NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 20 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, No. 20-17271
Plaintiff-counter- D.C. No. defendant-Appellant, 2:15-cv-01597-MMD-NJK
v. MEMORANDUM* RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,
Defendant-counter-claimant- Appellee,
v.
SAHARA SUNRISE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-third-party- plaintiff-Appellee,
ALESSI & KOENIG LLC,
Third-party-defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted January 11, 2022** Pasadena, California
Before: WALLACE, BOGGS, *** FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) appeals from the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of River Glider Avenue Trust (River Glider). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both a district court’s order
granting summary judgment and a district court’s application of the rule of mandate.
Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2012). For the following
reasons, we vacate and remand to the district court to address Nationstar’s excused
tender and judicial estoppel arguments and, if the district court again holds that the
foreclosure sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust, to address Nationstar’s
claims against Sahara Sunrise Homeowners Association (Sahara).
On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court held that the rule of
mandate precluded it from considering Nationstar’s new, post-remand excused
tender and judicial estoppel arguments, declined to use its equitable powers under
Shadow Canyon to set aside the foreclosure sale of property in which Nationstar had
a deed of trust, and did not address Nationstar’s alternative claims against Sahara.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2 On appeal, Nationstar argues that the district court should have considered
Nationstar’s excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments on their merits, should
have set aside the sale on equitable grounds under Shadow Canyon, and should have
addressed Nationstar’s alternative claims against Sahara.
First, Nationstar contends that the district court erred in holding that the rule
of mandate precluded the court from considering its new excused tender and judicial
estoppel arguments raised in post-remand supplemental briefing. The district court
held that our prior decision in Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. River Glider Avenue
Trust, No. 19-15760, barred consideration of any arguments not raised in the
original, pre-remand briefing, and therefore precluded the district court from
considering Nationstar’s additional post-remand arguments that the foreclosure sale
should be set aside. We vacate and remand to the district court to consider
Nationstar’s new excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments raised in post-
remand supplemental briefing.
The rule of mandate “provides that any district court that has received the
mandate of an appellate court cannot vary or examine that mandate for any purpose
other than executing it.” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). “Violation of the rule of mandate is a
jurisdictional error.” Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067 (citation omitted). However, “the rule
of mandate allows a [trial] court to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate,”
3 and the district court is limited by our remand only “when the scope of the remand
is clear.” Id. (citations omitted).
In our prior decision, we narrowly held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Nationstar and setting aside the foreclosure sale for lack of
notice and declined to consider any additional arguments because “the district court
explicitly limited its summary judgment ruling to the notice issue.” Nationstar
Mortg. LLC v. River Glider Ave. Tr., No. 19-15760, 812 F. App’x 524, 525 (9th Cir.
2020). The mandate stated: “[W]e remand to allow the district court to address the
remaining issues for the first time.” Id.
The district court erred in concluding that the rule of mandate precluded
consideration of Nationstar’s post-remand arguments because our decision “did not
impose clear limits on the scope of the remand.” Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067. The prior
decision focused exclusively on the notice issue and did not address the remaining
issues at all. See id. (stating that “when a court is confronted with issues that the
remanding court never considered, the mandate requires respect for what the higher
court decided, not for what it did not decide”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, on remand, the district court should consider Nationstar’s
new arguments raised in supplemental briefing that the foreclosure sale should be
set aside on the grounds of excused tender and judicial estoppel.
Second, Nationstar argues that the district court should have set aside or
4 reformed the sale of the property in which Nationstar had a deed of trust on equitable
grounds under Shadow Canyon because Nationstar presented evidence of fraud,
unfairness, or oppression in the sales process. On remand, the district court should
consider Nationstar’s excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments in determining
whether to set aside or reform the foreclosure sale on equitable grounds.
Under Nevada law, “courts retain the power to grant equitable relief from a
defective foreclosure sale.” Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n v. N.Y. Cmty.
Bancorp., Inc., 366 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Nev. 2016). To set aside equitably the
foreclosure sale, the party seeking to set aside the sale must show “(1) an
unreasonably low sales price, and (2) fraud, unfairness, or oppression that affected
the sale.” U.S. Bank, N.A., Tr. for Banc of Am. Funding Corp. Mortg. Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-F v. White Horse Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, 987 F.3d 858,
863 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “[W]here the inadequacy of the price is great,
a court may grant relief on slight evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.”
Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d
641, 643 (Nev. 2017). Courts are “required to analyze the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether to set aside an HOA foreclosure sale on
equitable grounds.” Res. Grp., LLC v. Nev. Ass’n Servs., 437 P.3d 154, 160 (Nev.
2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).
The district court applied the proper Shadow Canyon framework in holding
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 20 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, No. 20-17271
Plaintiff-counter- D.C. No. defendant-Appellant, 2:15-cv-01597-MMD-NJK
v. MEMORANDUM* RIVER GLIDER AVENUE TRUST,
Defendant-counter-claimant- Appellee,
v.
SAHARA SUNRISE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-third-party- plaintiff-Appellee,
ALESSI & KOENIG LLC,
Third-party-defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted January 11, 2022** Pasadena, California
Before: WALLACE, BOGGS, *** FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) appeals from the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of River Glider Avenue Trust (River Glider). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both a district court’s order
granting summary judgment and a district court’s application of the rule of mandate.
Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2012). For the following
reasons, we vacate and remand to the district court to address Nationstar’s excused
tender and judicial estoppel arguments and, if the district court again holds that the
foreclosure sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust, to address Nationstar’s
claims against Sahara Sunrise Homeowners Association (Sahara).
On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court held that the rule of
mandate precluded it from considering Nationstar’s new, post-remand excused
tender and judicial estoppel arguments, declined to use its equitable powers under
Shadow Canyon to set aside the foreclosure sale of property in which Nationstar had
a deed of trust, and did not address Nationstar’s alternative claims against Sahara.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2 On appeal, Nationstar argues that the district court should have considered
Nationstar’s excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments on their merits, should
have set aside the sale on equitable grounds under Shadow Canyon, and should have
addressed Nationstar’s alternative claims against Sahara.
First, Nationstar contends that the district court erred in holding that the rule
of mandate precluded the court from considering its new excused tender and judicial
estoppel arguments raised in post-remand supplemental briefing. The district court
held that our prior decision in Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. River Glider Avenue
Trust, No. 19-15760, barred consideration of any arguments not raised in the
original, pre-remand briefing, and therefore precluded the district court from
considering Nationstar’s additional post-remand arguments that the foreclosure sale
should be set aside. We vacate and remand to the district court to consider
Nationstar’s new excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments raised in post-
remand supplemental briefing.
The rule of mandate “provides that any district court that has received the
mandate of an appellate court cannot vary or examine that mandate for any purpose
other than executing it.” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). “Violation of the rule of mandate is a
jurisdictional error.” Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067 (citation omitted). However, “the rule
of mandate allows a [trial] court to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate,”
3 and the district court is limited by our remand only “when the scope of the remand
is clear.” Id. (citations omitted).
In our prior decision, we narrowly held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Nationstar and setting aside the foreclosure sale for lack of
notice and declined to consider any additional arguments because “the district court
explicitly limited its summary judgment ruling to the notice issue.” Nationstar
Mortg. LLC v. River Glider Ave. Tr., No. 19-15760, 812 F. App’x 524, 525 (9th Cir.
2020). The mandate stated: “[W]e remand to allow the district court to address the
remaining issues for the first time.” Id.
The district court erred in concluding that the rule of mandate precluded
consideration of Nationstar’s post-remand arguments because our decision “did not
impose clear limits on the scope of the remand.” Hall, 697 F.3d at 1067. The prior
decision focused exclusively on the notice issue and did not address the remaining
issues at all. See id. (stating that “when a court is confronted with issues that the
remanding court never considered, the mandate requires respect for what the higher
court decided, not for what it did not decide”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, on remand, the district court should consider Nationstar’s
new arguments raised in supplemental briefing that the foreclosure sale should be
set aside on the grounds of excused tender and judicial estoppel.
Second, Nationstar argues that the district court should have set aside or
4 reformed the sale of the property in which Nationstar had a deed of trust on equitable
grounds under Shadow Canyon because Nationstar presented evidence of fraud,
unfairness, or oppression in the sales process. On remand, the district court should
consider Nationstar’s excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments in determining
whether to set aside or reform the foreclosure sale on equitable grounds.
Under Nevada law, “courts retain the power to grant equitable relief from a
defective foreclosure sale.” Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n v. N.Y. Cmty.
Bancorp., Inc., 366 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Nev. 2016). To set aside equitably the
foreclosure sale, the party seeking to set aside the sale must show “(1) an
unreasonably low sales price, and (2) fraud, unfairness, or oppression that affected
the sale.” U.S. Bank, N.A., Tr. for Banc of Am. Funding Corp. Mortg. Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-F v. White Horse Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, 987 F.3d 858,
863 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “[W]here the inadequacy of the price is great,
a court may grant relief on slight evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.”
Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d
641, 643 (Nev. 2017). Courts are “required to analyze the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether to set aside an HOA foreclosure sale on
equitable grounds.” Res. Grp., LLC v. Nev. Ass’n Servs., 437 P.3d 154, 160 (Nev.
2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).
The district court applied the proper Shadow Canyon framework in holding
5 that Nationstar was not entitled to equitable relief. However, because the district
court erroneously held that the rule of mandate precluded consideration of
Nationstar’s excused tender and judicial estoppel arguments, the district court did
not consider these arguments in determining whether Nationstar presented “slight
evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression” under Shadow Canyon, and thus did
not “analyze the totality of the circumstances when determining whether to set aside
[the] foreclosure sale on equitable grounds.” Res. Grp., LLC, 437 P.3d at 160. The
district court should consider these arguments in the first instance.
Third, Nationstar contends that the district court should have addressed its
alternative claims against Sahara. We hold that if, after considering the excused
tender and judicial estoppel arguments, the district court again holds that the
foreclosure sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust, the district court should
address Nationstar’s claims against Sahara.
Nationstar’s complaint included claims for damages against Sahara in the
event the district court determined that the foreclosure sale extinguished Nationstar’s
deed of trust. In its original judgment, the district court dismissed Nationstar’s
claims against Sahara as moot because the district court ruled that the foreclosure
sale was void. However, in its judgment following our remand in which the district
court held that the foreclosure sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust, the
district court did not address Nationstar’s claims against Sahara. If the district court
6 again holds that the foreclosure sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust, the
district court should address in the first instance Nationstar’s claims against Sahara.
VACATED AND REMANDED.