Nathaniel Yancey, Jr v. Iowa Board of Parole

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: March 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-0508
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0508 Filed March 19, 2025

NATHANIEL YANCEY, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA BOARD OF PAROLE, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.

An inmate appeals the district court’s decision on judicial review to uphold

denial of his release on parole. AFFIRMED.

Gordon E. Allen, Johnston, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and John R. Lundquist, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.

Buller, J., takes no part. 2

BADDING, Judge.

Nathaniel Yancey, Jr., is serving a combined sentence of up to 105 years

based in part on his involvement in a pair of shootings while released on parole.

See Yancey v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, No. 22-2013, 2023 WL 5949006, at *1 n.1 (Iowa

Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2023). Yancey completed his nine-year mandatory minimum

term in 2020. Each year since, the Iowa Board of Parole (Board) has considered

him for release to a pending federal detainer. Despite the recommendations of the

Department of Corrections (DOC), the Board has denied Yancey parole to date.

In this case, Yancey seeks judicial review of the Board’s April 2023 decision,

which held that “the seriousness of your crime and/or your criminal history

indicates more time is needed before the Board will be convinced a release would

be in the best interest of you and/or society.” Yancey has heard these words

before. The Board’s language—coded as a “DR7” decision—is one of several

standardized reasons used to communicate the basis for a parole denial. Yancey

argues that the Board violated his due process rights by relying on a “boilerplate”

DR7 code to explain the reasons for its decision. The district court rejected this

argument, finding Yancey was not entitled to a more detailed explanation.

”Constitutional issues raised in agency proceedings are reviewed de novo.”

Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 762 (Iowa 2019); see also Iowa

Code § 17A.19(10)(a) (2023). The mandatory language of Iowa’s parole statute

creates a constitutional liberty interest entitling adult parole applicants to due

process protection. Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41, 48 (Iowa 2021) (citing

Iowa Code § 906.4(1)). Procedural due process “requires only ‘minimal’

procedures, including an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons why 3

parole was denied.” Id. at 49 (citation omitted) (noting these requirements are

embraced by the statutory and administrative rules governing parole review in

Iowa). In denying parole, the Board must provide “sufficient reasons to facilitate

appellate review.” Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 785. However, “[t]here is no categorical

due process requirement that after every review the Board issue . . . detailed

findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the denial of parole.” Id.

(rejecting a juvenile offender’s facial challenge to Board decision-making

procedures).

We find no constitutional infirmity here. The administrative record shows

the Board considered Yancey’s unique criminal history in addition to other

aggravating and mitigating factors, including his disciplinary history, rehabilitative

efforts, risk score, and DOC recommendation. After considering that information,

the Board concluded the seriousness of Yancey’s crimes precluded his release in

2023. The Board’s stated reasons are “sufficient . . . to facilitate appellate

review.” Id.

What Yancey really appears to be challenging are the reasons themselves.

He does so under Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(n), which allows for reversal of

agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” We review

the district court’s judicial review ruling on that ground for errors at law. See

Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 762.

Yancey argues that denying parole based on the seriousness of his offense

is inherently backward-looking and inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals of

parole. He also contends that a code “DR7” denial departs from the language of

Iowa Code section 906.4. Contrary to these arguments, we have repeatedly held 4

that the seriousness of an inmate’s offense is a legitimate factor for the Board to

consider in deciding whether release is in the “best interest of society and the

offender.” Iowa Code § 906.4; see also Werts v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, No. 22-0127,

2022 WL 16985843, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022) (upholding denial of

parole based solely on the seriousness of an inmate’s offense); Johnson v. Iowa

Bd. of Parole, No. 02-1320, 2003 WL 1970475, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003)

(same).

It was not unreasonable for the Board to give that factor significant weight

here. As we previously observed, “Yancey was on parole for three violent state

crimes as well as two violent federal crimes at the time of the 2011 shootings” that

gave rise to his current sentence. Yancey, 2023 WL 5949006, at *3. Those

offenses took place a few days apart and involved threats toward law enforcement.

Id. As of 2023, he had served only twelve years of his 105-year sentence. See

Werts, 2022 WL 16985843, at *5 (noting denial of parole was reasonable where,

among other factors, the inmate had served less than one-third of a seventy-five-

year term). Considering all these circumstances, we find the Board’s decision to

deny Yancey’s release in 2023 was not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we find no error at law in the district court’s ruling

and affirm.

AFFIRMED.