RANDALL, Circuit Judge:
In this case the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) seeks to enforce its order in Haberman Construction Co., 236 N.L. R.B. 79 (1978). Adopting the findings of the administrative law judge, the Board found that Haberman Construction Co. (the Company) had by its actions adopted a prehire contract in effect between Local 1266 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (the Union) and the Austin Chapter of the Associated General Contractors (the AGC). On this basis, the Board found that the Company had committed unfair labor practices by unilaterally refusing to make further union benefit payments as required by the Union-AGC contract, by announcing to its employees that it intended to go “open shop,” and by constructively discharging certain employees who resigned in response to the Company’s decision to cease union benefit payments and to go “open shop.” Although the Board generally adopted the remedies proposed by the administrative law judge, it rejected his suggestion that, since the projects on which the employees had been working were in all likelihood completed by the time of his decision, the employees should be made whole only for losses incurred until the end of those projects. Rather, the Board ordered that those employees who would have continued in the Company’s employment but for the unfair labor practices be reinstated to substantially equivalent positions on new projects and that they be made whole for all losses incurred by them as a result of the unfair labor practices (such losses not being limited to the projects under way at the time of the unfair labor practices).
A panel of this court granted the Board’s petition to enforce its order in NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co., 618 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.), vacated and rehearing en banc granted (July 15, 1980). The panel enforced the Board’s order in all respects. In so doing, the panel interpreted the Board’s opinion as having adopted the rule that a prehire contract between a project-by-project employer in the construction industry and a union, entered into pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), becomes and continues thereafter to be an ordinary section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement once the union has achieved majority status in the relevant bargaining unit. As a section 9(a) agreement, the panel reasoned, a presumption of continuing union majority applies, and the union is not required to establish its majority status at each succeeding job site in order to enforce its contract with the employer. Accordingly, the panel concluded that the Board’s remedy approximately extended to projects not yet begun at the time of the unfair labor practices.
We have reheard this case en banc primarily to consider whether the panel misinterpreted the remedial portion of the order and opinion of the Board in this case. For the reasons set forth below, we have decided that the panel did misinterpret the order and opinion of the Board. Further, reading the Board’s order in the context of the explanation provided in its opinion and of its own prior precedents, we conclude that we cannot enforce that portion of the Board’s remedial order which extends to projects not yet begun at the time of the unfair labor practices at issue.
The Facts
The dispute in this case derives from the disruption of the relationship between the Company, a construction firm operating in Austin, Texas, and the Union. This relationship had its origin in 1973 when the Company hired Jessie Beshears, a union member, to be its carpenter foreman, and began paying Beshears’ benefits into the carpenters’ welfare, pension and apprentice [355]*355training fund in accordance with the contract then in effect between the Union and the AGC. Under Beshears’ tutelage, this burgeoning relationship grew to significant proportions since Beshears, according to his own testimony, hired “strictly union carpenters.” Some of the Company’s growing complement of union carpenters were hired by Beshears on the basis of his personal knowledge of their work; others were procured through his use of the union hiring hall.
Although the Company never formally executed a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, and despite the fact that respondent was not a member of the AGC, by May 1973 respondent was remunerating its carpenters at the pay scale provided by the Union-AGC contract. Furthermore, when this contract expired on August 31, 1974, and was replaced by a contract effective from September 1, 1974, through March 31,1977, the Company instituted the new contract’s higher wage scale. The Company also submitted payments for its carpenters’ benefits to the Union and allowed the employees to maintain a job steward at the worksite.
This amicable relationship ended abruptly on February 14, 1977. On that date, the Company informed its carpenters that it would cease paying for their union benefits, and that it was going “open shop.” In response, the carpenters sought the advice of their union business agent. Acting on his advice, at the end of business on February 16, 1977, five of the Company’s carpenters relinquished their positions because of the Company’s actions.
The Union’s charges of unfair labor practices were tried before an administrative law judge. He found that in February, 1977, the Company operated two Austin projects and that the carpenters employed at these two projects constituted one bargaining unit because the employees were freely shifted by the Company between the two projects. He further found that on the date of the discharges, the Union represented at least seven of the eleven rank-and-file carpenters in this unit. Hence, it represented a majority of the employees.
The administrative law judge found that the Company was a project-by-project employer, having no regular complement of workers but rather hiring as the need arose. The Company’s two Austin projects were almost completed at the time of the unfair labor practices and were considered by the administrative law judge to have been completed by the time of the administrative hearing.
The administrative law judge also found that the Company had adopted the Union-AGC contract. Since the Union enjoyed majority status at the time of the breach of this contract, the administrative law judge concluded that the Company’s unilateral cessation of paying union benefits constituted a refusal to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act; that the Company’s announcement that it was going “open shop” was coercion in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act; and that the Company’s unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment constituted a constructive discharge of the five employees who quit their employ, and thus amounted to a discriminatory discharge in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
After adopting the administrative law judge’s findings as to the violations, the Board ordered the Company to reinstitute the terms and conditions of the Union-AGC contract, to reinstate the five discharged employees and to make them whole for the projects under way at the time of the violations and for new projects on which they would have been hired but for the violations, and to bargain with the union.
