Native Ecosystems Council v. Mary Erickson

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 20, 2020
Docket18-35687
StatusUnpublished

This text of Native Ecosystems Council v. Mary Erickson (Native Ecosystems Council v. Mary Erickson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Native Ecosystems Council v. Mary Erickson, (9th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NATIVE ECOSYSTEMS COUNCIL; No. 18-35687 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES, D.C. No. 9:17-cv-00053-DWM Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MARY ERICKSON, Custer Gallatin National Forest Supervisor; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 8, 2019 Portland, Oregon

Before: GILMAN,** PAEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Appellants Native Ecosystems Council and the Alliance for the Wild

Rockies appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of

Defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Ctr. for Biological

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Diversity v. Ilano, 928 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2019). We review claims under the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Forest Management

Act (NFMA) by utilizing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and we may set

aside agency action that was arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 779–80; see also

Great Old Broads for Wilderness v. Kimbell, 709 F.3d 836, 846 (9th Cir. 2013).

No private cause of action exists under the Healthy Forest Restoration Act

(HFRA), so asserted violations are also reviewed under the APA. See 16 U.S.C.

§§ 6501, 6515; see also Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d

1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005).

1. Initially, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

expand the administrative record. The proffered materials, including an overlay

map, do not satisfy any of the “four narrowly construed circumstances” in which

we allow expansion of the administrative record. See Fence Creek Cattle Co. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 602 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. The United States Forest Service (Forest Service) was not required to

prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the designation of landscape-

scale areas. Under NEPA, a federal agency need not prepare an EIS when the

proposed federal action does not “change the status quo.” Ilano, 928 F.3d at 780

(citation omitted). Because the designation of landscape-scale areas did not

change the status quo, but only designated damaged areas of the forest, the

2 decision did not trigger an obligation to prepare an EIS. See id. at 780–81.

3. The Forest Service decision to categorically exclude the Smith Shields

Project (Project) from NEPA was not arbitrary or capricious. An agency may issue

a categorical exclusion for a project approved under HFRA in certain

circumstances. See id. at 782 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(a)). The categorical

exclusion applies if, among other requirements, the project “maximizes the

retention of old-growth and large trees, as appropriate for the forest type, to the

extent that the trees promote stands that are resilient to insects and disease.” 16

U.S.C. § 6591b(b)(1)(A). In this case, the Forest Service concluded, based on

scientific research and analysis by its experts, that no old growth would be

removed in conjunction with the Project. An agency must have discretion to rely

upon the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts. See Ilano, 928 F.3d at

783. Accordingly, there exists a reasonable basis for the Forest Service’s

application of the categorical exclusion.

4. The Forest Service decision to not prepare an EIS for the “Clean Up

Amendments” to the Forest Plan regarding old-growth forest and elk hiding cover

was not arbitrary or capricious. If, after preparing an environmental assessment

(EA), an agency finds that an action would have “no significant impact” on the

human environment, it may issue a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) and is

not required to prepare an EIS. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9, 1508.13; see also

3 Native Ecosystems Council, 428 F.3d at 1238–39. We review “whether the agency

has taken a hard look at the consequences of its actions, based its decision on a

consideration of the relevant factors, and provided a convincing statement of

reasons to explain why [an action’s] impacts are insignificant.” Nat’l Parks &

Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). We conclude that the Forest Service

has complied with these requirements in the present case.

5. As to the old-growth standard, the original and amended standards

both require the Forest Service to strive to maintain 10% old-growth forest. But

the amendment altered the scale over which that percentage must be achieved,

moving from the “timber compartment” to the “mountain range” scale.

Appellants argue that the Forest Service’s FONSI regarding the old-growth

amendment was arbitrary and capricious. In evaluating the amendment, the Forest

Service explained that the larger scale would yield more reliable data and was

more consistent with the Forest Plan’s original goal of achieving habitat diversity

across the landscape. The Forest Service also evaluated the effects of the

amendment, determining that it would not affect wildlife associated with old-

growth forest and also that it would likely cause an increase in old growth in the

long term. Given these determinations, even if old growth may vary from one

timber compartment to the next, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the Forest

4 Service to conclude that the new scale would not have a significant impact on the

environment.

The remaining challenges to the old-growth amendment similarly fail.

Appellants claim the 10% old-growth requirement, which now applies to “lands

classified as forested,” previously applied to a larger area. We disagree.

Logically, the Forest Service can “strive to maintain” old-growth only where it

exists. Accordingly, the previous standard’s requirement of maintaining 10% old-

growth cover in timber compartments “containing suitable timber” necessarily

applied to forested areas. Appellants also argue that the Forest Service, in

amending the indicator-species standard, removed the only two indicator species

for old-growth forest (i.e., northern goshawk and pine marten). Again, we

disagree. Northern goshawk and pine marten continue to be indicators for “mature

forest,” a category that includes old-growth forest. Appellants’ remaining

arguments that the old-growth-related amendments were significant are unavailing.

6.

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Related

Hapner v. Tidwell
621 F.3d 1239 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Native Ecosystems Council v. Leslie Weldon
697 F.3d 1043 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Great Old Broads for Wildernes v. Abigail Kimbell
709 F.3d 836 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Center for Bio Diversity v. Eli Ilano
928 F.3d 774 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt
241 F.3d 722 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)

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