National Labor Relations Board v. Corning Glass Works

204 F.2d 422, 35 A.L.R. 2d 408, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2136, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3546
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedMay 21, 1953
Docket4711_1
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 204 F.2d 422 (National Labor Relations Board v. Corning Glass Works) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Corning Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422, 35 A.L.R. 2d 408, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2136, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3546 (1st Cir. 1953).

Opinion

WOODBURY, Circuit Judge.

The respondent is a large manufacturer of glass products having plants in several states including one in Central Falls, Rhode Island, where it employs approximately 860 workers. In May, 1951, the Federation of Glass, Ceramic ,& Silica Sand Workers of America, CIO, a labor organization which we shall refer to hereinafter simply as CIO, began to organize the respondent’s Central Falls plant. Its campaign proceeded slowly', and for some unexplained reason it was. at first conducted secretly, but nevertheless CIO’s activity became known to the respondent’s management by mid-June.

At about that time another labor organization, Flint Glass Workers’ Union of North America, affiliated, with the American Federation of Labor, and its Local Union No. 1007, referred to hereinafter collectively as AFL, also started to organize the plant. It opened its campaign with a letter dated June 11, 1951, from AFL’s International President in Toledo, Ohio, to the respondent’s Plant Manager in Central Falls advising the latter that AFL represented a majority óf the production and maintenance workers at the Central Falls plant and insisting upon a meeting with the respondent’s officers for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining contract. The Plant Manager acknowledged this letter on June 15, and said that the respondent would be available to meet at its plant with representatives of AFL on Monday, June 18 at 2 P.M. or on Tuesday, June 19 at 9 A.M., but gave warning that before the respondent would recognize AFL as the collective bargaining representative of its employees, AFL would have to prove that it actually represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. AFL’s International President by telegram selected the earlier date offered by the respondent, and agreed to present proof of majority representation at that time.

While this interchange of correspondence was taking place, AFL openly put on what can appropriately be called a whirlwind campaign for membership in the respondent’s plant. Several rank-and-file workers, both men and women, with their supervisors’ permission, left their machines to substitutes selected by their supervisors and circulated freely and openly throughout the plant on the respondent’s time distributing AFL cards and soliciting membership in that Union from other workers both while the latter were at their machines as well as during their rest periods. And two or three of the respondent’s supervisors verbally encouraged the solicitors in their work, inquired as to the progress of the campaign, and expressed satisfaction with the results being achieved, voicing preference for AFL over CIO, not only to the solicitors but also to other workers in the plant, saying in substance that it would be “advisable” to sign AFL cards, and that they did not want CIO in the plant.

On Monday, June 18, soon after the hour appointed,, representatives of AFL and of the respondent’s management met for conference according to agreement. A joint committee was appointed to check the AFL cards turned in against the respondent’s payroll, and while that committee was at work in another room, the rest of the conferees proceeded with discussion of a contract to take effect in the event of a showing that AFL represented a majority of the production and maintenance workers.

Previous collective bargaining agreements with both AFL and CIO covering respondent’s employees at other plants were used as the basis for discussion. The most recent contract of the sort between respondent and AFL, covering employees at respondent’s plant in Albion, Michigan, was *425 read and discussed paragraph by paragraph, and as the various clauses were agreed upon, in some instances with changes, the clauses were sent out of the conference room to be typed and mimeographed. The committee appointed to check union membership cards reported that of approximately 860 hourly paid workers on the payroll, 540 had signed membership cards in AFL, and at about 6:15 P.M. on the same day a contract consisting of some fifty-five mimeographed pages was signed. The conferees then went out to dinner together.

On October 19, 1951, General Counsel for the Board filed a complaint against respondent based on a charge made by CIO wherein he alleged that the respondent had violated § 8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, by interfering with, restraining and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7, and had also violated § 8(a) (2) of the Act in that it had assisted, dominated, contributed to the support and interfered with the administration of AFL. The usual proceedings followed upon the filing of the complaint.

At the opening of the hearing before the trial examiner all essential jurisdictional facts were stipulated, and then General Counsel’s legal representative stated that he had no evidence to support the allegation that the respondent had dominated or interfered with the administration of AFL in violation of § 8(a) (2) of the Act. There being no evidence or finding that the respondent contributed financial support to AFL, the question boils down to whether or not the respondent violated § 8(a) (2) by contributing support other than financial to AFL, or violated § 8(a) (1) by interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under § 7, specifically by interfering with, restraining or coercing them in the exercise of their right to choose their union affiliation.

The trial examiner answered these questions in the negative. He first found that one of the individuals who had played an active role in AFL’s organizational effort was not a supervisor, as General Counsel for the Board contended, but was only a rank-and-file employee so that his activities were not chargeable to the respondent. The trial examiner then found that although the respondent had given AFL wide latitude in organizing in the plant on the respondent’s time, it would have given CIO like privileges if it had requested them, so there was no disparity in the treatment accorded the two unions, and hence the respondent had not assisted AFL in violation of § 8(a) (2). Furthermore, he found that while the respondent through some of its supervisors had expressed its preference for AFL and given encouragement to its activities, even to the extent of suggesting that on the basis of experience with CIO in another plant there would be more likelihood of strikes with consequent loss to the employees if that union got in, nevertheless the supervisors’ expressions were privileged under § 8(c) 1 because they were not accompanied by any threats of reprisal or force or promises of benefit. Therefore he concluded that the respondent had not violated § 8(a) (1).

The Board disagreed with the trial examiner. It found that the employee referred to above as having been active on behalf of AFL was in fact a supervisor, so that his conduct was chargeable to the respondent. And it also found that the respondent, through its supervisors, including the above individual, had not maintained an attitude of “strict neutrality”' while its employees were being simultaneously organized by competing labor organizations, which it said the statute required for the reason that any showing of favoritism for one competing union at such a time would defeat “the Congressional purpose of affording employees complete freedom in the selection of their bargain *426

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
204 F.2d 422, 35 A.L.R. 2d 408, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2136, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-corning-glass-works-ca1-1953.