I. Existence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
It is well settled that a union and employer’s adoption of a labor contract1 is [356]*356not dependent on the reduction to writing of their intention to be bound. See, e. g., Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters Local 996, 597 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1979); Warrior Constructors, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Local 926, 383 F.2d 700, 708 (5th Cir. 1967); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1952). Instead, what is required is conduct manifesting an intention to abide by the terms of an agreement. See, e. g., Warrior Constructors, Inc., supra, 383 F.2d at 708-09; NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 373 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Rabouin, supra, 195 F.2d at 909-10.
The conclusion that the Company manifested an intent to abide by the Union-AGC contract, by enjoying its benefits and abiding by its provisions, see id. at 910, is well supported by the findings of the administrative law judge:
[T]he evidence in the instant case of Respondent’s adoption of the Union-AGC agreement must be regarded as substantial. Respondent’s contributions to the Union’s trust funds from May 1973 through February 1977, its use of union members exclusively as far as the record shows, it [sic] observations of the Union-AGC holidays, its use of the union for referrals, its payment of the union wage scale, its allowance through Beshears of the appointment of a union job steward, and the undisputed testimony of Beshears, whom I credit, to the effect that on some but not all occasions when he wanted to start work at an earlier hour than called for in the union agreement he will check with business agent Rosentritt, all reflects [sic] an intention to adhere to the terms of the Union-AGC agreement.
Since these findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), we conclude that the Company had adopted the Union-AGC contract.2
The Company asserted below that it was free to repudiate the Union-AGC contract because its adoption of that agreement did not create a collective bargaining agreement, but created instead a “prehire contract.” It is true that section 8(f) of the Act creates a unique situation with respect to the formation of contracts between employers in the building and construction industry and unions. Section 9(a) of the Act, which otherwise would govern, provides that the exclusive representative of all the employees in a bargaining unit shall be the “representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees” in the unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer under section 8(a)(1) and (2) and for a union under section 8(b)(1)(A) to enter into a collective bargaining agreement recognizing the union as the [357]*357exclusive bargaining representative when only a minority of the employees have authorized the union to represent them. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737, 81 S.Ct. 1603, 1607, 6 L.Ed.2d 762 (1961). Section 8(f) of the Act specifically provides, however, that it shall not be an unfair labor practice for an employer to make an agreement with a labor organization covering employees engaged in the building and construction industry prior to the establishment of majority status for the labor organization. In NLRB v. Local 103, International Association of Bridge Workers (Higdon Construction Co.), 434 U.S. 335, 98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586 (1978), the Supreme Court determined the binding effect of prehire contracts entered into pursuant to section 8(f). The Court adopted the longstanding position of the Board that a section 8(f) prehire contract is voidable until such time as the union achieves majority support in the appropriate bargaining unit. Id. at 341, 98 S.Ct. at 655-656. The Court made clear, however, that “when the union successfully seeks majority support, the prehire agreement attains the status of a collective-bargaining agreement executed by the employer with a union representing a majority of the employees in the unit.” Id. at 350, 98 S.Ct. at 660. Since a majority of the employees in the relevant unit in the Company’s employment supported the Union on February 14,1977, the Company’s actions of that date were taken in the face of a valid collective bargaining agreement.
II. The Unfair Labor Practices
A. Cessation of Benefit Payments
It is well settled that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976),3 by unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment without first granting its employees’ exclusive bargaining representative the opportunity to bargain about “mandatory” subjects. See, e. g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1114, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962). It is equally well established that contributions to a health, welfare and pension fund constitute mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See, e. g., NLRB v. SAC Construction Co., 603 F.2d 1155, 1156 (5th Cir. 1979); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343, 1349 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978); United Brick & Clay Workers v. District 50, UMW, 439 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1971); Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1970).
Given the existence of these two principles, we have no difficulty in affirming the Board’s finding of an unfair labor practice here, for the Company does not dispute that it ceased payments of the benefits without bargaining with the Union. Since that action accomplished a unilateral alteration in terms and conditions of employment which are mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Company violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
B. “Open Shop” Announcement
The Board found that the Company’s communication of its intention to go “open shop” coerced its employees in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),4 because “such announcement by Respondent conveyed to employees an intent of Respondent to refuse to abide by the terms of an applicable contract and to discontinue dealing with a union with which it was obligated to deal.” In contrast, the Company contends that its statement was simply an announcement of its intention to abide by the Texas “right to work law” which prohibits closed shops. See Tex.Stat. Ann. art. 5207a (Vernon 1971).
