart-fully drawn, the Commissioner should have recognized the applicability of § 162.211 2 to the situation. The required action was, they say, to dispatch a representative to St. Peters to determine the boundaries of the new school district and arrange for a popular election. Enforcement of procedures under the petition as filed rather than petitioning the Board of Education anew is critical to the school reorganization efforts by appellants because St. Charles County became a county of the first class January 1. 1979, and thereafter § 162.211 no longer applied. 3

In their challenge to the order of the trial court quashing the alternative writ and dismissing the petition, appellants first contend the court erred as to the facts and the law when it held the petition to the Board of Education was insufficient as an attempt to form a six-director district because petitioners were not voters of a city divided by a school district boundary but were voters of only the Fort Zumwalt School District. Appellants assert their petition showed those who signed were St. Peters residents and, as such, § 162.211 grants to them the opportunity to vote to establish a six-director district. Appellants contend those who signed the petition were entitled to call for the election, and it was *373 immaterial which school district each represented so long as all resided in St. Peters.

Assuming for the purpose of disposition here that the Commissioner was chargeable with notice that all petitioners resided in the city of St. Peters, an assumption by no means presumptive because many signatures were followed by no more than a street number and street name, the issue is not one of eligibility to participate in an election to establish a six-director district. The petition in mandamus charges that the petition was sufficient to require implementation of the procedures under § 162.221. The trial court found, as the petition itself stated, that those signing all resided in the Fort Zumwalt District. It therefore follows, necessarily, that no residents of the Francis Howell or St. Charles districts were petitioning for creation of the six-director district. Section 162.221 plainly requires that a petition to create the six-director district authorized by § 162.211 contain signatures of “at least ten percent in number of those voting for school board members in the last annual school election in each district or one hundred voters, whichever is the higher number.” The Commissioner no doubt concluded, as the trial court found, that the petition failed to generate any required action under § 162.221 because no patrons of the two other affected districts had joined in seeking election for a six-director district.

It is to be anticipated that a six-director district established under § 162.211 will unify school administration in the city by amalgamating portions of school districts which formerly divided thé city. The petition to set the boundaries of the new district need not, however, be generated by city residents alone. In fact, the petition would normally include school district patrons without regard to residence in the city because it could well be impossible to meet the minimum signature requirement if only a small portion of one of the districts, as here, intruded into the city. There is no restriction, expressed or implied, in the statute that those who petition must live in the city or town, only that each school district be represented by the minimum number of petitioners.

In the present ease, the petition to establish a St. Peters School District was insufficient in fact and in law because it did not contain signatures of at least ten percent of those voting at the last school board elections in the Francis Howell and St. Charles school districts as well as those voting in the Fort Zumwalt District, all three districts being partially within the city limits of St. Peters. It was immaterial whether the petitioners lived in St. Peters at all. Appellants made no attempt to show qualification of the petition with the representative requirements from the three school districts and the trial court was therefore correct in holding that the petition by residents of the Fort Zumwalt District created no duty on the respondents to act pursuant to § 162.221.

Appellants next take issue with the trial court’s finding that the relief sought by mandamus was not the same as was requested in the petition to the Board of Education. This point turns on the petition phrase “creating a St.

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Bluebook (online)
631 S.W.2d 370, 3 Educ. L. Rep. 1145, 1982 Mo. App. LEXIS 3829, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/naugher-v-mallory-moctapp-1982.