Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Transp.
This text of 374 F. Supp. 3d 634 (Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Transp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MARK A. GOLDSMITH, United States District Judge
OPINION & ORDER
(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKTS. 57 & 59); (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKTS. 64 & 67); AND (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR ENBRIDGE'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 68)
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's ("NWF") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkts. 57 & 59), Defendants the Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation ("Secretary") and Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's ("PHMSA") (collectively, "Federal Defendants") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkts. 64 & 67), and Defendant-Intervenor Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership's ("Enbridge") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 68).
In the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 34), NWF seeks review of PHMSA and Enbridge's actions under the Administrative Procedure Act,
NWF argues that PHMSA's interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380,
I. BACKGROUND
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. In the prior case, National Wildlife Federation v. Secretary of United States Department of Transportation ("NWF I"),
The present case concerns another challenge to the spill response plan approval process, albeit a narrower one. Instead of challenging the approval of every spill response plan for every oil pipeline in the last two decades, NWF is now challenging only the approval of two spill response plans for a pipeline known as Line 5 - a 30-inch-diameter pipeline that was constructed in 1953. It spans 641 miles beginning in Superior, Wisconsin, passing through Michigan's Upper Peninsula, under the Straits of Mackinac, through Michigan's Lower Peninsula, and across the St. Clair River, to Sarnia, Ontario, Canada. Enbridge Answer ¶¶ 2, 42, 80-81 (Dkt. 36); Fed. Def. Answer ¶¶ 83, 86 (Dkt. 35). The Straits of Mackinac are a six-mile-long section of water that joins Lake Michigan and Lake Huron into a single hydraulic system. NWF Mot. ¶ 3. It is spanned at its narrowest point (four miles) by the Mackinac Bridge, which connects Michigan's Upper and Lower peninsulas.
Although one has never occurred, an oil spill in the Straits of Mackinac poses a significant threat to Lake Michigan and Lake Huron. The currents in the Straits can be quite strong and tend to reverse direction every few days. David J. Schwab Decl., Ex. 1. to NWF Mot. to Amend, at PageID.865. According to a recent study, because of the reversing currents, an oil spill in the Straits is almost equally likely to be found east or west of the Straits, and could travel as far as nine miles in either direction. Id. ¶ 6. More than 700 miles of shoreline in Lakes Michigan and Huron are potentially vulnerable to an oil spill in the Straits. Id. ¶¶ 13-18.
*643To avoid such ecological disasters, legislative and regulatory measures have been adopted. A year after the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, the Oil Protection Act, which amended section 311 of the CWA, was enacted, with the goal of preventing another such tragedy by prohibiting owners and operators of certain oil facilities from transporting oil unless they had a spill response plan approved by the President. See
The President delegated his authority under the CWA - to issue regulations and review and approve response plans - to different executive branch departments. See Executive Order No. 12777,
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MARK A. GOLDSMITH, United States District Judge
OPINION & ORDER
(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKTS. 57 & 59); (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKTS. 64 & 67); AND (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR ENBRIDGE'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 68)
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's ("NWF") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkts. 57 & 59), Defendants the Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation ("Secretary") and Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's ("PHMSA") (collectively, "Federal Defendants") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkts. 64 & 67), and Defendant-Intervenor Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership's ("Enbridge") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 68).