In essence the Company asks us to reject the Board’s inference that its statement conveyed an intention to repudiate its bar[358]*358gaining obligations. Even were we to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the character of the Company’s statement, we cannot reverse its finding, for it is not the province of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board when the Board has drawn a plausible inference from competent evidence. See, e. g., NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260, 88 S.Ct. 988, 991, 19 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1968). Indeed, we find the Board’s inference to be quite plausible. Given the fact that the Company’s announcement was made simultaneously with its repudiation of its obligation to pay the carpenters’ benefits, its statement is quite easily interpreted as a message to its employees that it would not recognize and bargain with the Union. The Board’s inference of coercion is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.5
C. Constructive Discharge
There are two elements to a constructive discharge violative of section 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).6 First, the employer’s conduct must have created working conditions so intolerable that an employee is forced to resign. Second, the employer must have acted “to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization” within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) of the Act. See, e. g., Cartwright Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1979); J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Holly Bra of California, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn Division, 339 F.2d 203, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1964). We must therefore determine whether the Company’s conduct created intolerable conditions and was accomplished to discourage union membership.
1. Intolerable Conditions
Five of the Company’s employees resigned in response to the Company’s decision to go “open shop” and to unilaterally cease payment of all union benefits. Although the payment of union benefits was a mandatory subject of bargaining, see Part 11(A) of this opinion, we need not decide whether that fact alone would render the cessation of such payments an “intolerable condition” sufficient for a finding of a constructive discharge. As discussed above, the administrative law judge also found that the Company’s announcement that it intended to go “open shop” conveyed to its employees an intent to refuse to abide by the terms of a binding labor contract and to refuse to deal with the union with which it was obligated to deal, and thereby forced the Company’s employees to choose between quitting its employ or continuing in the face of the Company’s unlawful repudiation of its bargaining obligations under the Act. The Board has repeatedly held that employees who decide to quit in circumstances similar to those in this case have been constructively discharged. See, e. g., Superior Sprinkler, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 204 (1976) (refusal to negotiate new collective bargaining agreement, and unilateral cessation of contributions to the union’s vacation fund and health and welfare fund); Mar[359]*359quis Elevator Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 461 (1975) (withdrawal of recognition from union with statement that employer would operate as nonunion shop, with institution of new wage guidelines and discontinuance of payments to various union trust funds); Lifetime Shingle Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 688 (1973) (conditioning of continued employment upon employees’ giving up union membership); Barwise Sheet Metal Co., 199 N.L. R. B. 372 (1972) (conditioning of continued employment upon employees’ giving up union membership); Johnson Electric Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 637 (1972) (unilateral change in wages and benefits provided for in new contract, with requirement that employees work with nonunion workers under circumstances which would require employees to lose union membership); Blue Cab Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 489 (1965), enforced sub nom. Teamsters Local 782 v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837, 88 S. Ct. 54, 19 L.Ed.2d 100 (1967) (unilateral change in method of operation from use of commission drivers to nonunion lease arrangement, thereby forcing employees to choose between new conditions and union representation).
2. Conduct to Discourage Union Membership
The font of our analysis of the Company’s motivation for its conduct is of course the paradigm for section 8(a)(3) established by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967):
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer’s discriminatory conduct was “inherently destructive” of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is “comparatively slight,” an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct. Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.
Id. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1798.
Our research has revealed that at least two categories of conduct are “inherently destructive of important employee rights.” One type of such conduct is that which jeopardizes the position of the union as bargaining agent or diminishes the union’s capacity effectively to represent the employees in the bargaining unit. Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Division v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 845 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 1939, 40 L.Ed.2d 288 (1974); see Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976). This action “creates visible and continuing obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights.” Inter-Collegiate Press, supra, 486 F.2d at 845 (footnote omitted); Loomis Courier Service Inc. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1979). Examples of such conduct include the grant of super-seniority to returning strikers, see NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963), the institution of fixed work shifts to non-striking workers, action that insured that the strikers, upon return, would be permanently relegated to less desirable shifts, see NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1978), and the cessation of payments of insurance premiums for strikers, conduct which assured that the employees would be unable to obtain renewed insurance coverage for ninety days past the date of their reemployment. See id. at 841-42.
The second type of conduct inherently destructive of important employee rights is that which directly and unambiguously penalizes or deters protected activity. Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1976); Portland Willamette Co., supra, 534 F.2d at 1334; see NLRB v. [360]*360Lantz, 607 F.2d 290, 299 (9th Cir. 1979); Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 232 (7th Cir. 1979). Examples of such action include discharges occurring because of the employees’ expressed desire to obtain union assistance in attaining compliance with the- collective bargaining agreement, see Lantz, supra, 607 F.2d at 299, and a discharge resulting from an employee’s lobbying of legislators regarding changes in national policy affecting the employee’s job security. See Kaiser Engineers, supra, 538 F.2d at 1384-86.
