National Un. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mulholland

Ohio Court of Appeals

National Un. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mulholland

161 N.E. 351, 27 Ohio App. 334, 5 Ohio Law. Abs. 771, 1927 Ohio App. LEXIS 410

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedOctober 24, 1927

Docket8261

StatusPublished

This text of 161 N.E. 351 (National Un. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mulholland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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National Un. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mulholland, 161 N.E. 351, 27 Ohio App. 334, 5 Ohio Law. Abs. 771, 1927 Ohio App. LEXIS 410 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The following is taken, verbatim, from the •opinion.

SULLIVAN, P. J.

The authorities are unanimous on the proposition that one of the purposes of sefving proof of loss is to acquaint the insured with the facts, or with the medium by which the facts ■may be ascertained fully by the insured. It Is conceded that the company became aware of the facts in plenty of time to protect itself in the payment of the insurance, and inasmuch as there is no evidence of collusion or fraud, the mere fact that there was no disclosure of the situation that appears in the record would not, in and of itself, avoid the policy, for the reason that no harm could come to the insurance company, and that there is no evidence of intent to defraud, although it would appear, from the evidence, that the serious conflict thereof is sufficient to make inquiry ■ as to the purpose of the payments. We think, however, that it is a question of pure law and that, under the record, there is no prejudicial error. It is not clear that the O’Neills had any equitable interest that was based upon any document which would make the foundation for such a claim.

The attitude of courts, under a situation as appears by the record in this case, is apparent in Acer v. Merchants’ Ins. Co. (N.Y.) 57 Barb. 68, which is worth reading in connection with the question at issue here. We quote:

“It was not the understanding or intention that any other person who might have a separate interest in the property, and not connected in interest with the plaintiff, and having no interest in his insurance, might avoid the plaintiff’s contract by obtaining an insurance on his own interest in the property without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. Such a construction would render the contract exceedingly harsh, unreasonable, and oppressive, and the parties will not be deemed to have so contracted, if the language used by them fairly admits of a different interpretation. By this rendering, the ‘parties, interested’ are considered to mean those interested with the plaintiff in his contract, instead of outside persons, who might have some distinct and separate interest in the property.”

Thus holding, the judgment of the court below is hereby affirmed.

(Levine and Vickery, JJ., concur.)

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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The following is taken, verbatim, from the •opinion.

SULLIVAN, P. J.

The authorities are unanimous on the proposition that one of the purposes of sefving proof of loss is to acquaint the insured with the facts, or with the medium by which the facts ■may be ascertained fully by the insured. It Is conceded that the company became aware of the facts in plenty of time to protect itself in the payment of the insurance, and inasmuch as there is no evidence of collusion or fraud, the mere fact that there was no disclosure of the situation that appears in the record would not, in and of itself, avoid the policy, for the reason that no harm could come to the insurance company, and that there is no evidence of intent to defraud, although it would appear, from the evidence, that the serious conflict thereof is sufficient to make inquiry ■ as to the purpose of the payments. We think, however, that it is a question of pure law and that, under the record, there is no prejudicial error. It is not clear that the O’Neills had any equitable interest that was based upon any document which would make the foundation for such a claim.

The attitude of courts, under a situation as appears by the record in this case, is apparent in Acer v. Merchants’ Ins. Co. (N.Y.) 57 Barb. 68, which is worth reading in connection with the question at issue here. We quote:

“It was not the understanding or intention that any other person who might have a separate interest in the property, and not connected in interest with the plaintiff, and having no interest in his insurance, might avoid the plaintiff’s contract by obtaining an insurance on his own interest in the property without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. Such a construction would render the contract exceedingly harsh, unreasonable, and oppressive, and the parties will not be deemed to have so contracted, if the language used by them fairly admits of a different interpretation. By this rendering, the ‘parties, interested’ are considered to mean those interested with the plaintiff in his contract, instead of outside persons, who might have some distinct and separate interest in the property.”

Thus holding, the judgment of the court below is hereby affirmed.

(Levine and Vickery, JJ., concur.)

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161 N.E. 351, 27 Ohio App. 334, 5 Ohio Law. Abs. 771, 1927 Ohio App. LEXIS 410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-un-fire-ins-co-v-mulholland-ohioctapp-1927.

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