National Cash Register Co. v. Leach

3 Tenn. App. 411, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 24, 1926
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 3 Tenn. App. 411 (National Cash Register Co. v. Leach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Cash Register Co. v. Leach, 3 Tenn. App. 411, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Opinion

PORTRUM, J.

The defendant in error, Bertie E. Leach, was run down by an automobile, while attempting to cross North Broadway in the city of Knoxville, by a car bearing the advertisement or name of the National Cash Register Company on its side, and used to transport cash registers by salesmen. The car was being driven by a salesman and the principal question involved in this lawsuit is, was the salesman an agent or servant of the company, which would render the company liable for his negligent operation of the car, or was he a so-called independent contractor? On the trial in the lower court the plaintiff obtained a judgment, and the defendant entered a motion for a new trial and has appealed.

The assignments of error are six in number, but only present two questions, which will be dealt with without restating the assignments. .

The first is, that the conduct of the plaintiff below was so negligent as to defeat her right of recovery.

We do not think the conduct of Miss Leach amounted to gross negligence barring her right to recover. At the place of the accident the street is broad, and Miss Leach was standing at or near an intersection waiting for a street car to board in order to get up town, and while standing there a friend drove down the right hand or opposite side of the street in an automobile and, seeing Miss Leach, brought the car to a stop> and motioned to her to come across and enter, in order to take her to town in the automobile. She started across the street to enter the ear, and a large automobile was approaching her, which was followed by the Ford car driven by the salesman, and which was about one hundred feet away from her. She had gotten in the middle of the street when she discovered these cars approaching her, and she hastened her pace and cleared the big car, which in fact was under the control of the driver and would not have struck her. She then for an instant slacked up, but seeing the other approaching ear again quickened her pace, but was unable to clear the ear, which struck her and dragged her some distance. The driver states that the road was slick, due to a *413 recent rain and Re was unable to bring the car under control by an application of the brakes, which he applied, when the car skidded and struck her. He testifies that he was travelling approximately twenty miles an hour at the time. An ordinance of the city of Knoxville prohibits the operation.of a car across intersections at a higher rate of speed than seven and one half miles per hour.

The person who was operating the larger car brought his car under control within a shorter distance, and the fact that the streets were wet was no excuse relieving the salesman from his duty to keep his car under control at all times. The wet street alone was not responsible, and contributed only to his inability to control his car, when taken in conjunction with the high rate of speed at which he was operating it. The fact that a person attempts to cross a street, even though a wide one, and one in which automobiles are passing to and fro at rapid rates of speed, is not per se an act of negligence barring one’s right to recovery for injury. If this were the law, then it would be impossible; for the pedestrians to cross many of the suburban boulevards. As a matter of fact the pedestrian may take his life in his hands when he attempts to cross, but the attempt is not in law an act of negligence.

It is insisted that Mr. Akridge was not the agent or servant of the National Cash Register Company, and that the car which he was driving was the personal property of his employer, who was not the agent of the defendant company; and if this be true then the defendant company is not liable to the plaintiff for the acts of a person who is not under its control or direction, that is not its servant or agent. Mr. Akridge’s deposition was taken by the defendant, but was read by the plaintiff. He states in thai deposition that he was the agent of the defendant company, and that his duties were to sell, deliver, take up and collect for National Cash registers; that he was engaged in these duties at the time of the accident and was operating a car upon which he carried registers in the back, and which bore the name printed on the sides, “National Cash Register Co”; that the ear belonged to and was the property of his immediate employer, Mr. C. H. Milton, who is termed Sales Agent for the National Cash Register Company, Knoxville, and the car was registered in his name.

He was introduced as a witness upon the trial and introduced a written contract of employment between him and the said C. H. Milton, and also a written contract of employment between C. H. Milton and the National Cash Register Company, and by this evidence an attempt is made to establish the fact that Milton was not the agent or servant of the company, but was acting independently of it and had the status in law of an independent contractor, or *414 that tbe contract did not establish the relationship of servant or agent.

The contracts, in view of the undisputed testimony of the duties of the agent Abridge, present a question of law for the determination of the court, and the complaint that the trial judge should have submitted to the jury the question of this relationship is not well made.

The provisions of the contract between the company and Mr. Milton provide, among other things, as follows:

“(1) Said sales.agent agrees to devote his whole time and best endeavor to the business of the company in said territory. He also agrees to employ such salesmen to assist him, and upon such terms and conditions as the Company may require.
“(2) Said sales agent, during his continuance in said agency under this contract, shall receive a commission on all moneys received from the sale of cash registers and other products sold for the Company for use in said agent’s territory, whether sold by him or by the Company, or others.
“(3) This agreement shall apply to business procured at the time of the Company salesman’s visit, and also to all business subsequently procured either by said sales agent, the Company salesman, or other Company representatives.
“ (4) All orders for cash registers shall be taken upon the printed forms furnished by the Company; and all such orders shall be sent to the Company immediately after being signed by the purchasers, and such orders shall embody all the conditions and agreements of every matter whatsoever, it being understood and agreed that the Company shall not be responsible for promises or conditions not specified on such orders.
“(5) No orders taken shall be binding upon the Company until accepted by it.
“(6) Said sales agent agrees that the Company shall have full control of, and discretion as to the collection, adjustment or compromise of any or all accounts.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Tenn. App. 411, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-cash-register-co-v-leach-tennctapp-1926.