National Iam Benefit Trust Fund v. Borough of Bellwood

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 20, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3089
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NATIONAL I.A.M. BENEFIT TRUST FUND et al.

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 24-3089(EGS) v.

BOROUGH OF BELLWOOD

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment

filed by National I.A.M. Benefit Trust Fund (“Fund” or “Plan”)

and Yolanda Montgomery, a fiduciary on behalf of the Fund

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) against Defendant Borough of

Bellwood (“Defendant”). Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8. 1

Upon consideration of the Motion, the Complaint, the exhibits

thereto, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’

Motion for Default Judgment and awards $2,953.40 in attorney’s

fees and $510 in costs to the Fund.

1 Except for the Trust Agreement, Ex. A to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1, which does not contain ECF header page numbers, when citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page number of the filed document. For the Trust Agreement, the Court cites the original page number of the filed document.

1 I. Background

A. Factual History

Because Defendant has failed to respond in this matter, the

Court takes the factual background from Plaintiffs’ Complaint,

the Motion for Default Judgment, and the docket generally. See

generally Dkt. in Civil Action No. 24-3089; Compl., ECF No. 1;

Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8.

The Fund is a multiemployer employee welfare benefit plan

under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

(“ERISA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Compl., ECF No.

1 ¶¶ 5-6 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (32)). The Fund was

established pursuant to a Restated Agreement and Declaration of

Trust of the National I.A.M. Benefit Trust Fund (“Trust

Agreement”) for the purpose of “providing welfare beneficiaries

to [Covered] Employees and their beneficiaries under the terms

of the Plan.” Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8 at 1 (citing

Trust Agreement, Ex. A to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1

at 8). Yolanda Montgomery is the Executive Director of the Fund,

authorized to initiate litigation on behalf of the Fund under

the Trust Agreement and as a fiduciary of the Plan under ERISA.

Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 9; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1132(a)(3).

Defendant is a “a self-governing municipality of the State

of Pennsylvania.” Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8 at 2

(citing Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 11). Defendant entered into a

2 participation agreement (“Participation Agreement”) with the

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

(“Union”) on December 8, 2015. Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF

No. 8 at 2. The Participation Agreement provides that the

Defendant “agree[s] to be bound by the terms and provisions of

the Trust Agreement for the Fund and all lawful amendments.”

Participation Agreement, Ex. B to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF

No. 8-1 at 43.

The Fund has a Payroll Audit Policy which requires that

employers “be audited routinely every five or seven years,

depending on the circumstances, unless the Trustees

affirmatively waive the audit requirement.” Audit Policy, Ex. C

to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1 at 46. The Fund

scheduled a routine audit for the period of January 1, 2020,

through December 31, 2022, and after the Fund’s designated

auditor at that time was not able to schedule an audit, the Fund

sent a letter to Defendant demanding compliance. Pls.’ Mot. for

Default J., ECF No. 8 at 2 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21; Audit

Request Letter, Ex. D to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1

at 49-50; Audit Demand Letter, Ex. E to Pls.’ Mot. for Default

J., ECF No. 8-1 at 52). According to the Fund, Defendant has not

responded to the request as of the date of filing its Motion for

Default Judgment. Id.

3 B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendant on

October 31, 2024. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs

brought suit under ERISA seeking legal and equitable relief for

Defendant’s failure to comply with an audit of its payroll

records for the period of January 1, 2020, through December 31,

2022. Id. Plaintiffs seek to enforce Defendant’s obligations to

comply with terms of the Fund under ERISA §§ 502(a)(3) and 515,

as codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3) and 1145. Id.

Plaintiffs filed a Return of Service/Affidavit of Summons

and Complaint January 17, 2025. Return Serv. of Aff., ECF No. 4.

Defendant was served on November 26, 2024. 2 See id.; Pls.’ Status

Rep., ECF No. 5. The Clerk of the Court entered default against

the Defendant on April 11, 2025. Entry of Default, ECF No. 7.

Defendant has failed to respond in this action. See generally

Dkt. in Civil Action No. 24-3089.