In the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 34), NWF seeks review of PHMSA and Enbridge's actions under the Administrative Procedure Act,
NWF argues that PHMSA's interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380,
I. BACKGROUND
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. In the prior case, National Wildlife Federation v. Secretary of United States Department of Transportation ("NWF I"),
The present case concerns another challenge to the spill response plan approval process, albeit a narrower one. Instead of challenging the approval of every spill response plan for every oil pipeline in the last two decades, NWF is now challenging only the approval of two spill response plans for a pipeline known as Line 5 - a 30-inch-diameter pipeline that was constructed in 1953. It spans 641 miles beginning in Superior, Wisconsin, passing through Michigan's Upper Peninsula, under the Straits of Mackinac, through Michigan's Lower Peninsula, and across the St. Clair River, to Sarnia, Ontario, Canada. Enbridge Answer ¶¶ 2, 42, 80-81 (Dkt. 36); Fed. Def. Answer ¶¶ 83, 86 (Dkt. 35). The Straits of Mackinac are a six-mile-long section of water that joins Lake Michigan and Lake Huron into a single hydraulic system. NWF Mot. ¶ 3. It is spanned at its narrowest point (four miles) by the Mackinac Bridge, which connects Michigan's Upper and Lower peninsulas.
Although one has never occurred, an oil spill in the Straits of Mackinac poses a significant threat to Lake Michigan and Lake Huron. The currents in the Straits can be quite strong and tend to reverse direction every few days. David J. Schwab Decl., Ex. 1. to NWF Mot. to Amend, at PageID.865. According to a recent study, because of the reversing currents, an oil spill in the Straits is almost equally likely to be found east or west of the Straits, and could travel as far as nine miles in either direction. Id. ¶ 6. More than 700 miles of shoreline in Lakes Michigan and Huron are potentially vulnerable to an oil spill in the Straits. Id. ¶¶ 13-18.
*643To avoid such ecological disasters, legislative and regulatory measures have been adopted. A year after the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, the Oil Protection Act, which amended section 311 of the CWA, was enacted, with the goal of preventing another such tragedy by prohibiting owners and operators of certain oil facilities from transporting oil unless they had a spill response plan approved by the President. See
The President delegated his authority under the CWA - to issue regulations and review and approve response plans - to different executive branch departments. See Executive Order No. 12777,
In 1993, the Secretary re-delegated authority for onshore facilities to an agency within DOT, the Research and Special Programs Administration ("RSPA") - which authority was delegated once again, in 2005, to RSPA's successor within DOT, PHMSA. See
At the same time, DOI issued an Interim Final Rule,
Because Executive Order 12777 had expanded DOI's traditional role of regulating facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf, the department subsequently delegated its responsibilities regarding spill prevention to DOT and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). In a 1994 memorandum of understanding, DOI delegated to EPA "responsibility for non-transportation-related offshore facilities located landward of the coast line," and delegated to DOT "responsibility for transportation-related facilities, including pipelines, located landward of the coast line." 40 C.F.R. § Pt. 112, App. B.
Since that time, both RSPA and PHMSA have reviewed response plans for pipelines situated landward of the Nation's coasts, without challenge to their authority or the propriety of their actions, until NWF I was filed. After NWF I was initiated, the Secretary ratified RSPA's and PHMSA's approvals, including plans "covering pipeline segments located in, on, or under inland waters..." NWF I,
As noted above, this case involves two response plans. Under federal regulations, pipeline operators are required to submit a response plan for "a geographic area either along a length of pipeline or including multiple pipelines, containing one or more adjacent line sections, for which the operator must plan for the deployment of, and *644provide, spill response capabilities."
PHMSA approved Enbridge's response plan for the Superior Region Response Zone on July 6, 2015 (the "2015 Superior Plan"); this plan covered a response zone that "begins at the Canadian border near Neche, North Dakota and continues across northern Minnesota into Wisconsin and Michigan."1 The small portion that covers Michigan includes certain segments of Line 5.2 PHMSA also approved Enbridge's response plan for the Great Lakes Region Response Zone on June 7, 2017 (the "2017 Great Lakes Plan").3 The Great Lakes zone covers the rest of Michigan and covers portions of Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, and New York.4 The 2017 Great Lakes Plan covers all of Line 5 located in Michigan.5
*645NWF asserts that the Federal Defendants have misclassified Line 5 as a single-onshore facility and failed to follow the requirements set forth in the CWA by approving without sufficient explanation the 2015 Superior Plan and 2017 Great Lakes Plan (collectively, "Response Plans") submitted by Enbridge. Additionally, NWF maintains that the Federal Defendants failed to follow statutory requirements by approving the Response Plans without first complying with their mandatory duties under NEPA and the ESA.
