Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Deakin

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 9, 2015
DocketCUMre-14-15
StatusUnpublished

This text of Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Deakin (Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Deakin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Deakin, (Me. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. RE-14-15

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,

Plaintiff

v. ORDER

ROBERT DEAKIN,

Defendant

Before the court is plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage LLC's motion to dismiss without

prejudice.

That motion is opposed by counsel for defendant Robert Deakin, who points out that

(1) N ationstar has admitted that it cannot prevail in this action because its notice of default and right to cure was defective under Bank of America v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, 96 A.3d 700;

(2) this case was set for trial on May 6 and counsel for Nationstar appeared on that date - not to proceed to trial but to state that they would seek to dismiss without prejudice. The first notice received by counsel for defendant was at the May 6 hearing although counsel for Nationstar had left a telephonic message (which apparently was not received) the afternoon before; and

(3) Nationstar had previously filed a foreclosure action against Deakin based on the same claim, Docket No. RE-11-395 (Superior Ct. Cumberland), but had filed a voluntary notice of dismissal of that action.

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Deakin included a cross-motion for judgment on the

pleadings.

If Nationstar were merely seeking a dismissal without prejudice to regroup and consider

its options in light of Greenleaf the court might be favorably inclined to grant its motion. However, the second and third points made by Deakin are dispositive, particularly m

combination.

Under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a) the filing of a second notice of dismissal by a

plaintiff who has previously voluntarily dismissed the same claim operates as an adjudication on

the merits. Although in this case Nationstar has filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice rather

than a second notice of dismissal, it is still seeking a second voluntary dismissal. At least under

the circumstances of this case, the court cannot see why Nationstar should be granted more

favorable treatment than if it had filed a second notice of dismissal.

In addition, waiting until the day of trial to seek a dismissal without prejudice - where the

opposing party did not receive notice before trial and was prepared to try the case - does not

justify a dismissal without prejudice. Greenleaf was decided on July 3, 2014. It should not have

taken N ationstar 10 months to discern that its notice of default and right to cure was defective

under 14 M.R. S. § 6111. The court understands that there was an agreed continuance in January.

However, the court cannot see any excuse for waiting until the afternoon before trial to attempt

(apparently unsuccessfully) to contact opposing counsel and for waiting until the time of the

scheduled hearing to announce that a dismissal without prejudice was being sought.

Accordingly, Nationstar's motion to dismiss without prejudice is denied. Ordinarily that

would mean that the case would proceed to trial. However, given Nationstar's concession that it

cannot prevail and Deakin's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defective

notice -which Nationstar did not oppose except by filing a reply memo on its motion to dismiss

without prejudice - the court will enter judgment for Deakin. 1

1 In his opposition to the motion to dismiss without prejudice, Deakin seeks an order directing that Nationstar be precluded from recovering all interest that accrued during the pendency of this action and any associated charges that may have arisen during the pendency of this action. Given that the court has entered judgment for the defendant, the current status of Deakin's mortgage loan is unclear. It would

2 Counsel for defendant is also seeking attorneys fees pursuant to 14 M.R. S. § 61 01. This

1s a case in which the mortgagee has not prevailed and in which attorneys fees would be

appropriate under § 6101. Within the time frame set forth in Rule 54(b)(3) counsel for Deakin

shall file an application for attorneys fees including the number of hours for which fees are

sought, the legal work performed during those hours, the hourly rate sought, and appropriate

justification for the hourly rate. Nationstar shall have 21 days in which to oppose Deakin's fee

application.

The entry shall be:

Plaintiffs motion to dismiss without prejudice is denied. Defendant's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted and judgment is entered for defendant. The clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: July~' 2015

Thomas D. Warren Justice, Superior Court

appear that, at a minimum, Nationstar probably cannot rely on any default that occurred prior to the date of this judgment. Moreover, there is one Law Court case that can be read to suggest that Nationstar's claims under the mortgage may be extinguished under res judicata. Johnson v. Samson Construction Corp., 1997 ME 220, 704 A.2d 866. The court expresses no opinion as to any potential res judicata effect or as to the application of Johnson v. Samson Construction to this case. Johnson v. Samson Construction relied at least in part on two decisions from other jurisdictions, and the Supreme Court of Florida has since disapproved of the holding in one of those decisions. Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 2004), disapproving of the holding in Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers Inc., 150 So.2d 468 (Fla. App. 1963), and holding that successive foreclosure actions are not barred by res judicata. Given this uncertainty, the court will not attempt to decide whether and to what extent Nationstar should be precluded from any claim which it still may have for accrued interest. '

3 CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 041 01

JENAI CORMIER ESQ '? \c~. : C\ -t ~ ~ "'::) ( ' C> '-'" r-- 'S ..ca.. ~ DOONAN GRAVES LONGORIA LLC 100 CUMMINGS CENTER SUITE 225D BEVERLY MA 01915

.,· ...

CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 041 01

CHET RANDALL ESQ MOLLEUR LAW OFFICE ~s;e rJ"'6 c.-or-.. '\.C) Cov--.~.12..\ 419 ALFRED STREET BIDDEFORD ME 04005

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp.
1997 ME 220 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
Singleton v. Greymar Associates
882 So. 2d 1004 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2004)
Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc.
150 So. 2d 468 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1963)
Bank of American, N.A. v. Scott A. Greenleaf
2014 ME 89 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Deakin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nationstar-mortgage-llc-v-deakin-mesuperct-2015.