National Labor Relations Board v. Prime Energy Ltd. Partnership

224 F.3d 206
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedAugust 9, 2000
DocketNos. 99-5855, 99-5658
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 224 F.3d 206 (National Labor Relations Board v. Prime Energy Ltd. Partnership) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Prime Energy Ltd. Partnership, 224 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2000).

Opinion

[208]*208OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, we review a decision of the National Labor Relations Board that seven workers were not supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act. Because the record shows the purported supervisors employed independent judgment in assigning tasks to their subordinates and in exercising disciplinary authority, we conclude that the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we will grant the Petition for Review and deny the Board’s Cross-Application to Enforce.

Prime Energy Limited Partnership operates a power co-generation plant in Elm-wood Park, New Jersey that supplies steam and electricity to three nearby paper mills operated by Marcal Paper Mills, Inc. Surplus electricity is sold to Jersey Central Power & Light Company.

Completed in 1989, the plant was built for the specific purpose of supplying Mar-cal with its energy needs. Both the mill and the plant operate twenty-four hours a day, and any disruption in the steam or electricity supply will cause mill operations to halt abruptly. Shut-downs are extremely costly because of lost production time and possible equipment damage.

The plant requires only eighteen people to maintain this continuous operation. Plant personnel are organized into the following positions: Plant Manager, Assistant Plant Manager, Administrative Assistant, Senior Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor, Senior Electrical Maintenance Supervisor, five Shift Supervisors, five Plant Operators, an electrician, and two mechanical maintenance employees.

The Plant Operators migrated from the paper mill to the co-generation plant when operations began, and continue to be represented by the United Paperwork-ers International Union. In October 1998, the International Union of Operating Engineers sought to organize ten of the company’s non-union employees: the Shift Supervisors, the Senior Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor, the Senior Electrical Maintenance Supervisor, the mechanical maintenance workers, and the electrician. The company contended that of these positions, those with the title of “supervisor” actually were supervisory employees and excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act. The company proposed simply adding the remaining three employees to the existing bargaining unit.

The NLRB regional director disagreed with the company’s position and authorized a balloting of the ten employees to decide whether to organize. The union won the election.

The company refused to bargain with the union, and in due course, the matter came before an NLRB panel. By a 2-to-l vote, the Board found the refusal to bargain to be an unfair labor practice by the company and directed Prime Energy to bargain. The company filed a Petition for Review bringing the case before this Court; the Board filed a Cross-Application for Enforcement of its order.

We have jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Review and the Board’s Cross-Application pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). In our inquiry, we look to the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings of fact. NLRB v. Attleboro Assoc., Ltd., 176 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir.1999). On questions of law, we exercise plenary review, and our own jurisprudence dictates our decision. Passavant Retirement & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243, 246, 249 (3d Cir.1998).

The issue presented is whether the seven contested employees are within the category of supervisors in section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Act defines a “supervisor” as:

[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline [209]*209other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.

29 U.S.C. § 152(11).

Experience has demonstrated and the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a straightforward application of the text to the spectrum of real-world job descriptions sometimes creates tensions. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 581, 114 S.Ct. 1778, 128 L.Ed.2d 586 (1994) (citing NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686, 100 S.Ct. 856, 63 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980)). As the NLRB has evaluated and categorized various jobs in the economy, courts have noted the Board’s failure to arrive at a reasonably consistent view of the statutory definition of supervisor. See, e.g., Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir.1997).

In this Court, we have recently considered the question of supervisory status in the context of licensed practical nurses employed by health care institutions. See NLRB v. Attleboro Assoc., Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.1999); Passavant Retirement & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243 (3d Cir.1998). The so-called “charge nurse cases” demonstrate the difficulty of determining supervisory status and the several Courts of Appeals to consider the question differ in the results they have reached.1

In Attleboro, we held that a charge nurse with the authority to counsel other employees directly, as well as the discretion to initiate a disciplinary process documented in a personnel file that could lead to termination, performed one of the statutory supervisory activities. Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165. Doing so is an exercise of independent judgment. Id. In Passavant, we held that a charge nurse’s authority to send a person home from work is disciplinary in nature and indicative of supervisory status. Passavant, 149 F.3d at 248.

The Supreme Court’s contribution to this issue has so far been limited to considering a narrow, parallel question over application of the definition in section 2(11). Health Care & Retirement, 511 U.S. at 577-80, 583, 114 S.Ct. 1778. There, the Court held that the decision of a charge nurse about a patient’s health was “in the interest of the employer,” the final requirement in the definition of supervisor. Id. at 580, 114 S.Ct. 1778.

Although the charge nurse cases are factually different than the one presently before us, Health Care & Retirement, Attleboro, and Passavant provide the framework that governs the construction of section 2(11) within this circuit. We do not consider the ratio of supervisors to employees when determining the supervisory status of a position, and we give equal weight to each of the twelve categories within the statutory definition. Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 163 n. 5.

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224 F.3d 206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-prime-energy-ltd-partnership-ca3-2000.