II. STANDARDS OF DECISION
Under the APA, "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action."
III. ANALYSIS
NWF makes three arguments in its motion for summary judgment. First, it argues that the Federal Defendants' approvals of the Enbridge Response Plans were arbitrary and capricious because they did not comply with the CWA as amended by the OPA, specifically with respect to its interpretation of "onshore" facility. Second, NWF argues that the Federal Defendants' approvals of the Enbridge Response Plans were arbitrary and capricious because PHMSA failed to sufficiently explain the bases for the approvals. Third, it argues that because PHMSA has discretion to approve response plans under the CWA, PHMSA was required, under NEPA, to prepare an environmental impact statement and, under the ESA, to consult with the appropriate federal agencies to ensure that listed endangered species and their habitats would not be jeopardized. The Court will take each argument in turn.
A. The CWA's Response Plan Requirements
NWF argues that PHMSA's approval of the Response Plans was arbitrary and capricious because PHMSA incorrectly considers Line 5 a single "onshore facility" under the CWA. It further argues that even if Line 5 is considered a single onshore facility, PHMSA's Response Plan approvals were deficient.
1. Onshore and Offshore Facilities
The parties disagree about whether an oil pipeline should be considered a single *646"onshore" facility, as Defendants contend, or numerous "onshore" and "offshore" facilities, as NWF contends. If NWF is correct, the Federal Defendants acted improperly in approving a single response plan in each response zone, instead of insisting on response plans for most onshore and all offshore segments. As noted in NWF I, the CWA does not expressly address whether inter-connected pipelines over both land and water should be viewed as embracing a single facility - and characterized as solely onshore or offshore - or whether they should be viewed as a collection of different facilities with separate land and water segments. NWF I,
Because the parties' conflicting interpretations of the CWA indicate that the statute may be ambiguous, the Court must review the matter under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
The CWA requires an owner or operator of a facility"to prepare and submit to the President a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge ["WCD"], and to a substantial threat of such a discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance."
Facilities include both offshore facilities and onshore facilities.
The Court finds the CWA is ambiguous with respect to onshore facilities that cross navigable waters. As Defendants point out correctly, the CWA defines a pipeline as a single facility, even if it is made up of a group of structures.
NWF does not challenge that PHMSA's interpretation was promulgated via notice-and-comment rulemaking or through a formal adjudication. Therefore, the remaining question at issue is whether PHMSA's interpretation of an onshore facility that crosses navigable waters is reasonable. The Court finds that it is.
PHMSA interprets oil pipelines as single onshore facilities inclusive of all segments, even those that cross navigable waters. Fed. Def. Mot. at 14. In other words, an oil pipeline is a single facility defined by its beginning and end points of oil transportation.
PHMSA's definition also makes sense from a practical perspective. A single response plan, or in this case two response plans, will likely promote a timely and efficient response to a spill, by avoiding the need to identify and implement every plan that might be impacted in the frantic initial effort to contain and thwart migration of a spill.
Furthermore, whether an oil pipeline is characterized as a single onshore facility or a collection of both onshore and offshore facilities does not change the CWA's requirements. The CWA explicitly requires response plans for onshore facilities that "could reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm to the environment by discharging into or on the navigable waters."
Because there is an ambiguity in the CWA with respect to response plan requirements for pipelines, the Court must defer to the Federal Defendants' reasonable reading of the CWA. Sierra Club,
2. Response Plan Requirements
(i) Locations
NWF argues that even if Line 5 is considered one onshore facility, the Response Plans still do not satisfy the CWA's requirements. NWF Mot. at 26. NWF argues that both response plans calculate the WCD at facilities that are a significant *648distance away from Line 5, which it says is improper. Id. at 24, 26-27.
