National Labor Relations Board v. Interior Enterprises, Inc.

298 F.2d 147, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 2881
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 26, 1961
Docket17083_1
StatusPublished

This text of 298 F.2d 147 (National Labor Relations Board v. Interior Enterprises, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Interior Enterprises, Inc., 298 F.2d 147, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 2881 (9th Cir. 1961).

Opinion

HAMLIN, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter called the Board, petitions this court in this proceeding for enforcement of an order of the Board issued against Interior Enterprises, Inc., respondent herein. Unfair labor practices were alleged to have occurred at Fairbanks, Alaska, where respondent is engaged in business as a private contract carrier by air. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e).

The respondent, in addition to denying that there were any unfair labor practices, contends that the Board did not have jurisdiction of the proceedings because respondent is not an “employer” as defined in section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (2) , a pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

“The term ‘employer’ * * * shall not include * * * any person subject to the Railway Labor Act * *

In the proceedings below the Board issued a complaint alleging that respondent had committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of sections 2(6) and (7) and 8(a) (1), (3) , and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 152(6) and (7) and 158(a) (1), (3), and (5). At the conclusion of the hearing before a trial examiner respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that respondent was subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and hence was not an “employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 *148 (2), supra. The trial examiner concluded that respondent was not an “employer” under section 152(2) and recommended to the Board that the complaint be dismissed.

The Board disagreed with the recommendation of the trial examiner as to the dismissal of the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the trial examiner. Thereafter, the trial examiner made findings of unfair labor practices by respondent. He made recommendations that respondent cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action set out in the Trial Examiner’s Supplemental Intermediate Report. In accordance with these findings and recommendations the Board issued the order for which it seeks enforcement herein.

Respondent’s contention that it is subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S. C.A. § 151 et seq.) and not to the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.) is based upon the following section of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 181, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

“All of the provisions of sections 151, 152, and 154-163 of this title are extended to and shall cover every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and every carrier by air transporting mail for or under contract with the United States Government * *

In his first intermediate report and recommended order wherein he concluded that respondent was subject to the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act rather than to the National Labor Relations Act, the trial examiner set out in detail certain findings of fact as to respondent’s activity. When the Board made its order reversing the recommendation of the trial examiner that the proceeding be dismissed it did not set aside his findings of fact pertaining to the activities of the respondent in transporting mail. It did, however, draw a different conclusion therefrom. In the course of this opinion we shall quote from the findings of fact of the trial examiner.

The inception of respondent’s flying activities in Alaska and the Arctic region are described in the trial examiner’s findings as follows:

“As a result of negotiations with representatives of Western Electric Company and a joint enterprise operating under the name of Puget Sound & Drake, herein called P. S. & D., the Respondent * * * undertook in March 1953 to furnish flying service on what became known as the DEW Line (Distant Early Warning, a defense project), between Barter Island and several other sites in the Arctic. In addition to carrying workmen and freight, the Respondent transported mail between the DEW Line sites. Thereafter, the Respondent continued under contract with Western Electric Company and P. S. & D. alternately. Western Electric was the prime contractor under contract with the United States Air Force; P. S. & D. was a subcontractor under that contract, and the Respondent’s contract with the P. S. & D. was a sub-subcontract.
“By January 1,1957, the Respondent had planes stationed at Point Barrow and Barter Island and, although its principal function was lateral support of the DEW Line, it did, to a limited extent, participate in vertical hauling from Fairbanks to the DEW Line. As of the latter date, 1 the respondent entered into a contract with P. S. & D. for the period of January 1 to February 15, 1957, and later into an identical contract for the period of February 16 to June 30, 1957, under the terms of which the respondent agreed to make available to P. S. & D. aircraft with *149 crews, and P. S. & D. agreed to pay the respondent on a time or mileage basis according to a schedule furnished.
“On June 19,1957, the Respondent made a contract direct with the Federal Electric Corporation, covering the term from July 1, 1957, to June 30, 1958 * * * Federal Electric was a prime contractor with the United States Air Force for operation and maintenance of the DEW Line, and the Respondent became, by its contract with Federal Electric, a subcontractor. The subcontract was made subject to the approval of the United States Air Force Administration Contracting Officer and was stated not to be binding until so approved. Approval actually was given in October 1957, but the Respondent operated under the contract as made with Federal Electric after July 1, 1957 and the Air Force tacitly recognized it by direct delivery to the Respondent of some of the mail required to be carried by the Respondent under the contract.” [Emphasis added.]

The respondent is subject to the Railway Labor Act and not to the National Labor Relations Act if it is a “carrier by air transporting mail for or under contract with the United States Government.” 45 U.S.C.A. § 181.

Respondent’s subcontract contains, inter alia, the following clauses:

“1. GENERAL SCOPE OF AGREEMENT — In connection with the air transportation services for the logistic support of the DEW Line System, * * * the Carrier will perform the work and services necessary for the performance thereof, all in accordance with the applicable conditions and specifications contained in the Prime Contract between the Government and FEC [Federal Electric Corporation] * * *.
“5. (b) After Government approval of this subcontract, the Carrier, INTERIOR, is not authorized to expend or obligate in furtherance of its performance hereunder more than One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,200,000) during the period of the performance of this subcontract, without the written consent of FEC.
“7.

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298 F.2d 147, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 2881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-interior-enterprises-inc-ca9-1961.