National Bank of Oshkosh v. Hunger

95 F. 87
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJune 6, 1899
DocketNo. 497
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 95 F. 87 (National Bank of Oshkosh v. Hunger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Bank of Oshkosh v. Hunger, 95 F. 87 (7th Cir. 1899).

Opinion

JEKECENS, Circuit Judge,

after thus stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is elementary that a principál is bound by the wrongful act of his agent within the scope of the agency. It is also correct to say that a principal is bound by those acts of the agent in pursuance of powers directly conferred, or which were incidental to those powers and not prohibited, “because they are the direct result of his voluntary and .intentional act.” Mechem, Ag. § 282. This author, in the same section, also asserts (he rule to be that the principal “is likewise responsible, and for the same reasons, for those acts which he has intentionally led third persons to believe that he has authorized. He is responsible for the acts of the agent which he has by neglect, omission or acquiescence led the person dealing with the agent to believe he had authorized, because to deny them would be a fraud upon -innocent persons.” There is, however, a duty resting upon one dealing with the agent of another, and that duty is thus well stated by the same learned author:

"Every person dealing- with an agent is bound to ascertain the nature and extent of his authority. He must not trust, to a mere presumption of authority, nor to any mere assumption of authority by the agent. He must at all times be able to trace the authority home to its source.” Section 289. “The person dealing with the agent must act with ordinary prudence .and reasonable diligence. If the character assumed by the agent is of such a suspicious or unreasonable nature, or if the authority which he seeks to exercise is of such an unusual or improbable character, as would suffice to put an ordinarily prudent man upon his guard, the party dealing with him may not shut his e,\es to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to deal with the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition of affairs.” Section 290.

[92]*92The situation is complicated when the transaction involved is conducted upon both sides by one who is in some manner or in some respects the agent of both principals in the particular matter. In such case a careful scrutiny of the facts surrounding and controlling the transaction is essential, to determine in what particular he was the agent of each principal, and whether the knowledge he possessed of the wrongful act as the agent of the one is imputable to the other principal. The cases to which we are referred discuss these principles at length, but the result in each case is controlled by the particular facts stated. The authorities perhaps may be properly classified as follows: First. Those in which the one principal received, through the intervention and the wrongful act of a mutual agent of the parties, the property of the other principal. In such case the party receiving the property of the other is chargeable with the knowledge of the wrong which was possessed by the mutual agent. Or, to state the proposition shortly, one may not avail himself of the results of his agent’s fraud without responsibility for the fraud. Bank v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490; Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 453; Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass. 268, 17 N. E. 496; First Nat. Bank of New Milford v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 93; Holden v. Bank, 72 N. Y. 286; Bank v. Dunbar, 118 Ill. 625, 9 N. E. 186. Second. Those cases in which the fraudulent agent, being the agent of both parties, did not in the particular transaction represent the principal sought to be charged, but was, on one side of the transaction, representing himself, and the principal, in person, or others representing him, were upon the other side. In such case knowledge of the wrong is not imputed; otherwise, however, if in the particular transaction the a,gent acted for both principals. Innerarity v. Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282; Bank v. Babbidge, 160 Mass. 563, 36 N. E. 462; Corcoran v. Cattle Co., 151 Mass. 74, 23 N. E. 727; Bank v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451; Bank v. Christopher, 40 N. J. Law, 435; Bank v. Irons, 8 Fed. 1, and note; Bank v. Blake, 60 Fed. 78; Niblack v. Cosler, 74 Fed. 1000, affirmed on appeal in 47 U. S. App. 637, 26 C. C. A. 16, and 80 Fed. 596; In re Plankinton Bank, 87 Wis. 378, 58 N. W. 784. Two cases cited by counsel are possibly exceptional,—not falling within either of the classes specified. In the case of Gunster v. Power Co., 181 Pa. St. 327, 37 Atl. 550, it was held:

“An exception to tlie general rule that notice to the agent is notice to the principal arises in case of such conduct hy the agent as raises a clear presumption that he would not communicate the fact in controversy, as where the agent acts for himself in his own interest, and adversely to that of the principal. Where an agent representing two principals conducts a scheme to defraud one of them, it will be presumed that he did not disclose to the principal he intended to cheat the means hy which he intended to effect his purpose. An intended fraud committed hy an agent on his own account is beyond the scope of his employment, and hears analogy to a tort willfully committed hy a servant for his own purposes, and not as a means of performing the business intrusted to him by his master.”

In that case the treasurer of a manufacturing corporation, being also vice president of a bank, executed two promissory notes in the [93]*93name of the manufachiring corporation, signing them as treasurer. These notes were discounted by the bank, and the manufacturing corpora tion was given credit for the proceeds. On the same day the treasurer drew the check of the manufacturing corporation “to the order of dft N. Y.” As vice president he caused the amount of the check to be charged to the manufacturing corporation upon the books of the bank, and on the same day, in payment of the check, he drew two drafts upon New York in the name of the bank, and signed by him as vice president, making them payable to his own order. He received payment of the drafts in currency, and used the proceeds for his private purposes. In a suit brought by the bank against the corporation upon its promissory notes, the court ruled that as treasurer of the manufacturing corporation he had the authority to execute the notes and the check for the proceeds of the discount, and that the manufacturing corporation, and not the bank, was liable for the loss. “The real question,” says the court, “is, in what capacity did Jessup commit the fraud? It is clear it was as treasurer of the appellee. It was as treasurer he presented the notes for discount, and as treasurer he drew the check for the proceeds. Both acts were within his authority as treasurer, and would have been lawful if they had been honest; but he drew the money on drafts which were the property of the company, and when he embezzled the money it was the money of the company. The bank had no part in his act, and gained nothing by it. The fraud had its inception and consummation in acts done in Ms capacity of treasurer of the defendant company, and it should bear the loss.”

In Daniels v. Bank, 92 Hun, 460, 38 N. Y. Supp. 580, the plaintiff. in 1875, being unmarried, went to Europe, and just previous to her departure left with one Dann, who for a long period had been the secretary, treasurer, and general financial manager of the bank, blank checks, signed by her, to be filled and used by him during her absence as she should direct. She returned the following year, and in April, 1879, without authority, Dann filled one of these checks for $4,000, and used it to cover up his.fraudulent transactions with the bank.

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95 F. 87, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-bank-of-oshkosh-v-hunger-ca7-1899.