Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Brant, F.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 766 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-S03003-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF INSURANCE COMPANY : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellant : : : v. : : : No. 766 MDA 2025 FLOYD BRANT :

Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-SU-002827

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: APRIL 20, 2026

Appellant, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, appeals from the

May 13, 2025, order entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas

granting Appellee’s1 petition to enforce the court’s November 13, 2023 order

that had molded an “umpire’s” appraisal award in an insurance coverage

dispute.2 After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellant

provided homeowners insurance (“the Policy”) to Appellee at a home located

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1 Floyd Brant passed away in 2022, and his wife, Grace Brant, brought the

petition individually and as executrix of Floyd Brant’s estate (“Appellee”). 2 As the May 13, 2025 petition to enforce the trial court’s November 14, 2023

order was the only item pending before the trial court and resolved the only remaining issue between the parties, it is a final and appealable order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (a final order disposes of all claims and all parties). J-S03003-26

in York, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). On August 31, 2021, a large tree fell

and caused damage to the structure and contents of the house on the

Property, as well as to the surrounding structures and landscape. Appellee

retained an adjustment group to assess the loss for purposes of making a

claim under the Policy. Appellant disagreed with the adjustment group’s

assessment, provided its own valuation, and denied portions of Appellee’s

claim.

As permitted by the Policy, the parties requested that the court appoint

an “umpire” for appraisal. On August 1, 2023, the trial court ordered the

appointment of an umpire. On September 16, 2023, the umpire issued his

appraisal award and awarded Appellee $688,677.35, an amount in excess of

the estimates of either party. On October 13, 2023, Appellant moved to strike

and vacate the award, arguing that the umpire had exceeded the scope of his

authority in issuing the award.

In an order issued on November 14, 2023, the trial court found that the

umpire had exceeded the scope of his authority by considering costs beyond

the scope of the estimates submitted by the parties and by determining some

costs to be in excess of the estimates. The trial court, therefore, molded the

award “to conform to the terms of submission,” directing Appellant to pay “the

maximum amount between the differences submitted to the [u]mpire by the

parties for each line item.” Op. in Support of Order, 11/14/23, at 5.

Based on this order, Appellant issued a payment to Appellee using the

higher estimated value for line items that it deemed covered under the Policy.

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However, Appellant did not issue any payments for line items that it

considered to be excluded from coverage under the Policy. Thus, while the

sum of the highest submitted estimates totaled $576,232.90, Appellant paid

only $329,745.68. On March 22, 2024, Appellant filed a praecipe to

discontinue and end the action.

On April 25, 2024, Appellee filed a petition to enforce the court’s

November 13, 2023 order for the line items which Appellant had not paid.

Appellant filed a response in opposition and new matter, and Appellee filed a

reply to the new matter.

On December 10, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the petition to

enforce. On May 13, 2025, the trial court granted Appellee’s petition to

enforce and ordered Appellant to comply with the November 14, 2023 order

and pay the remaining balance of the molded appraisal of $206,296.41 to the

estate of Floyd Brant.

This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3

3 The trial court directed Appellant to file its 1925(b) statement by July 2, 2025. On July 2, 2025, Appellant timely filed its Rule 1925(b) statement. However, on July 3, 2025, the trial court prothonotary rejected the filing because Appellant had submitted a fee with the filing which was not required. The prothonotary directed Appellant to re-file without the fee. As a result, on July 3, 2025, Appellant re-filed its Rule 1925(b) statement without a fee and the prothonotary accepted it. We conclude that the prothonotary’s initial rejection of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was unnecessary since the court could have simply refused to accept the fee. We, thus, deem Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement timely filed for the purposes of this appeal.

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Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court improperly entered the [o]rder, granting coverage to [Appellee] for dwelling and contents items for which [Appellant] properly denied coverage, a determination for which [Appellee] never sought judicial review within the mandatory insurance policy two-year suit limitation period and which was outside the scope of the appraisal valuation and award process[?]

2. Whether the trial court improperly entered evidence into the record, over objection, that established valuation for dwelling and contents items for which [Appellant] properly denied coverage, a determination for which [Appellee] never sought judicial review within the mandatory insurance policy two-year suit limitation period and which was outside the scope of the appraisal valuation and award process, and which served as the basis for the damages award contained in the [o]rder[?]

