National Labor Relations Board v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Mansfield, Ohio

455 F.2d 1134, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2579, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11314
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 14, 1972
Docket71-1266
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 455 F.2d 1134 (National Labor Relations Board v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Mansfield, Ohio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Mansfield, Ohio, 455 F.2d 1134, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2579, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11314 (6th Cir. 1972).

Opinion

ROTH, District Judge.

This is an unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, commenced by a *1136 charge filed by the International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America, AFL-CIO (hereafter “Union”) against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Mansfield, Ohio (hereafter “Company”), a division of the Burger Brewing Company, alleging that the Company had committed acts constituting unfair labor practices under the Act. The case is before the court upon the application of the National Labor Relations Board (hereafter “Board”), pursuant to Section 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 151 et seq., for enforcement of its order to “cease and desist” and to affirmatively engage in bargaining with the Union.

The Union filed a representation petition with the Board pursuant to Section 9(c) of the Act on February 4, 1969 requesting certification as the bargaining representative for a unit consisting of the Company’s “driver-sales distributors.” At the hearing on the petition the Company took the position that the distributors were “independent contractors” and not “employees” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act. The regional director, with the Board’s concurrence, rejected the contention of the Company; a Board-ordered election was held; and the Union won. The Company thereafter refused to bargain with the Union, adhering to its position that the distributors were independent contractors. The regional director’s decision 1 describes in detail the relationship between the distributors and the Company.

Two questions are presented for our resolution. First, whether the Company has been deprived of procedural due process under Section 10 of the Act and Sections 5, 7, 8 and 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act and, if not, whether substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the Board’s determination that the “driver-sales distributors” are “employees” and not “independent contractors” for the purposes of collective bargaining.

As to the first question the Company takes the position that at the hearing on the charge of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain before the hearing examiner it was entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether the distributors were independent contractors, although it admitted that it had no newly discovered evidence to offer. The trial examiner took the opposite view and granted the motion of the general counsel for summary judgment. The Board upheld this ruling and found that the Company’s refusal to bargain violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act. The position of the Company on this question might plausibly have had some substance at the time it was first asserted, but all question of the propriety of the course pursued in these proceedings has since been removed by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Magnesium Casting Company v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 599, 27 L.Ed.2d 735, decided February 23, 1971. In speaking of the 1959 amendment 2 the Court said:

“Whatever the reason for the delegation, Congress has made a clear choice; and the fact that the Board has only discretionary review of the determination of the regional director creates no possible infirmity within the range of our imagination.”
“ * * * For it is unmistakably plain here that by § 3(b) Congress did allow the Board to make a delegation of its authority over determination of the appropriate bargaining unit to the regional director.” (p. 142, 91 S.Ct. p. 602).

See, also, NLRB v. Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 413 F.2d, 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1969):

“* * * Furthermore, it also clear that the Board is not required to grant a hearing to reconsider factual *1137 issues resolved at an earlier, related representation hearing unless newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence is presented."

The Supreme Court recently (Dec. 14, 1971) denied certiorari in a Second Circuit case, Herald Company v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 430 (1971) where one of the issues raised was the Board’s denial of the Company’s motion to reopen the representation hearing for reconsideration of the regional director’s finding that the distributors there involved were employees under the Act.

The second question requires consideration of the evidence supporting the Board’s finding that the distributors are employees and not independent contractors. Common law agency principles are controlling, NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256, 88 S.Ct. 988, 990, 19 L.Ed.2d 1083:

“Thus there is no doubt that we should apply the common-law agency test here in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.”

And United Insurance instructs further (p. 258, 88 S.Ct. p. 991) that

“ * * * In such a situation as this there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer but all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive. What is important is that the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent common-law agency principles.”

Keeping these principles in mind we have examined the record in this case, and without cataloging all aspects and facets of the relationship between Company and the distributors which have some bearing on its nature and characterization, we find that the Board’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. We concede that there are indi-cia present, which, generally, are associated with the independent contractor status, but the most that can be said for them is that the Board was presented with a choice between two fairly conflicting views. 3 Under NLRB v. United Insurance Co., supra, that leaves this court with no choice but to authorize the entry of a decree enforcing the order of the Board. Accordingly, a decree enforcing the order of the Board will be entered.

APPENDIX

The Employer through a franchise agreement, is engaged in the bottling and distribution of Pepsi-Cola’s soft drink products in nine Ohio counties. Its headquarters bottling plant and main warehouse are located at Mansfield, Ohio, where all manufacturing processes are performed. In addition, the Employer maintains warehouses at Marion and Mt. Vernon, Ohio. Approximately 30 distributors service the Employer’s geographic territory, with 20 stationed at Mansfield, 8 at Marion and 2 at Mt. Vernon. All 30 distributors are being sought by the Petitioner.

According to the Employer, its sales staff consists of a sales manager and five route managers. None of these individuals is sought by the Petitioner.

The distributors are assigned to sell and deliver the Employer’s soft drinks *1138 to various retail establishments on specified routes.

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455 F.2d 1134, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2579, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-pepsi-cola-bottling-company-of-mansfield-ca6-1972.