National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc.

181 F.2d 919, 26 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2116, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3557
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided May 5, 1950·No. 12888_1·Published·Cited by 23 cases

Opinion

RUSSELL, Circuit Judge.

The respondent urges the point, presented by motion to dismiss before the trial examiner, and presented and reurged before the National Labor Relations Board and in this Court, that the Board was forbidden by the statute 1 to complain of the charge made by the Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. O., that respondent refused to bargain with it. The question, as well stated in the Board’s brief is: “Whether the Board is authorized to issue a complaint upon a charge filed by an international [union] affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations if the officers of the international have filed the non-communist affidavit provided for in section 9(h) of the Act, but the officers of the C. I. O. have not.”

No question of the constitutionality of the statutory requirement is raised. We therefore do not consider Congressional power, but only the proper construction of the statutory language. There is no dispute between the parties as to Congressional purpose. It is conceded that the evil of Communist influence upon labor organizations was sought to be remedied by denying the benefits provided by the Act, and especially collective bargaining, to unions having *920 Communist officers. That Congress was properly concerned over the seriousness of industrial strife and disunity threatened and which would result from politically motivated strikes, of Communist-led unions may not be.doubted. In our efforts to give effect to Congressional purpose, we should not overlook what we consider the amply justified and validly sustained view of substantially the entire 'membership of the Congress (as is likewise true' óf all loyal Americans generally), that since Commune ist ideology has been shown so flagrantly incompatible with the principles of American democracy that both can not coexist in any one system of government, its destructive influence in all phases of government should properly be removed if lawful means be available.

The charge in the present case was made by the Textile Workers Union whose officers had filed the necessary affidavits. At the hearing it was stipulated, “that the Congress of Industrial Organization is a labor organization,” and that its President had not filed the affidavit required'by § 9(h), supra. It being established for the record, as is also a matter of general knowledge, that the Congress of Industrial Organizations is a labor organization, the question remaining to be settled, is whether it is likewise “any national or international labor organization” within the terms of the statute.

The Board contends that consideration of the well established meaning in labor relations parlance of the words “national or international labor organization” as not including the present federations, and of the autonomous, independent nature of the national and international unions, by which the parent organization is only a federation or alliance, with resultant lack of control by the federations over its affiliates, and that the federation does not generally directly ■bargain with employers, and of the legislative history of the Act, establishes that Congress did not intend to, nor bring the C. I. O. within the requirements of the noncommunist provision. It further contends • that its construction of the statute fully effectuates the Congressional intent to prevent Communist-led unions from subverting the statutory policy of encouraging collective bargaining, and the contrary construction tends to frustrate that purpose, since, as urged, if the failure of one officer of the C. I. O. to file the affidavit barred each of its affiliates or constituent units from invoking the jurisdiction of the Board there would be no incentive for such affiliate to purge its own ranks. The Board (with one member concurring for distinct reasons, and another dissenting) held, as to the American Federation of Labor, that it was not within the terms of the statute where the national union affiliated with it seeking relief, was in compliance. North Virginia Broadcasters, 75 N. L. R. B., 11. We recognize the Board’s opportunity of familiarity with the usual meaning of terms employed in labor relations parlance, but we do not approve its construction of the provisions of the legislative enactment. We think the language of the statute, considered in the light of Congressional purpose, the evil to be remedied, and the means provided to effectuate that purpose, evidences Congressional intent to wholly eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the unconstitutional overthrow of our Government.

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National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc., 181 F.2d 919, 26 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2116, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3557 (5th Cir. 1950).

181 F.2d 919 (National Labor Relations Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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