We have no difficulty placing the Company’s action within both of these categories.7 As we have discussed in Part 11(A) and (B) of this opinion, the Company’s conduct amounted to a repudiation of its bargaining obligation. It would be a complete contradiction to state that such action did not jeopardize the Union’s position as bargaining agent or diminish its ability effectively to represent the carpenters. Furthermore, no conduct could more efficaciously convey to the employees the futility of engaging in concerted activity, and thereby directly and unambiguously deter the exercise of that right, the guarantee most fundamentally protected by the Act. From the carpenters’ standpoint, it would be futile to engage in collective bargaining through a representative if the Company would repudiate any resulting agreement at will. Accordingly, the Company’s conduct was inherently destructive of important employee rights, and no proof of antiunion motivation is required.8
III. The Remedy
A. Our Interpretation of the Board’s Opinion in this Case
The administrative law judge recommended the following remedies in his proposed order: that the Company cease and desist from its violations of the Act; that the Company bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union; that the Corn[361]*361pany restore all terms which it had unilaterally changed in its agreement with the Union; that the Company pay the union benefits it had unlawfully refused to pay; and that the Company make whole the five employees it had forced to resign for any loss of wages or benefits caused by the Company’s wrongful conduct. Because the jobs on which these employees had been working appeared to be completed, and because the Company was a project-by-project employer in the construction industry, the administrative law judge expressly declined to order reinstatement:
From the record it appears that the jobs from which the employees were constructively discharged were almost completed at the time of the discharge and most likely by now, have been long since completed. Since it appears that the job complement of carpenters was not always the same from job to job reinstatement in the sense of restoring a carpenter to a particular job from which he has been discharged is neither practical or required.
236 N.L.R.B. at 87.
The Board adopted the proposed remedies of the administrative law judge but rejected his suggestion that remedies be limited to projects in progress at the time of the unfair labor practices. Instead, the Board ordered that those discriminatees who would have been rehired absent the Company’s unfair labor practices be reinstated “to their former positions of employment or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions of employment.” Id. at 80. The Board’s rationale for this order was set out in four sentences in its opinion:
We are aware that, even absent the unfair labor practices, Respondent, which hired employees on a project-by-project basis, might have discharged the discriminatees in the normal course of business when the projects were completed. However, there is a distinct possibility that, absent its discrimination, Respondent would have retained, transferred, or rehired at least some of the discriminatees for new projects. Accordingly, to remedy fully Respondent’s unfair labor practices and protect the discriminatees’ rights, we shall order Respondent to reinstate the discriminatees to their former or substantially equivalent positions and to .make them whole for any losses they suffered as a result of the discrimination against them... . The determination of which employees, if any, would have continued in Respondent’s employment and for how long can best be made at the compliance stage of the proceedings, to which we defer the matter.
Id. at 79 (footnotes omitted). This explanation was rendered without so much as a single citation to the Board’s previous decisions or to those of the courts. Moreover, this extremely brief and unenlightening opinion was issued despite the order’s possible conflict with a principle previously articulated by the Board — that a union must reestablish its majority status at each new jobsite before it can enforce a section 8(f) prehire agreement with a project-by-project employer. This principle, which is discussed in more detail infra, was clearly expressed by the Board in an opinion issued less than eight months before its decision in this case. See Dee Cee Floor Covering, 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977).
Although the remedial power of the Board is “a broad and discretionary one, subject to [a] limited judicial review,” 9 the Board may not order remedies which are in fact punitive. The purpose of a remedial order under the Act is to restore conditions that existed in the absence of unfair labor practices; a remedy which grants rights to which a party would not have been entitled in the absence of the violations is punitive as to the other party and is therefore unen[362]*362forceable.10 In light of these principles, the holding of Dee Cee Floor Covering appears to preclude remedial relief which extends beyond the projects in progress at the time of the Company’s unfair labor practices. If the Company was, as Dee Cee Floor Covering indicates, bound by the Union-AGC prehire contract only to the extent of the particular projects at which a union majority had been established, then it could lawfully have ended its relationship with the Union at the conclusion of those jobs. A remedy reaching future projects (on which a union majority was not yet established) would in effect hold the Company to a labor contract which has not become enforceable as to those projects. Such a remedy would be punitive rather than remedial and we therefore could not enforce it.
The panel opinion interpreted the Board’s opinion in this case as having rejected the principle enunciated in Dee Cee Floor Covering. The panel found that the Board had instead adopted the rule that a section 8(f) prehire contract is transformed into an ordinary section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement when the union first achieves majority status in the relevant bargaining unit; the panel concluded that a presumption of continuing union majority applies to project-by-project employers in the construction industry despite the origination of their agreement in a section 8(f) prehire contract. Crucial to the panel’s analysis, therefore, was its conclusion that the holding in Dee Cee Floor Covering has “met its well-deserved demise.” 618 F.2d at 309.
Although the panel’s reading of the Board’s opinion in this case is a possible one,11 we do not think it appropriate to read a change of that magnitude into such a brief and ambiguous opinion. The Board does not discuss or even cite Dee Cee Floor Covering, despite the dissent of one of its members on the basis that the Board’s action conflicts with that case. 236 N.L.R.B. at 79 n.5 (Member Penello, dissenting). We recognize that the Board is authorized to change its mind and “modify its construction of the Act in light of its cumulative experience.” Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 2477, 57 L.Ed.2d 370 (1978). But “when it does it must at least carefully explain its reasons, justify the change and follow con[363]*363trolling law.” Seafarers v. NLRB, 101 L.R.R.M. 2628, 2631 (D.C.Cir.1979). As the'Supreme Court made clear in NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443-44, 85 S.Ct. 1061, 1064, 13 L.Ed.2d 951 (1965), it is highly improper for “reviewing courts to substitute counsel’s rationale or their discretion for that of the Board.” It is the duty of the Board — not of the courts — to clearly set forth the intent of its decisions and to explain the basis of departures from its own precedent. Although the Board is entrusted with considerable discretion in its interpretation and application of the Act,12 “[w]hen it so exercises the discretion given to it by Congress, it must ‘disclose the basis of its order’ and ‘give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.’ ” Id. at 443, 85 S.Ct. at 1064. See Central Power & Light Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1980); Mitchell Energy Corp. v. FERC, 580 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Sunnyland Packing Co., 557 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1977). There is no such indication in the Board’s opinion in this case. Furthermore, several cases subsequent to the Board’s decision in this case, discussed infra, have made it clear that the Board did not intend to overrule Dee Cee Floor Covering.
