National Biscuit Co. v. Scott

142 S.W. 65, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 20
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 21, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 142 S.W. 65 (National Biscuit Co. v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Biscuit Co. v. Scott, 142 S.W. 65, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinions

This suit was instituted September 3, 1909, in the district court of Harris county by Frank Dunn Scott, a minor, by W. S. Scott, his father, as next friend, against the National Biscuit Company to recover damages for injuries received while in the employ of the defendant company on June 1, 1909. In the course of plaintiff's employment, it was his duty to cut paper and cardboard used in packing the products of the defendant company, in the cutting of which he was required to use a paper cutter. The construction of the paper cutter used may be described as consisting of an iron table with an upright frame on top in which frame a horizontal blade or knife was operated by a lever, which lever was raised and lowered by hand. When the lever was raised to a short distance beyond perpendicular, it stood in place and held up the blade or knife from the table, and, when the lever was lowered, the blade or knife would come down at rest on the table. To cut the paper or cardboard the lever was raised, as above indicated, to a point past perpendicular, when it would stand. The paper or cardboard would be put in position for cutting, the lever then pulled down with the hand, forcing the blade or knife through the paper or cardboard. The lever would then be raised to its former position, which would raise the blade or knife. The paper or cardboard cut would *Page 66 be removed or rearranged in position for another cutting. The lever when up past the perpendicular, as above indicated, or when down, was so held in such position by gravity. The lever controlled the position of the blade or knife.

Between the hours of 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 1, 1909, the plaintiff was cutting paper, had raised the lever which raised the blade, it staying up, he had adjusted the paper under the blade, had cut the paper, had again raised the lever, and, according to his testimony, it stayed up in such position for a period of 40 seconds or a minute, during which time plaintiff put his hand under the blade to remove the paper, when the lever came down, which brought the blade or knife down upon the table, severing the index finger of plaintiff's left hand between the first and second joints.

The allegations in plaintiff's petition, in substance, are that through the negligence of defendant the paper cutter was not in a safe condition or good working order; that defendant had negligently permitted the blade or knife to become loose in its fastenings to the machine to such an extent that an unusual jar was sufficient to cause the blade or knife to be jarred loose and to fall or to drop upon the table; that the blade or knife was suddenly shaken loose from its position by the sudden and unusual jarring of the running machinery in operation in the factory of the defendant, and before plaintiff could realize the dangerous position he had placed his hand, and before he had time to remove the same, the blade or knife dropped from its then raised position, severing the plaintiff's finger; that it was the duty of the defendant to keep the paper cutter in a safe condition and good working order, which duty the defendant negligently failed to perform, and this, coupled with the unusual jar of the running machinery, was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Defendant pleaded general demurrer, general denial, and pleaded specially contributory negligence and assumed risk. The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict was found for plaintiff in the sum of $1,975, and judgment was accordingly entered thereon.

Appellant's first and second assignments of error are submitted together as a proposition, and complain of the eighth and twelfth paragraphs of the charge of the court in submitting the issue as to whether or not the paper cutter was kept in a reasonably safe condition, and whether or not the paper cutter was in an unsafe condition, or was in such condition by reason of the negligence of the defendant at the time of the accident, there being no evidence showing, or tending to show, that the paper cutter was not kept in good condition, or that any defect therein contributed to cause the injury or that the paper cutter was in a defective condition. The eighth paragraph of the court's charge is as follows; "You will understand that the defendant is not in law held to be an insurer of the safety of its employés, or a guarantor that its machinery is always in perfect repair; but it rests under obligation to keep its machinery in reasonably safe repair so far as that can be done by the exercise of that measure of care, prudence, and watchfulness which an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances to avoid injury or accident. A failure to use that measure of care is in law termed `negligence'; and, if such negligence is the `proximate cause' of an injury to an employé, the employer is liable." The twelfth paragraph of the court's charge is as follows: "If you believe that the paper cutter was in an unsafe condition, and that it was in said condition by reason of the `negligence' of the defendant company, or its employés, and that said company knew of said condition or could have known of such condition by the exercise of ordinary care; and further believe that Frank Dunn Scott, the plaintiff, did not know of the unsafe condition of the machine, and could not have known of the same by the exercise of ordinary care, considering his age and the measure of his experience; and further believe that he was injured because the machine was jarred by the operation of other machinery in the factory, and that the blade of said machine was caused to fall upon the hand of plaintiff by reason thereof, and believe the said jarring caused the blade to fall, because the machine was in an unsafe condition by reason of the defendant's `negligence,' and that as a result of the fall of the blade of such machine the plaintiff lost a portion of his finger, as he alleges, and that but for such unsafe condition of the machine the accident would not have occurred — you will find your verdict for the plaintiff." Upon a careful examination of the record, we fail to find any testimony which tends to show that the paper cutter was out of repair, or was in any manner defective in any of its parts. The testimony, to the contrary, tended to prove that the paper cutter was at the time of the accident in a safe condition and in good working order. Plaintiff testified that he had operated the paper cutter for a period of two months prior to the accident, and it was the first time the blade or knife had fallen except when he pulled same down with his hand.

It is well established that the charge of the court should be based upon issues as made by the pleadings and the testimony produced at the trial, and the propriety of an instruction is to be determined with reference to both the issues as raised by the pleadings and the testimony. It is also established law that an issue may be made by the pleadings, but, if unsupported by any testimony, the court should not submit said issue to the jury. The fair test of the propriety of a charge cannot be whether in *Page 67 the abstract it is right. It must be taken in view of the testimony of the facts charged on which the jury is required to respond. A charge in the abstract as a mere legal proposition might be perfectly inoperative and harmless. When, however, referred to a certain set of facts and circumstances, it might have a most important and conclusive influence on the jury in forming their verdict.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 S.W. 65, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-biscuit-co-v-scott-texapp-1911.