The CWA requires response plans to, among other things,
(iii) identify, and ensure by contract or other means approved by the President the availability of, private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge;
(iv) describe the training, equipment testing, periodic unannounced drills, and response actions of persons on the vessel or at the facility, to be carried out under the plan to ensure the safety of the vessel or facility and to mitigate or prevent the discharge, or the substantial threat of a discharge;
NWF is mistaken that the Response Plans are deficient because they consider the WCD at facilities remote to Line 5. NWF argues that qualitatively the most significant risk of harm to navigable waters in the response zones are the pipes running parallel to the Mackinac Bridge and the pipe segments crossing the Saginaw and St. Clair Rivers. NWF Mot. at 24. However, the CWA defines WCD as the location of the "the largest foreseeable discharge in adverse weather conditions."
The Response Plans identify facilities within the respective response zones where the largest volume of oil could be released. The Response Plans provide the methodology and the calculations used to determine the locations of the WCDs.6 NWF has not explained why as a quantitative matter, Enbridge's calculations are incorrect. Instead, NWF attempts to confuse the matter by equating "worst case discharge," which under the regulations relates to the largest volume of oil, with a "worst case scenario," which it would argue is an oil spill in the Straits of Mackinac or in the Saginaw and St. Clair Rivers. There is no basis in the regulations for NWF's qualitative argument that areas other than the ones identified in the Response Plans should be identified as the WCDs in the Response Plans. The Response Plans identify the locations of the potential WCDs within the meaning of the federal regulations. Accordingly, there is nothing deficient with the Response Plans with respect to the locations identified as sites for a potential WCDs.
(ii) Equipment
NWF further argues that the Response Plans do not explain what specific equipment and response actions Enbridge has determined are necessary to ensure the safety of the facility and to mitigate or prevent WCD at the identified locations, especially in adverse weather conditions. NWF Mot. at 27-28. Defendants make two arguments in response. The Federal Defendants *649argue the Response Plans meet the CWA requirements because Enbridge contracted with Oil Spill Removal Organizations ("OSROs") that have received WCD classifications from the United States Coast Guard. Fed. Def. Mot. at 22. They assert that a WCD classification represents the Coast Guard's expert judgment that an OSRO has the necessary resources to respond to a WCD in adverse weather conditions in a particular geographic area.
The Federal Defendants' first argument cannot be reconciled with the CWA's requirements. The CWA's response plan requirements are explicit. The CWA requires a response plan to ensure the removal, to the maximum extent practicable, of the largest foreseeable discharge in adverse weather conditions, and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of the largest foreseeable discharge in adverse weather conditions.
each response plan must include a core plan that provides an information summary (e.g., operator address; description of response zones; contact information for designated spill response manager), and additional detail on immediate notification procedures; spill detection and mitigation procedures; the applicable response organization; response activities and response resources; government agencies that will provide support; training procedures; equipment testing; drill types, schedules, and procedures; and plan review and update procedures.
Pipeline Safety: Response Plans for Onshore Transportation-Related Oil Pipelines, 70 FR 8734-01 (emphasis added).
As noted above, one of the driving forces behind OPA was the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which discharged almost eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound in the Gulf of Alaska. At that time, there were not enough dispersants, skimmers, and containment booms available to mitigate and control the oil spread, which eventually reached shorelines and caused significant and ongoing environmental damage. Response plans under the CWA are a direct response to the shortcomings of the response to the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989. See
*650It is not enough that the United States Coast Guard qualifies that an OSRO has sufficient resources to address a WCD in a given response zone. The response plan itself, as required by the CWA, must identify resources available and strategies to be implemented in the event of an oil discharge into or around navigable waters. In some instances, the operator of an oil pipeline is required to respond to an oil spill in a matter of hours.
