National Labor Relations Board v. Sonora Sundry Sales, Inc., D/B/A Value Giant

399 F.2d 930, 68 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3000, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5889
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 2, 1968
Docket21909
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 399 F.2d 930 (National Labor Relations Board v. Sonora Sundry Sales, Inc., D/B/A Value Giant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Sonora Sundry Sales, Inc., D/B/A Value Giant, 399 F.2d 930, 68 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3000, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5889 (9th Cir. 1968).

Opinion

MERRILL, Circuit Judge:

This case is before the court upon petition of the National Labor Relations Board to enforce its order issued against respondent on November 1, 1966, as reported at 161 N.L.R.B. No. 53. The Board found that respondent had violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), by threatening its employees that execution of a union contract would result in decreased wage rate. The Board also found that respondent had refused to recognize and bargain with the union which represented a majority of the employees in violation of § 8(a) (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5). 1 The Board adopted the findings of the trial examiner as set forth in the margin. 2 From *935 these findings the trial examiner concluded that no unfair labor practice had been established and recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The Board disagreed.

§ 8(a) (1) Charge

The charge that respondent threatened its employees with a wage decrease if a union contract were to be executed is based upon the facts found by the trial examiner under his subheading “3. Speech of Russell Robinson, June 12, 1965.” The trial examiner concluded that Robinson’s remarks were protected under § 8(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 3

We agree. It is not a “threat of reprisal” for an employer to suggest that he will, if he signs it, adhere to the terms of a union contract. If those terms are disadvantageous it is the employer’s right to make fair comment upon that fact and the employees’ right to have him do so. Certainly a disadvantageous contractual provision cannot rationally be converted into an employer’s threat of reprisal because the employer pointed it out. Statements of much greater antiunion intensity than this fall within § 8(c) protection. See NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Don The Beachcomber v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1968).

§ 8(a) (5) Charge

The question here is whether in its refusal to accept the union authorization cards as establishing the union’s majority status the employer entertained a good-faith doubt as to such status. The trial examiner concluded that it did. We agree.

On June 5, 1965, while the union was still engaged in soliciting membership, and before any recognition demand had been made, the company president, Ease, expressed his doubt that such cards as resulted would truly reflect representation desires of the employees. This doubt had two bases: (1) that the employees might well be intending to express only a wish for an election; (2) that they were apparently being misled as to the terms of the contract which would probably be signed if the union were made the bargaining agent. In no respect do the facts adversely reflect upon the good faith of Ease’s doubts as they then existed. Later events demonstrated that in both respects the doubts were justified.

Whether the employer’s conjecture that the authorization cards might be intended to express only a wish for an election is a sufficient basis for good-faith doubt of majority status we need not decide. Compare, e. g., NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (6 Cir. 1965), with NLRB v. S. E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967). But when combined with the belief that the union was misrepresenting the terms of the anticipated collective bargaining agreement in order to procure the authorization cards, there was a sufficient basis for good-faith doubt that the cards represented a fair and free designation of the union as bargaining agent for the majority of the employees. In the face of such doubts the question of majority status encompasses more than the simple issue of the authenticity and number of signatures secured. The significance of the cards as representative of employee desires has become a relevant inquiry and accommodation must be made for its resolution. For these reasons the existence of such doubts as Ease entertained at the initial stage is justification for a refusal to accept the cards at face value until, with due dispatch, the truth is ascertained and the doubt resolved. Don The Beachcomber v. NLRB, supra.

The Board’s opinion suggests that respondent had been committed to a duty to bargain by action of the store *936 manager. It states: “We find, contrary to the trial examiner, that Finch, the highest official at the store, was clearly the respondent’s agent with ostensible authority to acknowledge the union’s majority status.”

We cannot agree. Finch’s lack of authority so to commit respondent was, on the very occásion of his action, communicated to union officials by respondent’s attorney. Knowledge of lack of authority precludes the attaching of ostensible authority.

The Board emphasizes respondent’s “delaying tactics” as reflecting upon the good faith of any doubt it may have entertained.

We wholly agree with the Board that respondent’s delay in communicating the existence of its doubt and the basis for it, and in demanding an election, was inexcusable. Respondent should not, then, enjoy the benefit of employee change of mind occurring subsequent to the point at which it had a duty to act, either in recognition or in rejection of the union’s showing. Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 1179, etc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967).

Respondent had no duty to act, however, until it had, without delay, ascertained the truth with respect to the doubt originally entertained. This occurred when, with knowledge of the fact that the contract discussed with them by union organizers was not the appropriate contract, the employees, by secret ballot, expressed their wish that representative status be ascertained by election rather than by card. From this point respondent was justified in its refusal to accept the cards as establishing representative status. International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 81 S.Ct. 1603, 6 L.Ed.2d 762 (1966). Its doubts were than resolved by knowledge and good faith was no longer an issue upon which subsequent delay might relevantly bear. Id.

This does not excuse respondent’s disregard of the union of which we continue to be highly critical. It does, however, dismiss such conduct from the ranks of unfair labor practices.

We conclude that upon the record as a whole there is a lack of support for the Board’s order.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
399 F.2d 930, 68 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3000, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-sonora-sundry-sales-inc-dba-value-ca9-1968.