National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Freddy Hicks, III

Opinions

Opinion filed August 31, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-25-00382-CV __________

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Appellant V. FREDDY HICKS, III, Appellee

On Appeal from the 266th District Court Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 25CVDC-00292

OPINION This interlocutory appeal presents the question of whether the application of certain eligibility rules for collegiate Division I athletics violates the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act (TFEAA). TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01– .52 (West 2021 & Supp. 2025). Appellant, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), appeals the trial court’s temporary injunction order prohibiting it from enforcing its Five-Year Rule, which would have precluded Appellee, Freddy Hicks, III, from participating in the 2025–2026 NCAA Division I men’s basketball season and receiving compensation for his name, image, and likeness (NIL). In three issues, the NCAA argues that the trial court erred in granting injunctive relief because Hicks did not (1) demonstrate a probable right to recovery, or (2) demonstrate irreparable harm, and (3) the balance of equities favors the NCAA. Because we determine that the culmination of the season did not moot the parties’ controversy, we reverse the trial court’s order, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the case to the trial court because Hicks did not meet his evidentiary burden to demonstrate a probable right to relief on his antitrust claim. I. Factual and Procedural Background The NCAA bylaws governing collegiate athletics includes the Five-Year Rule, which provides: A student-athlete shall not engage in more than four seasons of intercollegiate competition in any one sport [and] shall complete the student-athlete’s seasons of participation within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter in which the student- athlete first registered for a minimum full-time program of studies in a collegiate institution, with certain exceptions not relevant here. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 46 (2025–26 ed.) (NCAA Bylaw § 12.6). Further, the NCAA may grant an additional year of competition for an injury that “results in incapacity to compete for the remainder of that playing season.” Id. at 53. Litigation regarding the participation in collegiate athletics has seen a marked increase beginning with the Supreme Court’s landmark 2001 decision in NCAA v. Alston, where the Court upheld the district court’s permanent injunction of the NCAA’s bylaws limiting education-related benefits for student-athletes, who had

2 alleged that the bylaws violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting “contract[s], combination[s], or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce.” 594 U.S. 69, 80, 107 (2021) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1) (alterations in original).1 Following Alston, the NCAA largely continued to prohibit athletes from receiving direct payment from member institutions. See Fourqurean v. NCAA, 143 F.4th 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2025). However, this changed on July 1, 2025, as a result of a settlement in In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, which was a consolidation of several antitrust cases, including House v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 545 F. Supp. 3d 804 (N.D. Cal. 2021). In re Coll. Athlete NIL Litig. (House), 803 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969–71 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Martinson v. NCAA, 804 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1122– 23 (D. Nev. 2025). As part of the House settlement, the NCAA agreed to amend its rules and permit direct payment to student athletes by member institutions through a revenue sharing model. House, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 975. The settlement allows Division I schools to pay up to an estimated $20 million “in the 2025–26 school year and grow to $32.9 million per school in 2034–35.” Id.

1 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Gorsuch ultimately upheld the district court’s permanent injunction (and the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance), thereby confirming that the “rule of reason” (discussed below) is the proper antitrust framework for rules that affect a student-athlete’s ability to earn money. The Supreme Court’s holding was that the district court’s decision was consistent with established antitrust principles and “within the law’s bounds.” As shown through his concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh stated that the Court held/made the independent determination that the education-related benefit rules violated antitrust law—but federal district and circuit courts are split on that interpretation. Contrast NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. at 107 (“‘Our task is simply to review the district court judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust law.’ That review persuades us the district court acted within the law’s bounds.” (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1265 (9th Cir. 2020))); Fourqurean v. NCAA, 143 F.4th 859, 864, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting that Alston affirmed the trial court’s injunction but did not make an independent determination of all issues); United States v. Jindal, No. 4:20-CR-00358, 2021 WL 5578687, at *6 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2021) (“In Alston, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that evaluated the NCAA’s limits on education-related compensation under the rule of reason.”), with Robinson v. NCAA, 172 F.4th 271, 279 (4th Cir. 2023) (“The Supreme Court [in Alston] found the NCAA could not impermissibly limit education-related compensation for college athletes.”). Pre-Alston, the Fifth Circuit assumed without deciding that the antitrust laws apply to such rules but has not yet issued an opinion ruling on the issue post-Alston. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988).