On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default

Judgment against Defendant seeking equitable relief to compel an

audit and to award attorneys’ fees and costs to the Fund

2 In their February 24, 2025 Status Report, Plaintiffs state that originally, Plaintiffs’ Counsel erroneously entered December 3, 2024 as the date of service. Pls.’ Status Rep., ECF No. 5 at 1, n.1. Plaintiffs clarify that December 3, 2024 is the date that the Return of Service was notarized, but that service was effected on November 26, 2024. Id. It is clear from the Return of Service that service was effected on November 26, 2024. See Return Serv. of Aff., ECF No. 4. 4 pursuant to the Trust Agreement and ERISA. See Pl.’s Mot. for

Default J., ECF No. 8.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment and awards a total of

$2,953.40 in attorney’s fees and $510 in costs to the Fund.

II. Standard of Review

A. Default Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, there is “a

two-step process for a party seeking default judgment: entry of

default, followed by entry of default judgment.” Farris v. Rice,

No. 05-1975, 2006 WL 8435181, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2006). “If

a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise defend against an

action, the plaintiff may request that the clerk of the court

enter default against that defendant.” Simon v. U.S. Dep't of

Just., No. 20-850, 2020 WL 4569425, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2020)

(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a)). “After the clerk's entry of

default, the plaintiff may move for default judgment.” Id.

(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2)). Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the

“determination of whether default judgment is appropriate is

committed to the discretion of the trial court.” Flynn v. JMP

Restoration Corp., No. 10-0102, 2010 WL 1687950, at *1 (D.D.C.

Apr. 23, 2010) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C.

Cir. 1980)). For the Court to determine whether default judgment

is appropriate, a “defendant must be considered a ‘totally

5 unresponsive’ party and its default plainly willful, reflected

by its failure to respond to the summons and complaint, the

entry of default, or the motion for default judgment.” Id.

(quoting Gutierrez v. Berg Contracting Inc., No. 99-cv-3044,

2000 WL 331721, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2000)).

[t]he law is clear ... [that a defendant's] failure to appear and the Clerk's subsequent entry of default against it do not automatically entitle plaintiff to a default judgment. Indeed, a default is not an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover, but is instead merely an admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant's liability.... First, the defendants' default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief.... In other words, a default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.

Harris v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 600 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (D.D.C.

2009)(quoting Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 2d 22,

26–27 (D.D.C. 2008)(cleaned up). “Thus, unless the complaint

states a claim upon which relief may be granted as to the

defendants who have defaulted, default judgment is not

justified.” Id. at 136–37.

B. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

ERISA provides that a civil action may be brought by a

fiduciary “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any

provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to

6 obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such

violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter

or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Court

also “in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee

and costs of action to either party” in an action brought under

ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(1). The “reasonableness of the

fees requested by the [plaintiff] is a ‘judgment call’ which

only the [c]ourt can make.” Flynn v. Mastro Masonry Contractors,

237 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Combs v. Coal &

Mineral Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1984)).

ERISA further provides for federal jurisdiction “in the

district where the plan is administered.” 28 U.S.C. §

1332(e)(2). The Plan is administered in the District of

Columbia, according to Plaintiffs’ Motion, and jurisdiction in

this Court is therefore proper. Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF

No. 8 at 3.

III. Analysis

A. Defendant Has Defaulted

The docket shows that Defendant was served on November 26,

2024. See Return Serv. of Aff., ECF No. 4; Pl.’s Status Rep.,

ECF No. 5. Upon Defendant failing to plead or otherwise defend

itself and following Plaintiffs’ filing of their Affidavit in

Support of Default, see ECF No. 6; the Clerk of the Court

entered default against the Defendant on April 11, 2025. Entry

7 of Default, ECF No. 7. Defendant has failed to respond to this

action. See generally Dkt. in Civil Action No. 24-3089.

B. Plaintiffs have Stated a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted and are Therefore Entitled to Default Judgment

The facts of Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Motion allege that

Defendant is party to a Participation Agreement that “obligated

Defendant to make contributions to the Fund on behalf of covered

employees.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 12; see also Pls.’ Mot. for

Default J., ECF No. 8 at 2. According to the Complaint, the

Participation Agreement binds the Defendant to the Trust

Agreement, which gives trustees the authority “to audit at any

time the payroll books and records of an Employer, as they may

deem appropriate,” and states that when an audit is authorized,

“the contributing Employer involved shall make available [to the

Fund’s auditor] its payroll books and records and any other

pertinent record.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15, 16. Pursuant to the

Fund’s Audit Policy, upon an employee refusing to comply with an

audit, “counsel shall institute legal action to enforce the

Trustees’ right to conduct a payroll audit.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶

18.