Accordingly, we must interpret the Board’s decision in this case in the context of the holding in Dee Cee Floor Covering that a union must reestablish its majority status at each new jobsite before it can enforce a section 8(f) prehire contract with a project-by-project employer. Reading the Board’s opinion in this light, the Board appears to have found that while the Company was not bound by the Union-AGC contract at subsequent jobsites, relief extending beyond the termination of an enforceable contract was nevertheless required, in order to fully restore the employees to the status quo ante. This apparent holding requires a factual finding (which the Board does not make, but instead leaves to the compliance stage of these proceedings) that particular employees would have been rehired by the Company despite its lawful option not to rehire them at the conclusion of ongoing projects. We hold that such a finding is precluded as a matter of law by factual findings already made by the administrative law judge and accepted by the Board. Therefore we must refuse the Board’s application for enforcement of its order insofar as that order extends relief to projects not yet begun at the time of the unfair labor practices. In order to understand our interpretation of the Board’s opinion and our conclusion as to its validity, it is necessary first to review the history of section 8(f) and its interpretation by the Board and by the courts; we will then describe the Board’s apparent holding and apply that holding to the facts of this case.
B. The History of Section 8(f) and its Interpretation by the Board and by the Courts
The Board declined to exercise jurisdiction over the construction industry before 1947. As a result, “[cjoncepts evoked by the Board ... developed without reference to the construction industry.” H.R.Rep.No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959), Reprinted at [1959] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2318; 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 777 [hereinafter cited as Leg.Hist.], quoted in Higdon Construction Co., 434 U.S. at 348, 98 S.Ct. at 659. In 1959, Congress added section 8(f)13 to the Act in response to the special characteristics and needs of the building and construction [364]*364industry.14 The short duration and occasional nature of employment in that industry make ordinary collective bargaining negotiations — which must await the employees’ choice of a bargaining representative— difficult at best. Under section 8(f), the execution of an agreement with a minority union by an employer in the construction industry does not constitute an unfair labor practice. This exception to the requirement of majority support at the time of the execution of the contract is limited, however, by a proviso to the section which states that a contract which would be invalid but for section 8(f) “shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e).” Under this proviso, the employer, employees or union may request a bargaining representative election at any time.
In NLRB v. Local 103, International Association of Bridge Workers (Higdon Construction Co.), 434 U.S. 335, 98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586 (1978), the Supreme Court discussed the legislative history of section 8(f) and the effect to be given section 8(f) agreements in the building and construction industry. Higdon Construction Co. and Local 103 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron-workers, AFL-CIO (Local 103), after several years of collective bargaining, entered into a prehire agreement requiring Higdon to abide by the terms of an “understanding” between Local 103 and a multiemployer association. There was no union security clause in the Local 103-Higdon agreement. When Higdon later undertook construction projects (through an alter ego company) with nonunion labor, Local 103 picketed those projects (one for more than 30 days) with signs stating that the employer was violating the agreement with the union. The union did not represent a majority of the employees at the job sites and had not petitioned for a representation election. The employer filed a charge with the NLRB alleging that the union was violating section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an uncertified union to picket for more than 30 days for the purpose of forcing an employer to recognize the union as the bargaining representative of his employees unless a petition for an election has been filed within that period. Local 103 argued that its picketing did not constitute an unfair labor practice because, since Higdon had entered into a lawful section 8(f) prehire contract with Local 103 promising to abide by the multi[365]*365employer standard, the purpose of the picketing was to obtain compliance with an existing contract rather than to obtain recognition or bargaining as an initial matter.
The Supreme Court approved the longstanding position of the Board, see R.J. Smith Construction Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 615 (1974), and held that the picketing by Local 103 was for recognitional purposes and constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(7)(C). The Court explained that the picketing was recognitional because
a prehire agreement does not entitle a minority union to be treated as the majority representative of the employees until and unless it attains majority support in the relevant unit. Until that time the prehire agreement is voidable and does not have the same stature as a collective-bargaining contract entered into with a union actually representing a majority of the employees and recognized as such by the employer. Accordingly, .. . picketing by a minority union to enforce a prehire agreement that the employer refuses to honor, effectively has the object of attaining recognition as the bargaining representative with majority support among the employees, and is consequently violative of section 8(b)(7)(C).