3 Hicks played basketball at Tarleton State University (TSU) during the 2020– 2021 academic year, but the season did not count toward his eligibility limit since the NCAA issued a blanket waiver for student athletes due to the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hicks again played for TSU during the 2021–2022 and 2022–2023 academic years. He then transferred to Arkansas State University (ASU) for the 2023–2024 season. Hicks returned to TSU for the 2024–2025 season during which he sustained an injury. The injury caused him to miss games, but he returned to the team before the season ended. After the 2024–2025 season, Hicks had exhausted his four seasons within the NCAA five-year eligibility window. TSU sought a medical hardship waiver for Hicks, but the NCAA denied the request. Hicks filed suit in October 2025, contending that the Five-Year Rule violated the TFEAA because its application to Hicks “unreasonably restrain[ed] trade in the labor market for NCAA Division I college athletes.” Hicks requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the NCAA from enforcing the rule so that he would be allowed to participate in the 2025–2026 season and receive NIL compensation. The trial court held a hearing on December 3, 2025 on Hicks’s request for temporary injunctive relief at which the following evidence was adduced. Hicks stated that he received NIL compensation of approximately $60,000 to $70,000 for each of the preceding two seasons of basketball. Hicks explained that he was unable to perform at his peak ability following his return from the foot injury he sustained during the 2024–2025 season, which negatively impacted his goal to play professionally in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Hicks had a second surgery after the season. For the 2025–2026 season, Hicks testified that he aspired to be the conference player of the year and then be selected to play in the NBA. Hicks stated that he was the leader of the team and that he was recognized in

4 the campus community. Hicks explained that when the team played well, more people attended the games and that more experienced players were beneficial to team success. Billy Gillispie, TSU’s head basketball coach, testified that he has coached for forty years, including high school, junior college, and Division I basketball, and including stops at the University of Kentucky, Texas A & M, and Texas Tech. Coach Gillispie stated that nothing compares to Division I basketball in terms of excitement and emotion. He explained that less than 1% of Division I basketball players play in the NBA, which is a much greater chance than those coming from other levels of basketball. Coach Gillispie stated that TSU has raised a lot of NIL money to be able to offer players. He stated that before Hicks suffered a foot injury, several NBA scouts would watch their practices to observe Hicks play. Coach Gillispie stated that Hicks was a leader, a kind person, and a hard worker. He believed Hicks could get an opportunity to play in the NBA if he was able to reestablish his performance with another season of Division I basketball. Coach Gillispie explained that when Hicks played more people attended the games, and the team played better. As it related to antitrust markets, Gillispie stated that he had “studied [them] a little bit” but “couldn’t tell [the parties]” the “last thing [he’d] read” about them. Following the hearing, the trial court signed an order granting a temporary injunction on December 8, 2025. The trial court found that Hicks established a probability of success on the merits of his antitrust claim and enjoined the NCAA from enforcing its eligibility rules against Hicks. It also enjoined the NCAA from enforcing “its Rule of Restitution . . . against Hicks and/or [TSU] and/or any school whose basketball team that plays against [TSU] and/or the Western Athletic

5 Conference and/or any agent of any of the foregoing for complying with and relying on this order.” The NCAA filed this interlocutory appeal seeking review of the temporary injunction order, and the trial court subsequently stayed the proceedings pending our resolution of the appeal. II. Mootness As a threshold matter, we address the possible mootness of this controversy because it pertains to our jurisdiction. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (“[W]e are obligated to review sua sponte issues affecting jurisdiction.”). There are two factors that implicate possible mootness concerns: (1) the trial court’s stay of the proceedings below pending the outcome of this appeal; and (2) the culmination of the 2025–2026 basketball season. Upon examination of these factors, we conclude there remains a live controversy between the parties. “When a case ‘becomes moot, and the issues no longer justiciable,’ the case ‘should be dismissed.’” Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 873 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Sterling v. Ferguson, 53 S.W.2d 753, 760 (Tex. 1932)). A party is entitled to appeal an interlocutory order that “grants or refuses a temporary injunction.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (West Supp. 2025). “When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. An appellate court decision about a temporary injunction’s validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.” NCAA v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Further, “[w]hile such an appeal is pending, [the Texas Supreme Court] has directed parties to expeditiously proceed to trial as a matter of judicial economy.”