Appellant’s Br. at 6.

Appellant first asserts that the trial court, in issuing its November 14,

2023 order, “could only have molded the award consistent with the umpire’s

authority and therefore, could not have included items for which coverage had

been denied.” Id. at 42. Appellant also asserts that the trial court never

intended its November 2023 order “to award [Appellee] the full amount of

each of [Appellee’s] estimates[.]” Id. at 43. Therefore, Appellant asserts

that the trial court could not compel it to pay Appellee for any line items “for

which coverage was denied.” Id. at 42.

Preliminarily, we must determine if we have jurisdiction to consider

Appellant’s challenges to the court’s November 2023 order. A court may only

modify or rescind an order “within 30 days after its entry [] if no appeal from

such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. After this 30 day

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period expires, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction. Szwerc v. Lehigh

Valley Health Network, Inc., 235 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2020). The

November 2023 was a final, appealable order which resolved all claims as to

all parties4 and, following its entry, Appellant filed a praecipe to discontinue

and end the action. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). As neither party appealed the

November 2023 order, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to modify or

reconsider this order when the 30 day time period expired.

Accordingly, the trial court properly emphasized that its role at the

hearing on the subsequent petition to enforce “was limited to determining if

[Appellant] had complied with our [November 2023] order” and stated that “if

[Appellant] believed we erred in how we molded the [u]mpire’s [a]ward, which

they assert includes items that are not covered by the Policy, or that we erred

by molding instead of vacating the [a]ward, they should have appealed our

November 14, 2023, [o]rder.” Trial Ct. Op., 8/18/25, at 10.

As Appellant appealed only the May 2025 order granting Appellee’s

petition to enforce, we, too, decline to consider any issues pertaining solely to

the November 2023 order. In its November 2023 order, the trial court molded

the award “to conform to the terms of submission, which is the maximum

amount between the differences submitted to the [u]mpire by the parties for

4 For instance, this Court has found that an order vacating an appraisal award

and failing to direct further proceedings was a final order. See Riley v. Farmers Fire Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 124, 127 (Pa. Super. 1999). Here, the trial court did not direct further proceedings in its November 2023 order because it considered the order final. See Order, 11/24/23; Trial Ct. Op. at 4.

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each line item.” Op. in Support of Order, 11/14/23, at 5 (emphasis added).

Appellant admits that it did not pay out the maximum difference between the

competing estimates for each line item but explains that it did not do so

because it determined that certain line items were not covered under the

Policy. However, if Appellant wished to assert that the trial court erred in

including those line items in its molded award, it should have appealed the

November 2023 order rather than unilaterally withholding payment for select

line items. It did not do so and, accordingly, this Court does not have

jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s challenges to the November 2023 order.

Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred when it heard and

considered evidence pertaining to “coverage issues” at the hearing on the

petition to enforce. Appellant’s Br. at 45-54. Appellant claims that Appellee’s

petition to enforce was Appellee’s attempt to “raise coverage issues, i.e.

challenge [Appellant’s] denials and limitations” in contravention of the Policy’s

suit limitation clause and, thus, the court could not consider any argument

involving coverage at the hearing. Id.

We review challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse

of discretion. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Pautenis, 118 A.3d 386, 391 (Pa. Super.

2015). “[D]ecisions on admissibility are within the sound discretion of the

trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or

misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on evidence to constitute

reversible error, it must have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining

party.” Id. (citation omitted).

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In response to Appellant’s argument, the trial court again clarified that

it “did not make any coverage determinations” at the hearing on the petition

to enforce and its “determination that [Appellant] was not in compliance with

[the November 2023 o]rder, and as to the sum owed, had no connection to

coverage determinations.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11.

Our review of the record demonstrates that the parties discussed and

presented evidence regarding coverage at the hearing due to Appellant’s

position that it was not required to fully comply with the November 2023 order

for line items it deemed excluded from the Policy’s coverage. The trial court,

therefore, did not err or abuse its discretion in allowing the parties to present

evidence and argument on this point as it was directly relevant to Appellant’s

compliance with the November 2023 order. Further, the trial court made no

coverage determinations at the hearing as it did not have jurisdiction to

reconsider its November 2023 order, and the scope of the hearing was limited

to determining whether Appellant had complied with that order. Appellant’s

argument is, therefore, without merit.

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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2026

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