National Labor Relations Board v. Norris, Inc.

162 F.2d 50, 20 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2304, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3035
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 16, 1947
DocketNo. 11893
StatusPublished

This text of 162 F.2d 50 (National Labor Relations Board v. Norris, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Norris, Inc., 162 F.2d 50, 20 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2304, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3035 (5th Cir. 1947).

Opinion

LEE, Circuit Judge.

The NLRB petitions for enforcement of its order directing Norris, Incorporated, to bargain collectively with Bakery and Confectionery Workers’ Union No. 42, AFL, as exclusive bargaining representative, with certain exceptions, of Norris, Incorporated’s inside workers.1

The question presented involves the result of an election as declared by the Board, by which the Bakery and Confectionery Workers’ Union was chosen as exclusive bargaining representative of the appropriate unit.2

Because of a strike begun on November 16, 1944, current at the date of the election, the Board, in accordance with an agreement of the parties, declared eligible to vote at the election those employees who were on Norris’ pay roll during the week beginning November 13, 1944, and those who would have been thereon that week but for illness, — excluding those who had since quit or been discharged for cause. The election was held on February 16, 1945, and resulted in 209 votes being cast. Of these, 71 were for union representation, 81 were against union representation, and 57 were challenged ballots. Following an investigation in accordance with its procedure,3 the Board ordered 35 of the challenged votes counted; 26 of these were for representation, 9 were against. The result of the election was then found to be 97 votes in favor of union representation and 90 votes against. Thereupon, the Board certified the union as the bargaining representative of the unit. Upon Norris refusing to bargain with it, the union filed charges with the Board, alleging violation of section 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(5). To expedite matters, all parties stipulated that further proceedings before the Board he dispensed with and that an order be entered by the Board directing Norris to bargain with the union, reserving to Norris the right to challenge the Board’s order in this court on the ground that the union had not been selected by a majority of the employees in the unit.

The controversy here revolves around (1) the Board’s finding that Opalee Butler, Lois McConnell, Emma Pirkle, Lillian Burton, Willie Daniel, and Ruth Petty were employees of Norris at the time of the election, and its order that their challenged ballots be counted; (2) the Board’s finding that the regular work of four others — Ash-er Lee, Onnie McKinney, Paul Lowe, and Rupert Redmon — was such as to exclude them from the unit, and its order that their challenged votes be not counted; and (3) the Board’s finding that one Nelle Gentry was not a factory office worker, and its order that her challenged vote be counted.

Norris contends that these findings were not supported by substantial evidence, hence that the orders are erroneous.

[52]*52It is to be noted that the Board in its order fixing eligibility to participate in the election excluded those employees on the November 13, 1944, pay roll who had since quit or been discharged for cause. The personnel absenteeism at the time of the strike was shown to be pronounced, and it was not possible in some cases to tell whether an employee was on strike or had quit. The six found by the Board to be employees of Norris at the time of the election had made application to other employers for employment. The Board contends that the employment sought was temporary. As proof of this, the Board relies upon a general understanding the union had with the new employers that any former employee of Norris would be released if she desired to return to work for Norris. Norris contends that the six had left its employ. To prove this, it filed in evidence the written applications of the' six employees for new employment. These applications, filled out and signed by the applicants, show that four of the six continued in Norris’ employ until January, 1945, one to November, 1944, and one to November 16, 1944. Each of them received a referral card from the United States Employment Service and submitted it along with the application for new employment.4 Fou’r of the six were employed elsewhere at the time of the election. One had made no application for new employment prior to that time; her application was made in April following the election in February, but she, as the others, had written “Quit” in her application as her reason for leaving Norris’ employ. The remaining employee obtained new employment prior to the election but left that job after working one night, (she desired daytime work, and no job on a day shift was available). Of the six, she was the only one called as a witness by the Board. She was asked: .

“Q. Now, Miss Burton, was that a temporary job you had at National Biscuit? A. Well, I didn’t ask him if I could come back to Norris, but I thought it was understood when the strike was settled I might come back.

“Q. Did he [referring to the employer] say anything to you? A. He did not; not.”

None of the six gave the strike as a reason for terminating her employment with Norris. Five said in their applications that they had “quit”; 5 one said that she had “resigned”.6 The strike was called on November 16, 1944. Four of the six in their applications stated that they were employed by Norris until January, 1945, some two months after the strike was called. The evidence refutes any inference that at the time of the election the six were employees of Norris. The Board’s order that the six challenged votes be counted was erroneous.

The four employees whose ballots were ordered not counted were found by the Board not to be within the unit. The unit, according to the Board’s order, embraced “all inside workers of the company except * * * porters * * * and all other supervisory employees with authority .to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees”.

Though tire unit, finding made no men-[53]*53lion of this employee category, the Board found that Asher Lee, whose vote was challenged by the union on the ground that he was a chemist but who the company asserted was a chemist who also made candy, spent approximately 10% of his time in technical work, 30% in making candy flavors, and 60% in non-clerical routine jobs, and further found that Lee had supervisory authority over certain helpers. Norris moved for reconsideration and called attention to testimony to the effect that Lee, though referred to as a “chemist”, spent only 10% of his time in the work of a chemist and spent 90% of his time in the production of candy; this was so found and so reported by the Regional Director. As for the element of supervisory authority, Norris set forth the fact that no evidence indicates that Lee had such authority and that the Board undoubtedly confused Asher Lee with his father, W. H. Lee, who did have such authority. xVfter consideration of the Norris motion, the Board held that it was not necessary to determine Lee’s supervisory status and sustained its original holding of ineligibility on the theory that Lee was a highly trained technician whose duties were different, in large measure, from those of production employees.

As the uncontroverted recoid shows that Lee devoted 90% of his time to candy production and non-technical routine jobs in the factory, to exclude him from the election as a highly trained technician not only reads into the Board’s definition of the unit an exclusion not therein set forth, but gives the term “technical employee” a scope without substantial support in the evidence.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Unfair labor practices
29 U.S.C. § 158(5)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
162 F.2d 50, 20 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2304, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-norris-inc-ca5-1947.