National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc.

181 F.2d 919, 26 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2116, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3557
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMay 5, 1950
Docket12888_1
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 181 F.2d 919 (National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc., 181 F.2d 919, 26 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2116, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3557 (5th Cir. 1950).

Opinion

RUSSELL, Circuit Judge.

The respondent urges the point, presented by motion to dismiss before the trial examiner, and presented and reurged before the National Labor Relations Board and in this Court, that the Board was forbidden by the statute 1 to complain of the charge made by the Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. O., that respondent refused to bargain with it. The question, as well stated in the Board’s brief is: “Whether the Board is authorized to issue a complaint upon a charge filed by an international [union] affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations if the officers of the international have filed the non-communist affidavit provided for in section 9(h) of the Act, but the officers of the C. I. O. have not.”

No question of the constitutionality of the statutory requirement is raised. We therefore do not consider Congressional power, but only the proper construction of the statutory language. There is no dispute between the parties as to Congressional purpose. It is conceded that the evil of Communist influence upon labor organizations was sought to be remedied by denying the benefits provided by the Act, and especially collective bargaining, to unions having *920 Communist officers. That Congress was properly concerned over the seriousness of industrial strife and disunity threatened and which would result from politically motivated strikes, of Communist-led unions may not be.doubted. In our efforts to give effect to Congressional purpose, we should not overlook what we consider the amply justified and validly sustained view of substantially the entire 'membership of the Congress (as is likewise true' óf all loyal Americans generally), that since Commune ist ideology has been shown so flagrantly incompatible with the principles of American democracy that both can not coexist in any one system of government, its destructive influence in all phases of government should properly be removed if lawful means be available.

The charge in the present case was made by the Textile Workers Union whose officers had filed the necessary affidavits. At the hearing it was stipulated, “that the Congress of Industrial Organization is a labor organization,” and that its President had not filed the affidavit required'by § 9(h), supra. It being established for the record, as is also a matter of general knowledge, that the Congress of Industrial Organizations is a labor organization, the question remaining to be settled, is whether it is likewise “any national or international labor organization” within the terms of the statute.

The Board contends that consideration of the well established meaning in labor relations parlance of the words “national or international labor organization” as not including the present federations, and of the autonomous, independent nature of the national and international unions, by which the parent organization is only a federation or alliance, with resultant lack of control by the federations over its affiliates, and that the federation does not generally directly ■bargain with employers, and of the legislative history of the Act, establishes that Congress did not intend to, nor bring the C. I. O. within the requirements of the noncommunist provision. It further contends • that its construction of the statute fully effectuates the Congressional intent to prevent Communist-led unions from subverting the statutory policy of encouraging collective bargaining, and the contrary construction tends to frustrate that purpose, since, as urged, if the failure of one officer of the C. I. O. to file the affidavit barred each of its affiliates or constituent units from invoking the jurisdiction of the Board there would be no incentive for such affiliate to purge its own ranks. The Board (with one member concurring for distinct reasons, and another dissenting) held, as to the American Federation of Labor, that it was not within the terms of the statute where the national union affiliated with it seeking relief, was in compliance. North Virginia Broadcasters, 75 N. L. R. B., 11. We recognize the Board’s opportunity of familiarity with the usual meaning of terms employed in labor relations parlance, but we do not approve its construction of the provisions of the legislative enactment. We think the language of the statute, considered in the light of Congressional purpose, the evil to be remedied, and the means provided to effectuate that purpose, evidences Congressional intent to wholly eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the unconstitutional overthrow of our Government.

The force of the Board’s argument that national and international unions are generally considered to have a status different from the parent organizations, sought to be supported by quotations from recognized authorities in the field of labor economics, is considerably weakened by the observation that these writers refer to the relationship of national and international unions to the American Federation of Labor or the- Congress of Industrial Organizations, not to national or international organizations, as does the statute. Nor do we think the question of the relative strength or contrasting power of the union and the parent organization controlling. If the position of the union desiring the benefit of the Act is strong, it can with other affiliates exercise control over the parent; if weak, the parent can exercise control over it. Thus in either event, effectuation of the Congressional purpose to eradicate Communist leadership is *921 not thwarted, but promoted, in requiring compliance by each. But if extent of control be material, we are cited by the Board to instances where strong national and international unions withdrew from their parent organizations and presently function successfully independently of the federations. Congress was doubtless aware of these instances and may well have been of the opinion that in view of the desire of any federation to grow in members and power, the realities of the situation would require the parent to bring itself into compliance rather than lose its strong affiliates. It is said that the leaders of the two major organizations are determined to rid their organizations of Communist influences. We make no inquiry of and are not legally concerned with the purpose of the officers of the two major federations in declining to file the required affidavits. However, if the statute had been enforced as we here hold proper, and one had complied and another had not, we doubt not there would have resulted such acquisition of new affiliates by the complying organization as would have proven the validity of the means adopted by Congress to remove Communist influence from the American labor movement. Furthermore, without regard to relative power, the parents themselves in instances so numerous as to be substantial, directly charter and control local unions. Clearly Congress did not intend to require compliance in such instances where the parent organization bargained directly but, not where it was indirectly engaged through the full support accorded an affiliated national or international union. The Board takes a contrary view, and as a result the parent is held sometimes subject and sometimes not, to the provisions of the statute. Compare North Virginia Broadcasters, supra, and American Optical Co., 81 N. L. R. B., 453.

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Bluebook (online)
181 F.2d 919, 26 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2116, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3557, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-postex-cotton-mills-inc-ca5-1950.