The Federal Defendants' second argument, however, which Enbridge joins, has more teeth. They argue that the Response Plans comply with the CWA and federal regulations by addressing necessary equipment and response actions. Fed. Def. Mot. at 22-23; Enbridge Mot. at 24-25. Annex 1.7 to the respective Response Plans describe Enbridge's local spill response equipment in detail.8 Enbridge has a master service agreement with a number of OSROs, and their equipment is detailed in Annex 2.9 The Response Plans provide maps showing the location of response resources and the response times.10 The Response Plans further provide guidance on emergency response and management during an incident.11 And the Response Plans purport to have appropriate equipment to operate in adverse weather conditions and respond to a WCD.12
NWF argues that the guidance in the Response Plans is merely general in nature and fails to provide specific action plans. NWF Mot. at 27. NWF is mistaken. The Response Plans each begin with an overview setting forth objectives in order of importance and specific strategies to meet those objectives. The Response Plans then provide more than a hundred pages of comprehensive response protocols and response actions.13
NWF does not explain what is defective in these protocols and response actions other than to say that they lack a certain level of detail. The Response Plans contain information directed at each of the relevant requirements under
*651Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
B. Were Federal Defendants' approvals arbitrary and capricious because they failed to explain the approvals?
NWF argues that PHMSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not explain its decisions to approve Enbridge's Response Plans. NWF Mot. at 29. The Federal Defendants contend that PHMSA followed its response plan review process, which it argues is satisfactory under the CWA. Id. at 16-18. Enbridge agrees and asserts that the administrative record details PHMSA's efforts to confirm that the Response Plans satisfy the response planning criteria specified under Section 311(j)(5)(D). Enbridge Mot. at 26-27. NWF has the better part of the argument.
The APA requires courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
Further, courts "should accept the agency's factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Arkansas,
relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible *652that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
A court must not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency," Judulang,
" 'Nevertheless, merely because [a court's] review must be deferential does not mean that [it] must also be inconsequential.' " Kentucky Waterways All. v. Johnson,
PHMSA did not articulate a satisfactory explanation for its decision to approve the Response Plans. PHMSA's review process was conducted using a standard set of regulatory review criteria. Fed. Def. Mot. at 17. Two PHMSA reviewers addressed the criteria using standard worksheets.15 The worksheets are broken down by regulatory requirements and present checklist-type questions to which reviewers may respond.16 For example, the first category asks the following:
Is the pipeline described in the Plan jurisdictional to PHMSA's Part 194 jurisdiction?
Score ACCEPTABLE if the Plan includes Part 194 jurisdictional elements (onshore pipelines/breakout tanks). If the reviewer believes that the facility described in the Plan is not jurisdictional to PHMSA Part 194 regulations please notify HQ personnel.
PHMSA005719 (citing
Does the Plan include procedures for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge?
Comments: Yes.
PHMSA005724 (citing
Occasionally, the reviewers answer yes with cursory or conclusory statements that the particular criterion was met. For example, question sixteen says the following:
Does the Plan show the methodology and calculations the operator used to determine the Worst Case Discharge, based on the pipeline, breakout tank, and historic discharge components, for each Response Zone in the Plan?
Comments: Yes; pipeline, max historic discharge and BOT all addressed appropriately.
PHMSA005723 (citing
A similarly cursory response is made to question twenty-three:
Does the Plan establish provisions to ensure the protection of safety at the response site?
Comments: Yes; Site Safety and Health Plan required and Safety Officer discussed throughout the Plan (responsibilities on PDF pg. 89).
PHMSA005726 (citing
No deficiencies were found with the 2015 Superior Plan, therefore a standard letter of approval was issued stating the following:
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has received and reviewed Enbridge (U.S.). Inc.'s oil spill response plan for the Superior Region Response Zone dated May 2015. We conclude that the Plan complies with PHMSA's regulations concerning onshore oil pipelines found at 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 194. Your Response Plan has been approved.
