National Newark, C., Co. v. Durant Motor Co.

1 A.2d 316, 124 N.J. Eq. 213, 23 Backes 213, 1938 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 37
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedSeptember 8, 1938
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 1 A.2d 316 (National Newark, C., Co. v. Durant Motor Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Newark, C., Co. v. Durant Motor Co., 1 A.2d 316, 124 N.J. Eq. 213, 23 Backes 213, 1938 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 37 (N.J. Ct. App. 1938).

Opinion

This suit to foreclose a mortgage securing bonds in the par amount of $770,000, duly proceeded to decree and sale. But no substantial bids were made, although the sale was several times adjourned. Finally, however, the master received a bid in a nominal sum, but containing an agreement that the bidder would cause a corporation to be formed to take title to the property, and that the corporation would secure by mortgage the fees and expenses of the trustee-complainant, its counsel and the receiver who had been appointed in the cause, and also that the corporation would issue "to the bondholders under the trust mortgage preferred stock limited in amount and having an aggregate par value *Page 215 of $770,000, each bondholder to receive in stock an equivalent par amount to the principal of his bonds, which said stock is to have no voting power and is to be entitled to non-cumulative dividends at six per cent., to be paid only to such extent as it shall be earned in any fiscal year, and which said stock upon the dissolution of the corporation, or the sale of the corporate assets, is to be paid in full prior to any payments being made to any other classes of stock and which said stock is to be redeemable at the opinion of the corporation at any time upon the payment of the par value thereof, plus proportionate dividends, if any. Provision is to be made for meeting of the preferred stockholders, and if two-thirds of those present and voting at such meeting shall vote to reduce the amount at which it may be redeemed, the redemption price of all the preferred stock shall be reduced accordingly. Unless two-thirds of the preferred stockholders voting at any such meeting shall so approve, no other class of stock is to be issued with any rights prior to those provided for hereinabove, over such preferred stock."

The bid, including the agreement, was approved and accepted by order of November 27th, 1933. A new corporation. Waverly Terminal Company, was organized, accepted an assignment of the bid and received from the master conveyance of the property. The mortgages were executed as agreed and have been paid off. Now the Terminal Company petitions the court to approve a suggested form of preferred stock certificate and to fix the method of the issuance and delivery of the preferred stock to the old bondholders. Holders of $10,000 par value of the bonds make sundry objections.

The first objection is that the Terminal Company should have proceeded by bill instead of by petition and order to show cause in the foreclosure suit.

A successful bidder at foreclosure sale, or his assignee, makes himself a party to the foreclosure cause. Other parties may proceed against him by petition in the cause to compel specific performance of his contract; or to set aside the sale; or the bidder may petition for relief, such as cancellation of his bid.Morrisse v. Inglis, 46 N.J. Eq. 306; Boorum v. Tucker,51 N.J. Eq. 135; Cropper v. Brown, *Page 216 76 N.J. Eq. 406; Murphy v. Skelly, 101 N.J. Eq. 793; Fuchs v.Syndicate Realty Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 506. A sheriff's sale may be set aside on petition and without bill, after the sale has been carried into effect by the delivery of a deed, and even after the purchaser has reconveyed to a third party. Hinners v.Banville, 114 N.J. Eq. 348.

By the petition now before me, the Terminal Company, as assignee of the bid, seeks the aid and instructions of the court in fulfilling the terms of the bid. The procedure adopted is proper.

Objectors next say that the court's guidance in drafting the stock certificates is unnecessary and should be denied since petitioner's duty is merely to copy into the stock certificates the language of the bid quoted above; that any additions, omissions, or alterations would constitute in greater or less degree, a departure from the terms of the contract between the parties. Whether this is so depends on the intention disclosed by the agreement. Inspection of the agreement convinces me that it was never intended to copy the words of the agreement verbatim — or even approximately — into the stock certificate. Note, especially, the clause, "Provision is to be made for meetings of the preferred stockholders." Clearly it was not contemplated that the clause be inserted in the stock certificate, but rather that the petitioner and its counsel should devise and embody in the certificate apt language in fulfillment of the stipulation.

The bid-agreement contains the gist of certain important terms of the preferred stock, to be expressed in the certificates in language more artistic and exact. Other reasonable provisions, not in conflict therewith, may be inserted at the option of petitioner. Petitioner has properly endeavored, in drafting the certificate, to state the rights of the preferred stockholders with precision, to the end that future litigation may be avoided. The question for decision is whether the preferred stock which petitioner proposes to issue fits the description contained in the agreement. If it does fit, if it secures to preferred stockholders the rights which were promised to them, the proposed certificate will be approved.

The objecting bondholders rely on American Trading and *Page 217 Importing Co. v. Miron Lifson, 98 N.J. Law 737. That was an action on a stock subscription agreement. Although nothing appeared in the agreement about redemption of the stock, the company so issued the stock that it was subject to redemption. The court held that this was a material departure from the terms of the agreement and released the subscriber. That decision does not, however, indicate that the stock certificate should not contain usual and suitable provisions which are consistent with the agreement.

The controversy on the merits is confined to the following paragraph in the draft certificate, in which I have italicized the provisions to which exception is taken:

"The holders of the preferred stock shall be entitled to receive, when and as declared by the Board of Directors, preferential dividends at the rate of six per centum per annum and no more, which shall be non-cumulative except to such extent as the dividend may be or may have been earned in any fiscal year, from December 1st, 1933. For the purpose of determining whether the dividend upon the preferred stock has been earned in any fiscal year there shall be deducted from the corporation's gross income for each fiscal year (excluding therefrom, however,any profit, income and proceeds resulting from the sale or otherdisposition of any of its capital assets or from the settlementor acquisition by the corporation of any of its capitalsecurities or other obligations) the following items (1) to (7), both inclusive: (1) All real estate, personal property, franchise, income, profits and other taxes and governmental charges with respect to the corporation, its assets or its business, accruing in such fiscal year. (2) All wages, salaries and other compensation of the corporation's executives, officers, directors and other employes and agents, including accounting and legal expenses, whether in any case paid or accrued. (3) All interest paid or accrued upon obligations of the corporation and upon taxes which are liens upon property owned by the corporation.

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Bluebook (online)
1 A.2d 316, 124 N.J. Eq. 213, 23 Backes 213, 1938 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-newark-c-co-v-durant-motor-co-njch-1938.