434 U.S. at 341, 98 S.Ct. at 655-656.
In accepting the Board’s position in Higdon Construction Co., the Supreme Court emphasized the unique nature of prehire contracts under section 8(f). A prehire contract is a “preliminary step” which allows an employer in the construction industry to negotiate and to reach a tentative agreement with a union before that union becomes the majority representative of its employees. Id. at 345. The Court also emphasized the significant limitations which are implicit in any prehire contract. Section 8(f) was not intended to undermine the employees’ right to bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing. Hence the proviso to section 8(f), which states that a prehire contract “shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e)” of the Act. That is, a bargaining representative election may be called at any time — despite the existence of a prehire contract between the employer and a union. Accordingly, the exception embodied in section 8(f) and allowing negotiations between an employer and a union which has not achieved majority status “is nevertheless of limited scope, for the usual rule protecting the union from inquiry into its majority status during the terms of a collective-bargaining contract does not apply to prehire agreements.” Id. at 345, 98 S.Ct. at 657-658. Of course, the Supreme Court recognized that once the union does establish its majority status, its prehire contract with the employer “attains the status of a collective-bargaining agreement executed by the employer with a union representing a majority of the employees in the unit.” Id. at 350, 98 S.Ct. at 660. Prior to that time, however, section 8(f) agreements are entirely voidable; since the union does not represent a majority of the employees, it is not entitled to enter into a binding collective-bargaining agreement with the employer.
Before the Supreme Court decided Higdon Construction Co., the Board had already reiterated its analysis of section 8(f) in Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977). After reaffirming its conclusion that section 8(f) prehire contracts do not become enforceable until the union demonstrates majority support, the Board unequivocally adopted the related principle which concerns us today, that is, that a union must reestablish its majority status at each affected job site before it can enforce a section 8(f) agreement with a project-by-project employer. Dee Cee Floor Covering, a seller and installer of carpeting in the construction industry, did not maintain a regular complement of employees, but hired workmen as the need arose. In April 1973, Dee Cee entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union. In April 1975, Dee Cee went out of business and Dagin-Akrab Floor Covering, Inc. (Dagin-Akrab), an alter ego of Dee Cee, came into being and entered into a contract identical to the 1973 Dee Cee-union contract. In August 1975, Dagin-Akrab was awarded a contract to buy and install [366]*366carpeting at the Ft. Riley military installation. In recruiting workmen for the project, Dagin-Akrab informed several union members that work at the project would be on a nonunion basis only and, if they wished such employment, they would have to withdraw from the union. Dagin-Akrab told them that they would pay union scale wages but would not pay any union fringe benefits as required by the April 1975 agreement. Some workers accepted employment with Dagin-Akrab and others, refusing to abandon the union, did not. The administrative law judge found that Dagin-Akrab, by making unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment and by refusing to bargain with the union, violated section 8(a)(5) and (1), and found, in addition, that Dagin-Akrab violated section 8(a)(3) by conditioning employment at the Ft. Riley project upon employees withdrawing from the union.
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge on the section 8(a)(3) finding, but refused to accept his recommendation on the section 8(a)(5) and (1) violations. The Board reasoned:
[Section 8(f)] merely immunizes the parties to such agreements from liability under Section 8(a) and (b) of the Act. Such prehire agreements do not, however, give rise to a presumption of majority status on behalf of the union. Thus, where a union fails to prove that it has obtained majority status among the employer’s employees, an employer may withdraw recognition from that union and/or make unilateral changes in the contractual working conditions without thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
While the April 1975 agreement was validly entered into pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, that agreement was not binding on the Respondent for purposes of Section 8(a)(5) until such time as the Union demonstrated that it enjoyed the support of a majority of the Respondent’s employees employed at the Ft. Riley project. However, in light of the fact that Respondent had no employees working for it either at the time that it executed the contract or when it unilaterally set the conditions of employment at the Ft. Riley project and refused to bargain with the Union, it is obvious that the Union could not have had a majority status.
Furthermore, the mere fact that the Union might indeed have represented a majority of the employees at Respondent Dee Cee’s previous job sites is of no consequence inasmuch as the Union must demonstrate its majority at each new job site in order to invoke the provisions of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. As the facts here show that the Respondent had no employees at the Ft. Riley job when it decided to abrogate its prehire agreement with the Union, no violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act can be found. Moreover, although Dagin-Akrab as the alter ego of Dee Cee would normally have been bound to Dee Cee’s 1973 agreement, no violation can be found in its failure to apply that agreement at the Ft. Riley job, since it had no employees working at that job when the unilateral changes were made. Therefore, a refusal-to-bargain violation also cannot be predicated on the breach of the 1973 agreement.
