National Labor Relations Board v. Beverage-Air Company

402 F.2d 411
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 27, 1968
Docket11961
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 402 F.2d 411 (National Labor Relations Board v. Beverage-Air Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Beverage-Air Company, 402 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1968).

Opinion

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

The Labor Board found that the Beverage — Air Company (the “company”) violated §§ 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) and (5), during the course of its negotiations with the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (the “union”), and issued a remedial order of sweeping scope which required the company (a) to cease and desist from engaging in certain activities which the Board deemed to interfere with the exercise of the employees’ organizational rights, (b) to offer reinstatement and backpay to one employee, whom the Board found was discriminatorily discharged after participating in a strike in July, 1965, and to other employees who conducted a strike against the company from January to April, 1966, (c) either to bargain collectively with the union or, at the request of the union, to sign a contract embodying the terms upon which the company and the union agreed in March, 1966, and (d) to give the employees the benefits which they would have received under this contract from the date which it should have been signed, plus six per cent interest. We agree that widespread and various violations of the Act have been established, and enforce the Board’s order, except for that portion thereof which requires the company to grant backpay to the employees who were on strike in the early part of 1966.

—I—

Pursuant to a Board election, on April 26, 1965, the union was certified as the exclusive bargaining unit for certain specified employees of the company. On May 12, 1965, a union agent first contacted Buffington, the company’s president, and negotiations between the parties continued until April, 1966. Bargaining sessions were held at an approximate rate of twice a month during this period, which was punctuated by two strikes, one in July, 1965, and the other from January 26, 1966, until the breakdown of the negotiations.

The indications are many that the company did not negotiate in good faith. It is well established that § 8(a) (5) requires an employer to supply information relevant to the bargaining issues if requested to do so by the union. See, e. g., NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4 Cir. 1954). Nevertheless, here the company refused to supply the union with full information concerning its classification of jobs and its savings and loan, profit sharing and insurance plans. Similarly, although specifically requested to do so, it never notified the union negotiators of any of the 417 wage increases which it granted while the negotiations were being carried on. Moreover, some of the *414 bargaining positions taken by the company indicate that it was not making good faith efforts to reach an agreement. For example, on the issue of break periods, it insisted upon continuation of its existing policy and when the union finally agreed, it insisted on something less favorable to employees than its existing policy. On the issue of holiday pay, it offered substantially less than it was then giving to its employees.

The most convincing evidence that the company was not bargaining in good faith, however, is found in its actions after an agreement had apparently been reached on March 9, 1966. The week following this tentative accord was harmoniously spent in the preparation of a schedule for the return of the strikers, and on March 16 the company informed the union that if the employees ratified the contract, no one would be discharged for strike violence and all the strikers would be recalled within a three-week period. The next day, March 17, the proposed contract and recall schedule were submitted to the union membership and ratified, and the union and the company immediately agreed to sign the contract the following afternoon. That evening, however, the first intimation that all was not yet well occurred when the company informed the union that it had been unable to type the contract— although it had agreed to do so on March 9 — and would need additional time.

March 18, the day on which the contract was originally scheduled to be signed, was a Friday; the company obtained a postponement, against the union’s wishes, until the following Monday. Over the week-end, Charles Taylor, an ex-president of the local union who had remained at work during the strike and who subsequently became an assistant supervisor of the company, contacted several of the strikers and solicited them to return to work before the agreement was signed. He told them that if they returned to work under their own auspices money would be available to pay debts which they might have accumulated, he hinted that strikers who returned on their own would receive wage increases and he stated to one employee that whereas the company would grant only a five-cent wage increase in the contract with the union, it would grant a ten- or fifteen-cent increase in the absence of the union.

The company’s only defense to the Board’s contention that these week-end events manifested the company’s desire to sabotage the union is that Taylor’s activities were not known or authorized by the company, and that he was motivated only by a desire to expiate his guilt in having led his fellow-employees into committing the sin of unionization. The Board could properly find this defense unconvincing. In his talks with the strikers, Taylor made certain predictions, such as that, despite its proposed recall schedule, the company would not permit all of the strikers to return to work for at least six months, which proved to be true and which, without Delphic powers, Taylor could have correctly made only if he had been consulted by the company officials and told of their plans. 1

The company’s attempt to undermine the union by enlisting Taylor’s support failed, and on Monday the meeting at which the contract was to be signed was held. However, the company had no intention of signing the document, as it quickly manifested. First, Buffington, the company’s president required Daniels — the union negotiator with whom the company had been bargaining from January 29 — to produce a card identifying him as a representative of the union, and when Daniels could only find his 1965 card, Buffington stated that he would not sign the contract. Then Taylor walked into the meeting and claimed that he was still the president of the *415 local union. Although Taylor had given the company written evidence of his resignation from the union on March 14, Buffington pretended that Taylor’s claim was a disquieting one which merited additional consideration. As a final blow, Buffington then informed Daniels that the company would be able to take back only two or three of the strikers immediately, perhaps another two or three in a month and would possibly never be able to use others. In other words, the company completely rescinded, its recall proposal which had been submitted with the contract to the union membership for ratification. Daniels stated that in light of the company’s action, he could not sign the contract and left the meeting. There were several communications and meetings between the parties during the following month, but each side remained rigid in its position and no further agreement was reached.

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Bluebook (online)
402 F.2d 411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-beverage-air-company-ca4-1968.