6 Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, 691 S.W.3d 493, 497 (Tex. 2024). And Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the appeal of a temporary injunction “shall constitute no cause for delay of the trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. However, this Rule and “considerations of judicial economy are no justification for dismissal based on a lack of jurisdiction.” Bienati, 691 S.W.3d at 498. Although intermediate appellate courts once thought otherwise, the trial court’s indefinite stay of the proceedings pending appeal does not moot this case if there remains an actual controversy between the parties. See id. at 499 (holding that “an appellate decision as to the propriety of a temporary injunction is not advisory, even if it involves a question of law that implicates the merits of the claims presented” and disapproving of intermediate appellate court decisions “refusing to recognize jurisdiction to review temporary injunctions because trial court proceedings have been delayed pending an appeal from a temporary injunction”). Here, there remains an actual controversy between the parties because the trial court’s order enjoins the NCAA from applying retroactive sanctions pursuant to the Restitution Rule. In Jones, the Texas Supreme Court addressed mootness when faced with an order that enjoined: (1) the NCAA and Texas Tech from enforcing eligibility rules that would have cost Jones his eligibility for the 1996 football season, and (2) the NCAA from enforcing the Restitution Rule. 1 S.W.3d at 84–85. The Rule authorizes the NCAA to impose retroactive sanctions against a member institution when an ineligible student-athlete competes under an injunction that is “later voluntarily vacated, stayed or reversed, or found by the courts to have been improperly granted.” Id. at 84. Despite the 1996 football season having culminated, the court noted that “[t]he NCAA clearly has an interest in having the injunction invalidated and set aside[,]” so that it could enforce the Restitution Rule. Id. at 87–

7 88. With respect to Jones’s interest, the court stated that “the NCAA could also erase the records of [his] individual performance in each game played in under the injunction.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded that “there is still a tangible and substantial controversy between the parties with respect to the portion of the injunction enjoining the NCAA from enforcing its restitution rights . . . against Jones and Tech.” Id. at 88. Similarly, in this case, the trial court’s order prohibits the NCAA from levying retroactive sanctions against Hicks and TSU. “As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307–08 (2012)). Given the parties’ respective interests regarding this portion of the trial court’s order, there remains a live controversy over which we exercise our jurisdiction. See id. III. Temporary Injunctions “A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam)). The party applying for a temporary injunction “must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). “If any one of these required showings is lacking, the injunction should be denied (or reversed on appeal).” Abbott v. Harris Cnty., 672 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2023). Due to the equitable nature of injunctive relief, the trial court also balances the equities involved, weighing the respective conveniences and hardships of the parties. Graham Mortg. Corp. v. Hall, 307 S.W.3d 472, 477–78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010,

8 no pet.); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 693 (“The principles, practice and procedure governing courts of equity shall govern proceedings in injunctions when the same are not in conflict with these rules or the provisions of the statutes.”). We review the trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Anti-Defamation League, 610 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58). “In resolving evidentiary matters, a trial court does not abuse its discretion ‘if some evidence reasonably supports the court’s ruling.’” Id. (quoting Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017)). However, the trial court does not have discretion to incorrectly analyze or apply the law. Id. at 916–17 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). IV. TFEAA In its first issue, the NCAA argues that the trial court erred in determining that Hicks “had demonstrated a probable right to recovery” because: (1) the Dormant Commerce Clause preempts the application of the TFEAA; (2) the Five-Year Rule is non-commercial and not subject to antitrust scrutiny; and (3) Hicks did not meet his evidentiary burden to (a) define a relevant antitrust market, or (b) demonstrate that the rule has a substantial anticompetitive effect in said market. Because they are dispositive, we need only address the NCAA’s second, third, and fourth arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; see Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620, 630 (Tex. 2021) (“‘As a rule, we only decide constitutional questions when we cannot resolve issues on nonconstitutional grounds.’ This rule is not optional.” (quoting In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003))). A. Applicable Law The TFEAA states, “Every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful.” BUS. & COM. § 15.05(a). “The [TFEAA] does not prohibit all restraints of trade; it prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade

9 that have an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.” Regal Entm’t Group v. iPic-Gold Class Entm’t, LLC, 507 S.W.3d 337, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing Winston v. Am. Med. Int’l, 930 S.W.2d 945, 951–52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied)). “We construe the TFEAA in harmony with federal antitrust caselaw to promote competition for consumers’ benefit[, and] [b]ecause our own caselaw is limited, we rely heavily on the jurisprudence of the federal courts.” In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 708 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The NCAA, like many other athletic organizations, creates horizontal restraints of trade, which are “agreement[s] among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another.” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984). “These agreements allow the NCAA to develop rules to promote uniform and fair gameplay—essential cooperation without which college sports would not exist in their current form.” Robinson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 172 F.4th 271, 279 (4th Cir. 2026) (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101–02). While these rules promote salutary purposes, they resemble the type of restraints that antitrust law prohibits. Id. In Alston, the United States Supreme Court upheld a permanent injunction of the NCAA’s rules limiting education-related benefits under federal antitrust law. 594 U.S. at 107. It rejected the NCAA’s argument that it was not a commercial enterprise, id. at 94–96, but its decision concerned “only a narrow subset of the NCAA’s compensation rules.” Id. at 108 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the aftermath of the House settlement, courts across the country are now addressing whether NCAA eligibility rules are subject to antitrust scrutiny. The three federal circuit courts that have considered the question have concluded that

10 eligibility rules are commercial in nature because they limit the ability to participate in a labor market. See Robinson, 172 F.4th at 289; Elad v. NCAA, 160 F.4th 407, 414–15 (3d Cir. 2025); Fourqurean, 143 F.4th at 863; see also Braham v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 794 F. Supp. 3d 824, 833 (D. Nev. 2025) (finding “in a post-Alston world of NIL compensation and changed ‘market realities,’ . . . classification of NCAA eligibility rules as ‘noncommercial,’ is rendered moot” (internal citations omitted)); Pavia v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527, 540 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (highlighting the “new economic reality in the age of NIL compensation”). There are three methods to review whether a commercial restraint constitutes an undue restraint that is violative of antitrust laws: (1) per se liability, (2) quick- look scrutiny, and (3) the rule of reason. Robinson, 172 F.4th at 290; see California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (explaining that a quick-look analysis is appropriate for arrangements that “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude [would] have an anticompetitive effect”); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (explaining that horizontal price fixing agreements are unlawful per se). NCAA rules that are necessary to produce a game such as the number of players on the field or playing time are procompetitive restraints under a quick-look analysis. See Alston, 594 U.S. at 90. However, NCAA eligibility rules are a type of restraint that require a closer evaluation under a rule of reason analysis. Robinson, 172 F.4th at 292; see also Alston, 594 U.S. at 88 (explaining that the fact that joint ventures like the NCAA “can have such procompetitive benefits surely stands as a caution against condemning their arrangements too reflexively”); Elad, 160 F.4th at 413 (applying rule of reason analysis to review of a different NCAA eligibility rule); Fourqurean, 143 F.4th at 868 (applying rule of reason analysis to review of the Five-Year Rule).

11 “[T]he rule of reason analysis requires courts to conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure to assess the restraint’s effect on competition.” Robinson, 172 F.4th at 293. This assessment involved a three-step burden shifting framework: (1) the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect; (2) if the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale; and (3) if the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be achieved through less anticompetitive means. Alston, 594 U.S. at 96–97. “Because legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law, courts usually cannot properly apply the rule of reason without an accurate definition of the relevant market.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529, 542–43 (2018) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). B. Analysis The NCAA argues that the Five-Year Rule is non-commercial because it concerns eligibility to participate in collegiate athletics and not compensation. The NCAA further argues that even if eligibility rules are viewed as a commercial restraint, Hicks failed to define a relevant market, which is a prerequisite to determining whether a restraint is unreasonable. Finally, the NCAA argues that Hicks failed to show that the challenged rule has anticompetitive effects. Hicks responds that eligibility rules are inherently commercial because they restrict a student-athlete’s ability to negotiate NIL agreements. Hicks further argues that he adequately defined the relevant market for Division I men’s basketball players and that the eligibility rules constitute a group boycott, which constitutes an

12 anticompetitive restraint under a quick-look analysis. We agree with the NCAA, in part. It is true that the eligibility rules do not directly bear on compensation, but they limit participation in a labor market and thus interfere with student athletes’ free exercise of their right to engage in commerce. See Robinson, 172 F.4th at 289; Elad, 160 F.4th at 415. Therefore, we join those courts that have concluded that the eligibility rules are commercial in nature and thus subject to antitrust scrutiny. See Robinson, 172 F.4th at 289; Elad, 160 F.4th at 414–15; Fourqurean, 143 F.4th at 863. Accordingly, we overrule the NCAA’s first issue in part to the extent that it argues that the Five-Year Rule is non-commercial and not subject to antitrust scrutiny. However, before determining whether a restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect, courts must have an accurate definition of the relevant market. Robinson, 172 F.4th at 293. “[T]he relevant market is defined as ‘the area of effective competition.’” Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. at 543 (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). “Without a definition of [the] market there is no way to measure [the defendant’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition.” Id. (quoting Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of the relevant product and geographic markets in an antitrust case. Market definition is essentially a question of fact.” Robinson, 172 F.4th at 293 (internal citations omitted). Here, Hicks alleged in his petition that the relevant market was “both the Texas and nationwide labor markets for the services of NCAA Division I basketball players.” At the temporary injunction hearing, Hicks submitted no evidence to support this market definition. While Hicks may claim that the market definition is self-evident, his definition must stand on some evidentiary foundation. “Reliance