The Complaint further alleges that on April 4, 2023, the

Fund’s auditor notified the Defendant via letter that the Fund’s

trustees authorized an audit of its payroll records from January

1, 2020, through December 31, 2022. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.

8 According to the Complaint, the Fund made several more

unsuccessful attempts to schedule an audit before the Fund’s

auditor referred the case to the legal department. Id. ¶ 20. The

Fund sent a final letter demanding an audit on September 13,

2024, and Defendant has not responded. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

Based on the facts alleged, by failing to comply with the

Fund’s audit requests, Defendant has violated the terms of the

Plan. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28-29. Because ERISA allows

fiduciaries to seek “appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress

violations [of] or (ii) to enforce . . . terms of the plan,” 29

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which

relief can be granted and are therefore entitled to default

judgment.

C. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to the Injunctive Relief Requested

Plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief to enforce the terms

of the Plan under ERISA, specifically here, the terms of the

Trust Agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The terms of the Trust

Agreement and the Fund’s Audit Policy are clear that Defendant,

bound by the Participation Agreement, is required to comply with

audit requests from the Fund. See Trust Agreement, Ex. A to

Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1 at 25-26; Participation

Agreement, Ex. B to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1 at

41-43; Audit Policy, Ex. C to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No.

9 8-1 at 46. The Court therefore will grant Plaintiffs’ request to

enforce the terms of the Trust Agreement and order Defendant to

comply with the audit request.

D. Plaintiffs are Entitled to the Requested Attorney’s Fees and Costs

In an action brought under ERISA, the Court “in its

discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of

action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The Fund’s

Audit Policy, to which Defendant is bound, further “requires an

employer to ‘pay to the Fund all costs and attorneys’ fees

incurred as a result of the employer’s refusal to permit an

audit.’” Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8 at 4 (quoting Ex.

C to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1 at 47). It has been

established that Defendant has failed to comply with Plaintiffs’

audit request and that legal action to enforce the Fund’s terms

is warranted under ERISA. The remaining issue before the Court

is to determine whether the requested fees and costs are

reasonable.

Plaintiffs request a total of $2,953.40 in attorney’s fees

incurred by initiating this action and a total of $510 in costs,

which includes a $405 filing fee and $105 spent on service of

process. Hemenway Decl., Ex. F to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF

No. 8-1 at 54-55. Plaintiffs allege their attorneys have spent

6.5 hours on this matter to date, which was reduced by

10 Plaintiffs to “remove unproductive, excessive, or redundant

hours.” Id. at 54. For the reasons explained below, the Court

agrees that this “represents a reasonable amount of time to

draft and file the Complaint, serve the Defendant, prepare and

file the Affidavit of Entry of Default, and to prepare and draft

the present motion and all supporting materials.” Pls.’ Mot. for

Default J., ECF No. 8 at 5.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys charged an hourly rate of $538 for

staff attorney work and $236 for paralegal work. Hemenway Decl.,

Ex. F to Pls.’ Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 8-1 at 54. These

rates “correspond to the latest publication of the Fitzpatrick

Matrix published by the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s

Office of the District of Columbia” and “reflect the customary

market rates in the D.C. area for federal litigation.” Id.;

Fitzpatrick Matrix, Ex. 2 to Hemenway Decl., ECF No. 8-1 at 60.

Noting that the Court has discretion in determining the

reasonableness of fees requested, the information provided in

the Plaintiffs’ Declaration and exhibits thereto regarding time

spent, rates charged, and costs incurred establish that

Plaintiffs have “provided an accounting of the incurred

attorney's fees and costs that demonstrates that the requested

amounts are reasonable.” Mastro, 237 F. Supp. at 71. The Court

will accordingly award the requested fees and costs.

11 IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the Court hereby

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. Defendant shall

permit the Fund to audit its payroll records for the requested

time period and shall pay to the Fund $2,953.40 in attorney’s

fees and $510 in costs.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge February 20, 2026