National City Bank v. Huey & Martin Drug Co.

102 S.E. 516, 113 S.C. 333, 1920 S.C. LEXIS 67
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJanuary 26, 1920
Docket10336
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 102 S.E. 516 (National City Bank v. Huey & Martin Drug Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National City Bank v. Huey & Martin Drug Co., 102 S.E. 516, 113 S.C. 333, 1920 S.C. LEXIS 67 (S.C. 1920).

Opinions

January 26, 1920. The opinion of the Court was delivered by I think the judgment is right and ought to be affirmed. There was no prejudicial error. If it be conceded that the issues were all equitable, and, therefore, triable by the Court, they were so tried. The preliminary ruling that certain issues were triable by jury was not prejudicial, because no issue was in fact submitted to the jury.

The statute starts out be denouncing as unlawful certain sales, without compliance with its provisions, which are in the main: (1) The making of a complete inventory; (2) a true schedule of the seller's creditors, or an affidavit of no indebtedness; and (3) the giving of joint notice by seller and purchaser to each creditor of the proposed sale. It then goes on to provide that, if the seller shall fail to make such inventory, or if the same shall fail to state the true value of the goods as required, or if the seller shall fail to make such true schedule of his creditors as required, and the purchaser shall have knowledge of that fact, or if the seller asserts that he owes no debts and the purchaser fails to require the affidavit of that fact, or if the *Page 339 joint notice is not given to each creditor, or if the same be incorrect as to the amount and consideration of the sale and the time and manner of payment therefor, "then and in either of such events, such sale shall prima facie be presumed to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of such sellers," etc.

The intention of the legislature was that, if a sale within the terms of the statute be made without any attempt to comply with the provisions thereof, it should be held to be unlawful, and voidable at the instance of a creditor of the seller who may be injured thereby, without regard to the intention of the parties to the sale. But if the parties attempt to comply with the provisions of the statutes, and fail in some particular or particulars, such failure shall not necessarily have the effect of making the sale void, but it shall only have the effect of raising a presumption that it is fraudulent. The difference lies in the failure to make any effort at all to comply with the provisions of the statute, and in making an effort which falls short of a legally sufficient compliance. In the first case, the sale is unlawful. In the second, it is only presumptively so — the presumption being slight or strong, according to the nature and extent of the failure and the circumstances of it. For example, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, errors or omissions may occur in making the inventory, or the schedule of creditors, or in complying with other requirements of the statute. In such cases the act creates only aprima facie presumption of fraud which may be rebutted by showing the good faith of the parties to the sale and honest and diligent efforts to comply with the statute. No doubt the provision was intended to prevent fraudulent evasions of the statute, and to stimulate the parties to make an honest effort to comply substantially with its provisions.

But where, as in this case, the statute is utterly ignored and no attempt whatever is made to comply with its provisions, *Page 340 to hold that only a prima facie presumption of fraud is raised, which may be rebutted by proof of the good faith of the parties, would practically nullify the statute.

Judgment affirmed.

MESSRS. JUSTICES WATTS, FRASER and GAGE concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 S.E. 516, 113 S.C. 333, 1920 S.C. LEXIS 67, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-city-bank-v-huey-martin-drug-co-sc-1920.