13 on a previously accepted market, without inspection of current market realities, is antithetical to antitrust legal principles.” Elad, 160 F.4th at 417 (citing Alston, 594 U.S. at 93) (observing that college-sports markets have changed significantly and that when “market realities change, so may the legal analysis”); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Where the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand[ ] or alleges a proposed relevant market that clearly does not encompass all interchangeable substitute products . . . the relevant market is legally insufficient.”); see also Coly v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:26-CV-8-PPS-APR, 2026 WL 799225, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2026) (noting that “defining the relevant market is not a chip shot field goal”). Without evidence in the way of economic analysis or data to support the relevant market definition, the trial court had no basis to support its finding that the eligibility rules had anticompetitive effects. See Robinson, 172 F.4th at 294–95 (explaining that “the Players presented no factual evidence here and therefore clearly failed to meet their burden of proof” to define the relevant market); Elad, 160 F.4th at 417 (“Rule-of-reason analyses under Section 1 of the Sherman Act require a well- defined relevant market and cannot rely on antiquated market definitions accepted on different evidence and in a different posture.”); Fourqurean, 143 F.4th at 870 (“Fourqurean needs more than the sparse and conclusory allegations” to establish the relevant market.). Accordingly, we conclude that Hicks did not establish a probable right to relief on his antitrust claim, and the trial court erred in granting a temporary injunction for this reason. See Butnaru., 84 S.W.3d at 204. Even had Hicks met his evidentiary burden to define the relevant market, he failed to demonstrate that the eligibility rules have an anticompetitive effect. A

14 plaintiff can meet this burden through direct evidence of “[a]ctual detrimental effects on competition[,] includ[ing] reduced output, increased prices, or decreased quality in the relevant market.” Robinson, 172 F.4th at 292 (citing Am. Express, 585 U.S. at 542). Or the plaintiff can produce indirect evidence “of market power plus some evidence that the challenged restraint harms competition.” Am. Express, 585 U.S. at 542. Hicks failed to meet his burden on both accounts. There is no evidence that the Five-Year Rule reduced output, increased prices, decreased wages, or decreased quality in the relevant market. Coach Gillispie spoke of the positive benefits of Hicks’s continued participation in TSU’s basketball program, but this pertained only to the effects of Hicks’s sole exclusion from the labor market, which is insufficient to establish anticompetitive effects. See Robinson, 172 F.4th at 292 (“The district court did not hold the Players to their evidentiary burden on this step of the rule of reason analysis—it failed to point to any record evidence showing that the JUCO Rule or the Five-Year Rule reduced output, increased prices, decreased wages, or decreased quality in the relevant market.”); Fourqurean, 143 F.4th at 870 (“But Fourqurean relies solely on his own exclusion from participating in college football as proof of anticompetitive effects.”). Nor did Hicks present any evidence regarding the NCAA’s market power in a relevant market and how the NCAA’s eligibility rules harmed competition within that defined market. See Robinson, 172 F.4th at 292 (citing Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2023)). Without competent evidence of anti-competitive effects, Hicks cannot show a probable right to relief. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction on this basis as well. While a more robust evidentiary record in support of a temporary injunction may have allowed us to more fully assess Hicks’s antitrust contentions, we conclude that, under the record before us, he failed to produce sufficient evidence to

15 demonstrate a probable right to the relief sought. Accordingly, we sustain NCAA’s first issue in part. We need not address the NCAA’s remaining arguments or issues because they are not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. V. This Court’s Ruling We reverse the trial court’s order, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE

August 31, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J.2, and Williams, J. (Bailey, C.J., concurring with opinion)

2 I join in the court’s opinion and judgment but also share the same frustration and concerns as expressed by Chief Justice Bailey in his concurrence.