This approval is valid for five years from the date of this letter. You must revise and resubmit a Response Plan for approval by July 6, 2020. If discrepancies are found during PHMSA inspections, or if new or different operating conditions or information would substantially affect the implementation of this plan, you will be required to resubmit a revised plan. See49 CFR § 194.121 (b).
Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at (202) 366-4595 or by email at PHMSA.OPA90@dot.gov. Please include the sequence number and your PHMSA Operator *654Identification Number on any future correspondence.
PHMSA005760; see also Fed. Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that if response plans contain all the required elements, PHMSA issues a letter of approval). Some deficiencies were found in the 2017 Great Lakes Plan, for which PHMSA issued a letter of correction explaining that the plan could not be approved without correcting the deficiencies.18 A revised response plan was submitted by Enbridge, and after further review,19 PHMSA issued an approval letter largely tracking the 2015 Superior Plan approval letter.20
NWF argues that PHMSA's explanation for its approvals were deficient and analogizes to Sierra Club v. Mainella,
Defendants attempt to pivot and argue that here, as in Mainella, the Court should look to the administrative record as a whole to determine if PHMSA's decisions were adequately explained. Fed. Def. Mot. at 23; Enbridge Mot. at 26-27. Defendants argue that the respective checklists explain adequately the bases for PHMSA's approvals when reviewed in conjunction with the relevant pages in the Response Plans.
In Alaska Department, the Supreme Court found the EPA's skeletal orders were sufficient when considered with the EPA's explanatory correspondences.
Furthermore, the Court cannot reasonably discern PHMSA's path to its decisions. Although Defendants argue that the Court can divine PHMSA's reasoning from *655the administrative record as a whole, that is simply not the case. The Response Plans contain approximately 2,000 pages of detailed and often technical information. It is neither feasible nor appropriate for the Court to sift through the Response Plans and independently conclude that they meet the CWA requirements. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.,
Accordingly, the Court finds that, as to each of PHMSA's decisions approving Enbridge's Response Plans, PHMSA failed to explain adequately its conclusions that the Response Plans met the CWA's requirements. Those decisions are, therefore, arbitrary and capricious under the APA. It may be the case that PHMSA can explain its conclusions to approve the Response Plans. Therefore, the Court remands the decisions to PHMSA for a full explanation of its reasons for approving Enbridge's Response Plans. See Home Builders,
C. Did the Federal Defendants violate NEPA and the ESA?
The parties contend that whether PHMSA has obligations under NEPA and the ESA turns on whether it has the "discretion" to meaningfully influence response plans based on environmental concerns. NWF Mot. at 37; Fed. Def. Mot. at 23-28; Enbridge Mot. at 28. NWF argues that PHMSA is required to prepare environmental impact statements under NEPA and consult with relevant agencies under the ESA, because its approvals are discretionary. Pl. Mot. at 37. Defendants argue that PHMSA's approvals are not discretionary, and therefore NEPA requirements and ESA consultations do not apply to its response plan approvals.
As explained below, the Court concludes that PHMSA has obligations under NEPA and the ESA because its review of response plans includes an exercise of environmental judgment for which the environmental information imparted by way of those statutory processes could well be useful.
1. National Environmental Policy Act
Congress enacted NEPA "[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation."
