National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 24, 2021
Docket4:20-cv-00903
StatusUnknown

This text of National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC (National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC, (W.D. Mo. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

NATIONAL NURSES ORGANIZING ) COMMITTEE-MISSOURI & KANSAS/ ) NATIONAL NURSES UNITED, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 20-CV-00903-SRB ) v. ) ) MIDWEST DIVISION-RMC, LLC d/b/a ) RESEARCH MEDICAL CENTER, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Midwest Division-RMC, LLC d/b/a Research Medical Center’s (“RMC”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. #11.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied. I. BACKGROUND This action arises from a collective bargaining agreement between Defendant RMC and Plaintiff National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United (the “Union”). The Union represents employees of various employers in Missouri, including a bargaining unit of registered nurses (“RN Bargaining Unit”) employed by RMC, which operates an acute care hospital in Kansas City, Missouri. The Union filed suit pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and seeks an order from the Court compelling arbitration under the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). The following facts, taken from the Union’s complaint, are briefly summarized below. The Union alleges that on June 24, 2020, RMC violated the CBA by implementing new staffing plans (or “staffing grids”) that “displaced bargaining unit nurses with supervisory nurses in the performance of bargaining unit work.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 10.) Put another way, the Union contends RMC’s staffing plan changes required supervisory nurses to perform work that, under the terms of the CBA, should be performed by members of the RN Bargaining Unit. A “grievance” is defined in Article 14 of the CBA as “an alleged breach of the terms and provisions of this Agreement.” (Doc. #1-1, p. 18.)1 Pursuant to Article 2, the CBA’s arbitration

provision, any grievance not resolved after completion of the grievance procedures outlined in Article 14 may be advanced for arbitration. Based on RMC’s implementation of new staffing plans, the Union initiated the grievance procedure outlined in Article 14 by filing a grievance (the “Grievance”) on July 15, 2020. The Union contends RMC violated Article 3 of the CBA, which states in relevant part: ARTICLE 3 BARGAINING UNIT WORK

It is not the intent of the Hospital to displace bargaining unit employees with supervisory employees in the performance of bargaining unit work. It is understood, however, that nothing in this Agreement shall preclude members of management from performing bargaining unit work when such work occurs during the course of training, in the event of an emergency, due to scheduled or unscheduled employee absences, due to an increase in patient census or workload, consistent with past practice and/or when such work or assistance is otherwise necessary for the timely provision of quality patient care.

(Doc. #1-1, p. 10.) On July 19, 2020, RMC informed the Union that it would not process the Grievance. Following RMC’s refusal to arbitrate, the Union contacted the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS”) as instructed in Article 2 of the CBA and requested a list of arbitrators. On July 23, 2020, the FMCS responded to the Union’s request and provided the parties with a panel of proposed arbitrators. On July 28, 2020, RMC acknowledged that it had

1 All page citations herein refer to pagination automatically generated by the CM/ECF filing system. received the FMCS arbitration panel but reiterated that the matter was “neither grievable nor arbitrable” under the CBA, and again refused to arbitrate the Grievance. (Doc. #1-5, p. 2.) Based on RMC’s refusal to arbitrate the Grievance, the Union filed suit on November 11, 2020, seeking an Order compelling RMC to proceed to arbitration. The Union additionally asks the Court to direct RMC to select an arbitrator with the Union, and to award the Union attorney’s

fees and any costs incurred for the suit. RMC subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss the Union’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ash v. Anderson Merchs., LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotations omitted). A court must consider all facts alleged in the complaint as true when considering a motion to dismiss. Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting “[t]he factual allegations of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable”). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts “may consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.” Illig v. Union Elec. Co., 652 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A party seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement must demonstrate (1) the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and (2) that the specific dispute at issue falls within the scope of that agreement. MedCam, Inc. v. MCNC, 414 F.3d 972, 974 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Hussmann Corp., No. 15-CV-278,

2016 WL 775179, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 29, 2016). “The scope of an arbitration agreement is given a liberal interpretation, with any doubts resolved in favor of arbitration.” MedCam, Inc., 414 F.3d at 975 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (noting “[a]n order compelling arbitration should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute”). “[T]he question of scope asks only whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular claim and does not reach the potential merits of the claim.” Id. (citations omitted). III. DISCUSSION The parties do not dispute the validity of the CBA or whether the parties are bound to its

terms. Consequently, the key issue is whether the Union has adequately stated that its grievance falls within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration provision. RMC contends the Grievance at issue is not arbitrable because it is a staffing plan dispute that, pursuant to Article 38 of the CBA, is exempt from the arbitration provision of the CBA. The Union disagrees, arguing its complaint adequately alleges a grievance subject to arbitration and should survive dismissal.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Illig v. Union Electric Co.
652 F.3d 971 (Eighth Circuit, 2011)
Linda Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC
799 F.3d 957 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
MedCam, Inc. v. MCNC
414 F.3d 972 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-nurses-organizing-committee-missouri-kansasnational-nurses-mowd-2021.