232 N.L.R.B. at 422 (footnotes omitted).15
In recent cases the Board has distinguished Dee Cee Floor Covering, which [367]*367involved a “project-by-project” employer, from cases involving an employer with a “stable work force.” See Hageman Underground Construction, 253 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1980); Corrugated Structures, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1980); Land Equipment, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1980); Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (1979). The Board has held that where an employer employs a stable work force (rather than employing new workers on a project-by-project basis) the union need not reestablish its majority status at each successive jobsite in order to enforce a section 8(f) agreement with the employer. As the Board explained in Hageman Underground Construction:
[Wjhere an employer employs a permanent and stable work force to work on a multisite basis, and the union, initially recognized under section 8(f), subsequently achieves majority status in that stable work force, the employer is then under a statutory duty to recognize and bargain with that union at all projects without requiring the union to demonstrate majority status at each one. It logically follows, and we so held in Precision Striping, that where there is a majority status in a permanent and stable work force, and a contract in effect between the parties covering that work force, the union not only becomes the employees’ statutory bargaining representative for all present and future sites but, as in a typical industrial setting, also enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for the duration of the agreement.
253 N.L.R.B. at - (footnotes omitted).
We need not decide whether this interpretation of the Act is a permissible one, and need not examine precisely where the Board has drawn the line between “project-by-project” and “stable work force” employers, for the Board has explicitly affirmed the finding of the administrative law judge that Haberman Construction Co. was a project-by-project employer. The cases which draw this distinction themselves reaffirm the rule of Dee Cee Floor Covering in the context of a project-by-project employer. As the Board explained in a footnote to the above text from Hageman Underground Construction:
This contrasts with a situation in which a construction industry employer has no stable complement and hires its employ[368]*368ees on a project-by-project basis with little carryover from site to site. In such situations majority status among employees at a given jobsite is not presumed to carry over automatically to future sites and “the union must demonstrate its majority status at each new jobsite in order to invoke the provisions of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.” See Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc. and its Alter Ego and/or Successor, Dagin-Akrab Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977).
253 N.L.R.B. at-n.7. In fact, the Board specifically referred in Hageman to its opinion in Haberman, distinguishing Haber-man as a case involving a project-by-project employer. Id. at n.9. We can only conclude, therefore, that the Board continues to adhere to the rule enunciated in Dee Cee Floor Covering: in order to enforce a section 8(f) contract with a project-by-project employer, the union must reestablish its majority at each successive jobsite.
C. The Affirmative Remedy Ordered by the Board and Its Validity in This Case
The Board appears to have applied the rule of Dee Cee Floor Covering and concluded that the Company was not bound by the Union-AGC contract at subsequent jobsites. Although the Board did not cite Dee Cee Floor Covering, it explicitly recognized that the Company, “which hired employees on a project-by-project basis, might have discharged the discriminatees in the normal course of business when the projects were completed.” 236 N.L.R.B. at 79. It does not appear, therefore, that the distinction between “project-by-project” and “stable work force” employers was an issue considered by the Board in this case. This contrasts with the recent cases of the Board discussed supra, in which the determinative issue was whether a valid contract existed at the particular project on which an alleged unfair labor practice had occurred. Here the Board accepted at the outset that the Company was a project-by-project employer and that the Union would therefore have to reestablish its majority status at each succeeding jobsite. The Board does not assert that the Company would be bound by the contract at subsequent job-sites; to the contrary, the opinion states that the Company could have “discharged the discriminatees in the normal course of business” at the conclusion of ongoing jobs. The determinative issue seems instead to have been the applicability of a remedial order which admittedly extended beyond the term of an existing contract but was nevertheless required in order to restore the economic status quo ante to particular employees who would have been rehired on subsequent projects, despite the termination of the Company’s obligations under the Union-AGC contract, were it not for the unfair labor practices committed while the contract was in force. The Board explained that, while the Company could have replaced its employees at the conclusion of ongoing projects, there was nevertheless “a distinct possibility that, absent its discrimination, Respondent would have retained, transferred, or rehired at least some of the discriminatees for new projects.” Id. (emphasis added). On this basis the Board ordered the Company to reinstate on its current projects those particular employees who would have been retained but for their wrongful discharge, and to make those employees whole accordingly. Id. at 80. Thus, the Board’s opinion and order appear to restore the discriminatees to an economic position to which they were not contractually entitled (since the Company could have terminated its obligations under the Union-AGC contract at the conclusion of ongoing projects), but which the Board felt they might nevertheless have attained (since the Company might have rehired some employees even if not contractually bound to do so). Underlying this holding is the proposition that an affirmative remedial order extending beyond the termination of ongoing projects is necessary to restore the economic status quo ante to those particular employees who would have been rehired absent the Company’s unlawful discrimination against them. This proposition is implicit in the Board’s brief explanation of its decision; after the opinion suggests the possibility that some of the discriminatees might have been rehired absent the Company’s unfair labor practices, it explains:
[369]*369Accordingly, to remedy fully Respondent’s unfair labor practices and protect the discriminatee’s rights, we shall order Respondent to reinstate the discriminatees . .. and to make them whole ....
Id. at 79 (emphasis added). As we read the Board’s opinion, then, it seeks to restore the discriminatees to an economic position they might in fact have attained despite the Company’s lawful right not to rehire them at the termination of projects in progress.