To that end, "all agencies of the Federal Government shall ... include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-"
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, *656(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
This Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") requirement serves the twin policy concerns that, first, an agency is obligated "to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action," and second, "it ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process." Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
The Supreme Court has instructed that the touchstone for the applicability of NEPA is whether its process would be "useful" to an agency's decision-making process. "[I]nherent in NEPA and its implementing regulations is a 'rule of reason,' which ensures that agencies determine whether and to what extent to prepare an EIS based on the usefulness of any new potential information to the decisionmaking process." Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen,
*6572. The Endangered Species Act
"The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,
However, the ESA-consultation is triggered only if "there is discretionary Federal involvement or control,"
3. PHMSA Discretion
Regarding whether PHMSA has discretion in reviewing response plans, the parties dispute the meaning of
As noted above, the Court must review competing statutory interpretations under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
The issue of whether agencies have the necessary discretion and authority under the CWA to deny oil spill response plans has not often been addressed by the courts. The only case to take this issue head-on is Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell,
The Jewell panel majority held that the statutory language and the structure of
(i) be consistent with the requirements of the National Contingency Plan [NCP] and Area Contingency Plans [ACP];
(ii) identify the qualified individual having full authority to implement removal actions, and require immediate communications between that individual and the appropriate Federal official and the persons providing personnel and equipment pursuant to clause (iii);
(iii) identify, and ensure by contract or other means approved by the President the availability of, private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge;
(iv) describe the training, equipment testing, periodic unannounced drills, and response actions of persons on the vessel or at the facility, to be carried out under the plan to ensure the safety of the vessel or facility and to mitigate or prevent the discharge, or the substantial threat of a discharge;
(v) be updated periodically; and
(vi) be resubmitted for approval of each significant change.
(i) promptly review such response plan;
(ii) require amendments to any plan that does not meet the requirements of this paragraph;
(iii) approve any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph;
(iv) review each plan periodically thereafter; and
(v) in the case of a plan for a nontank vessel, consider any applicable State-mandated response plan in effect on August 9, 2004, and ensure consistency to the extent practicable.
The Jewell majority reasoned that the three instructions - "to the maximum extent practicable," the six enumerated criteria, *659and the "shall approve" requirement under section 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) - created an ambiguity. The majority reasoned that although the "maximum extent practicable" language suggested discretion, the six requirements read like a check list, which, if met, requires response plan approval.
Judge Gould criticized the majority decision for erroneously affording Chevron deference to BSEE's interpretation of a statute where no ambiguity exists. Jewell,
The Federal Defendants, relying in part on the Jewell majority opinion, argue that the CWA does not give PHMSA discretion to decide whether a response plan is "acceptable," nor does it have the discretion to "disapprove" a response plan that meets the criteria under
The CWA explicitly allows PHMSA to "require amendments to any plan that does not meet the requirements of this paragraph."
*660Judge Gould criticized the majority opinion for relying so heavily on the "shall" approve any plan that "meets the requirements of this paragraph" language without giving consideration to the substance of those requirements. Jewell,
To be sure, if the land is acceptable, and if [the private company] transfers land and/or cash equal in value, Congress has directed that the Secretary "shall...convey all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the land." The Forest Service does lack the discretion to convey less than all right, title, and interest, or to refuse to make the exchange if all the conditions are met. But it does not lack all discretion in the process, its actions are not purely ministerial, nor will compliance with NEPA be an empty formality.
Other aspects of the statute show the considerable environmental judgment that must be exercised. Section 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii) requires a response plan to identify and ensure the availability of "personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge...and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge."
This is not a checkbox requirement that is met if an operator identifies two responders and a bucket; it requires PHMSA to bring its expertise to bear on the sufficiency of personnel and equipment within the limits of available technology to remove and mitigate oil spills. PHMSA has the discretion to decide a response plan is lacking in this regard and send it back to the operator for correction.
Section 1321(j)(5)(D)(i) also confers discretion upon PHMSA in the response plan review process. The first requirement is that a response plan must be "be consistent with the requirements of the [NCP] and [ACP]."
Indeed, the NCP has explicit instructions for evaluating the sufficiency of response plans. It mandates that the Fish and Wildlife Annex to the ACP "[d]efine the requirements for evaluating the compatibility between this annex and non-federal response plans (including those of vessels, facilities, and pipelines ) on issues affecting fish and wildlife, their habitat, and sensitive environments."
Facility owners or operators must determine the maximum distance at which a worst case oil spill from their facility could cause injury to fish and wildlife and sensitive environments and develop a plan for mitigating that discharge's potential adverse effects. Facility plans must be consistent with the requirements of the NCP, the National Response Framework (NRF), RCP and this ACP Annex. Pipeline plans in the Region will be reviewed and approved by DOT.
