National Labor Relations Board v. Southern Interiors, Inc. Service Art, Inc. Tri-County Installations, Inc.

107 F.3d 12, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2064, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6838
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 4, 1997
Docket96-5474
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 107 F.3d 12 (National Labor Relations Board v. Southern Interiors, Inc. Service Art, Inc. Tri-County Installations, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Southern Interiors, Inc. Service Art, Inc. Tri-County Installations, Inc., 107 F.3d 12, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2064, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6838 (6th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

107 F.3d 12

155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2064

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner,
v.
SOUTHERN INTERIORS, INC.; Service Art, Inc.; Tri-County
Installations, Inc., Respondents.

No. 96-5474.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Feb. 4, 1997.

Before: MERRITT, CONTIE, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

The National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") applies for summary enforcement of its October 20, 1995 decision and order in Case No. 7-CA-37262 in which it found (1) that the respondents constituted a single integrated business enterprise and a single employer, and (2) that the respondents committed unfair labor practices by failing to recognize and bargain with the union at certain job sites, failing to make all fringe benefit reports and contributions required under a collective bargaining agreement, and failing to permit the union to conduct an audit of their books. The respondents filed a response to the application, asserting that the Board's findings are not supported by the record, that their failure to file an answer to the charges against them is excused by extraordinary circumstances, and that they have substantially complied with the Board's decision and order. The respondents also move to adduce additional evidence supporting the above assertions. The Board has filed a reply in support of its application.

Charges were filed against the respondents in a complaint filed on July 12, 1995. The respondents failed to file an answer to the charges and General Counsel filed a motion for default judgment before the Board. Again, the respondents failed to respond to that motion and the Board granted default judgment in its decision and order of October 20, 1995. After concluding the respondents did not comply with its order, the Board applied to this court for summary enforcement.

The court's jurisdiction to review final orders of the NLRB is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) which provides, in pertinent part: "No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances." This court has invoked this provision to bar judicial review of issues or claims not presented to the Board. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tri-State Warehouse & Distributing, Inc., 677 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.1982) (order) (failure to file objections to decision of administrative law judge); NLRB v. Innkeepers of Ohio, Inc., 596 F.2d 177 (6th Cir.1979) (order) (same); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 344 F.2d 948 (6th Cir.1965) (per curiam).

The respondents seek to avoid the effect of the above caselaw by asserting their failure to file an answer to the unfair labor charges is excused by extraordinary circumstances. This court, however, has held that extraordinary circumstances exist, for purposes of § 160(e) "only if there has been some occurrence or decision that prevented a matter which should have been presented to the Board from having been presented at the proper time." NLRB v. Allied Products Corp., 548 F.2d 644, 654 (6th Cir.1977). This court has also stated that the filing requirements of § 160(e) are waived "only in cases of rare extenuating circumstances...." NLRB v. Ferraro's Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 366, 368 (6th Cir.1965).

The respondents assert their legal counsel was absent from his office at the time an answer was due to the charges because of his service as an arbitrator in a Pennsylvania case. They also assert that A.C. Ricca (the owner and president of each respondent) was suffering from "undiagnosed advanced uncontrolled Type II Diabetes Mellitus" at the time an answer was due and that the "typical symptoms of fatigue, dizziness, vision impairment, and dulled concentration ... allowed the period for objections to the Board's charges to elapse." The Board includes documents with its application, however, showing that Ricca was aware of the pending charges, forwarded the documents to counsel, and contacted local Board agents about counsel's absence. Despite being informed that an extension of time to answer could be sought, however, no written answer or request for an extension of time was forwarded to the Board. The fact that counsel later had compliance discussions with the Board also suggests that the respondents had legal representation throughout this time period. We conclude the respondents' assertions, which indicate mere oversight or negligence, rather than inability, as the cause for their failure to file an answer to the charges, do not constitute exceptional circumstances for purposes of § 160(e). See NLRB v. Farraro's Bakery, supra (fact that labor consultant confused two cases did not excuse untimely answer to charges); NLRB v. Good Foods Mfg. & Processing Corp., 492 F.2d 1302, 1305 (7th Cir.1974) (counsel busy with other legal problems); NLRB v. Local Union No. 74, 471 F.2d 43, 45-46 (7th Cir.1973) (counsel unfamiliar with Board procedures); NLRB v. Izzi, 343 F.2d 753, 754-55 (1st Cir.1965) (ignorance and inexperience of counsel).

The respondents also move for leave to adduce additional evidence (1) showing the existence and nature of Ricca's illness, and (2) supporting their claim that they have substantially complied with the directives of the Board's decision and order. Section 160(e) permits additional evidence to be made a part of the record if, upon application of a party, it is shown "to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency...." See also NLRB v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir.1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946). A decision to grant or deny a motion to adduce additional evidence under § 160(e) is within the sound discretion of the court. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 104 (1942).

We conclude the respondents' proposed evidence does not meet the above test. As previously noted, Ricca's physical condition at the time of the charges is irrelevant for purposes of establishing extraordinary circumstances. Because compliance with a Board order is not a defense to judicial enforcement, see NLRB v.

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107 F.3d 12, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2064, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-southern-interior-ca6-1997.