We recognize that the remedial authority of the Board may at least in some cases be used to restore the parties to economic positions they reasonably expected to occupy in the absence of unfair labor practices, whether or not those expectations rest on legally enforceable obligations. As we explained in Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911, 84 S.Ct. 666, 11 L.Ed.2d 609 (1964) (including profit shares, which had been voluntarily but consistently awarded by the employer in the past, in the computation of back pay awards):
In effectuating the policies of the Act, the Board has taken the position that the “make whole” concept does not turn on whether the pay was wholly obligatory or gratuitous, but on the restoration of the status quo ante. See Moss Planing Mill Co., 110 NLRB 933, 935, enforced as modified on other grounds, NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 4 Cir., 1958, 256 F.2d 653, 654. In that case there was included in back pay an amount representing clothing given gratuitously as Christmas gifts. The Board’s discretion to take such affirmative remedial action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act includes more than placing the employee in position to assert contractual or legally enforceable obligations. “Back pay” as used in section 10(c) includes the moneys, whether gratuitous or not, which it is reasonably found that the employee would actually have received in the absence of the unlawful discrimination. That principle seems to us so clear as to make unnecessary a discussion of the many persuasive authorities cited in the briefs of both parties.
323 F.2d at 690. See McCann Steel Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 1978) (overtime pay ordinarily received may be included in back pay); NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1312 n.9 (D.C. Cir.1972) (Christmas bonuses included in back pay); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) (safe driving award included in back pay); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 339 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1965) (Christmas bonus included in back pay).
We note that none of the cases we cite here for the proposition that the Board may order relief to which a party would not have been contractually entitled in the absence of an unfair labor violation involves a dispute arising in the special context of section 8(f) and the construction industry. We need not decide, however, whether this principle does or should extend to this area, for it clearly has no application to the particular facts of this case. The Board did not explicitly reach the factual questions raised by our interpretation of its action; instead, it left “[t]he determination of which employees, if any, would have continued in respondent’s employment and for how long” to “the compliance stage of the proceedings.” 236 N.L.R.B. at 79. But although the Board did not predetermine the results of such an inquiry, it at least suggested the possibility of a factual finding that the Company would have retained, transferred, or rehired some of the discriminatees on subsequent projects.
This suggestion ignores the factual findings already made by the administrative law judge and adopted by the Board. In the first place, the administrative law judge described as follows the Company’s decision to go “open shop” and to cease paying union benefits:
In November, 1976, Beshears’ employment with the Respondent ceased. His duties, if not his title, were assumed by Carpenter Foreman Randolph Whitfield. About February 1977, Respondent hired a new Superintendent, Robert McElyea. According to Respondent’s general mana[370]*370ger, Howard Haberman, after McElyea was hired Haberman and Bert Speed talked to McElyea who expressed the opinion that he could “do the job that we had on an open shop basis, without us having to pay the union pension thing .. .. ” It was concluded that the Respondent should proceed on that basis because the pension “thing" was a costly item running a $1000 to $1200 a month toward the latter part of the year 1976.
236 N.L.R.B. at 82 (emphasis added). In the second place, the administrative law judge found that the two Austin projects from which the employees were constructively discharged were “almost completed” at the time of the unfair labor practices. Id. at 87. These findings must be read in the context of the Company’s right to terminate its obligations under the Union-AGC contract at the conclusion of ongoing projects. Since the purpose of the Company’s actions was to cut its expenses, and since these actions could lawfully have been taken at the conclusion of ongoing projects (which were almost completed), one can only assume that in the absence of the unfair labor practices the Company would lawfully have decided to go “open shop” and to cease paying union benefits at the conclusion of the projects from which the discriminatees were constructively discharged.
A factual finding that any particular employee would be rehired depends, therefore, on the assumption that that employee would have returned to work on a subsequent project despite the Company’s decision to go “open shop” and to cease paying union benefits. As the administrative law judge found, however, the employees quit the Company’s employment precisely because of these actions:
The testimony of all of the foregoing named employees at the hearing with respect to the reasons for quitting was not contradicted by Respondent. I therefore credit their testimony which clearly establishes that the basis for their quitting was Respondent’s decision to go “open shop” and no longer pay their “fringes," i. e., payments to the Union’s funds.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added). Because the discriminatees (according to their own testimony) were unwilling to work under the conditions which it is clear the Company would have lawfully offered, we can only conclude that none of them in fact would have accepted employment by the Company on subsequent projects. We hold, therefore, that a factual finding that the Company would have “retained, transferred, or rehired at least some of the discriminatees for new projects” is foreclosed as a matter of law by factual findings already adopted by the Board. Absent such a finding, there is no basis in the facts of this case for the Board’s order insofar as that order extends relief to projects not yet begun at the time of the Company’s unfair labor practices.
Accordingly, the application for enforcement of the Board’s contract restoration order (paragraphs 1(a), 2(b), and 2(c)) is DENIED insofar as it applies to construction projects commenced by the Company after February 16, 1977. The application for enforcement of the Board’s reinstatement order (paragraph 2(d)) is DENIED. The application for enforcement of the “make whole” portion of the Board’s reinstatement order (paragraph 2(e)) is DENIED insofar as it applies to construction projects commenced after February 16, 1977. The application for enforcement of the Board’s bargaining order (paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a)) is DENIED.16 In all other respects, the Board’s order is ENFORCED.