Natkunanathan v. USA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 2, 2026
• Docket: 24-644
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIVATHARAN NATKUNANATHAN, No. 24-644 D.C. No. 8:20-cv-01080-DOC-ADS Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General; CHAD WOLF, Acting Secretary Department of Homeland Security; DONNA CAMPAGNOLO, District Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Los Angeles; JANE ARELLANO; DOES, 1 through 8,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2025**

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Sivatharan Natkunanathan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging the wrongful denial of his adjustment of status

application and related claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Pride v. Correa, 719

F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Natkunanathan’s claim alleging the

wrongful denial of his adjustment of status application because district courts

cannot review immigration decisions made at the Attorney General’s discretion,

including the decision whether to grant adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1159(b). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that no court shall have

jurisdiction to review a decision or action “the authority for which is specified

under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General”); Diego v.

Sessions, 857 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that federal courts lack

jurisdiction to review 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) adjustment of status decisions because

they are in the discretion of the Attorney General).

The district court properly dismissed the FTCA claims because

Natkunanathan filed his administrative claim after the statute of limitations had run

and his claims were not based on a continuing tort or subject to equitable tolling.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (establishing the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations to

2 24-644 present a claim to the appropriate Federal agency); United States v. Kubrick, 444

U.S. 111, 119–22 (1979) (explaining that a claim accrues under § 2401(b) when

the plaintiff knows both the existence and cause of his injury); Redlin v. United

States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2019) (outlining the requirements for

equitable tolling under the FTCA); Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th

Cir. 2002) (holding that when a single incident causes the claimed harm, it is not a

continuing tort).

The motion (Docket Entry No. 49) to maintain under seal Volume 4 of the

supplemental excerpts of record and District Court Records Nos. 5 and 7 is

granted. All other pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-644