Fish and Wildlife Annex to the ACP Part I subheading 10 - Compatibility of Non-Federal Response Plans (emphasis added).25
The ACP makes clear that PHMSA must review response plans and decide if they contain adequate plans to mitigate environmental consequences. Determining whether a response plan is consistent with the NCP and ACP, which specifically calls for environmental protection, again calls for PHMSA to exercise its judgment and expertise in the approval process. This is not a box to be checked; and PHMSA should not review a response plan's adequacy "on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct." Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council,
Defendants' analysis, like that of the Jewell majority, is faulty because it ignores the underlying rationale for evaluating whether the agency has any discretion. The rationale is that where an agency cannot take into account environmental concerns in its decisionmaking, then compliance with NEPA and the EPA would serve no purpose. So long as some elements *662of the decisionmaking involve environmental judgments for which information supplied through the NEPA and ESA processes might reasonably be useful, the decisionmaking is discretionary.
Even if some of the § 1321(j)(5)(D) criteria are mechanical, some are clearly not. Some discretion is all that is required to trigger compliance with NEPA and the ESA. See RESTORE,
Defendants rely on cases in which the relevant agencies had no discretion to consider environmental consequences: Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,
In Public Citizen, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's ("FMCSA") did not violate NEPA when it failed to analyze the impact of increased cross-border truck traffic in its EA, because it had no authority to take environmental consequences into its decisionmaking with respect to vehicle registration. Pub. Citizen,
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the FMCSA could not be the indirect effect of increased emissions, because it was the presidential order allowing Mexican carriers into the United States that caused the increase in emissions, and FMCSA lacked authority to countermand the President.
Public Citizen thus stands for the proposition that NEPA has application only where the agency has the authority to utilize the environmental information that a NEPA review would generate. If it has no such authority, the information would not be useful and need not be generated.
Similarly, in Home Builders, the Court addressed a tension between the CWA's requirement to transfer certain permitting powers to state authorities and one of the ESA's consultation requirements under Section 7.
Here, unlike in Public Citizen and Home Builders, the CWA directs PHMSA to review response plans for compliance with environmental concerns and grants it the authority to exercise its discretion to require operators to amend response plans it deems deficient. PHMSA's response plan approvals are based on the experience and training of the agency, which are the hallmark indicia of discretion. It cannot be reasonably in dispute that PHMSA has the discretion under the CWA to take into account environmental concerns before approving response plans. PHMSA's assertion that it has no discretion under § 1321(j)(5)(D) is unreasonable and entitled to no Chevron deference. See Sunrise Coop., Inc.,
Because PHMSA failed to meet its obligations under the ESA and NEPA based on an erroneous reading of the CWA, its approval of the response plans at issue here was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court grants NWF's motion for summary judgment and denies Defendants' respective cross-motions for summary judgment in this regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
NWF asks the Court to vacate the Response Plan approvals and require an EIS. NWF Mot. at 36-37. However, such decisions are "properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies." Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part NWF's motion for summary judgment (Dkts. 57 & 59), grants in part and denies in part Federal Defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 64 & 67), and grants in part and denies in part Enbridge's cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 68). The Court REMANDS the Response Plan approvals to PHMSA (i) to explain with specificity its reasons for the approvals, (ii) to consult with the appropriate environmental agencies before approving any response plan for the Superior Region Response Zone or the Great Lakes Response Zone that may affect endangered species or habitats, (iii) to comply with NEPA by either preparing an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement consistent with the law before approving any response plan for the Superior Region Response Zone or the *664Great Lakes Response Zone, (iv) and for further consideration consistent with this Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
374 F. Supp. 3d 634, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/natl-wildlife-fedn-v-secy-of-the-dept-of-transp-mied-2019.