1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATHANIEL LEE SMITH, Case No. 1:25-cv-00359-JLT-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CASE1 13 v. (Doc. 20) 14 TUOLUMNE COUNTY JAIL, et al., FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 15 Defendants. 16 17 Pending before the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is the pro se civil rights 18 First Amended Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Nathaniel Smith—a pretrial detainee. 19 (Doc. 20). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss 20 the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim without further leave to amend and direct 21 the Clerk to close this case. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation 24 Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief 25 against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any 26 defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2025). 1 dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon 2 which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 3 such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 4 At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 5 construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 6 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 7 2003). A court does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or 8 unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 9 1981). Critical to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual 10 basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 11 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and 12 plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 13 Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient 14 factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 15 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 16 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not 17 sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not 19 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 20 statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required 21 to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 22 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To satisfy this plausibility standard, 23 however, Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff to submit evidence of the claim at the pleading stage. 24 Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. __ at 3 (2026). 25 If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant 26 is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. 27 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 28 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on 1 how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial 2 decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 3 n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad 4 faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 5 amendments previously allowed . . . .” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 6 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE COMPLAINT 8 Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action 9 by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 26, 2025. (Doc. 1). On July 10 23, 2025,2 the court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to state any cognizable 11 constitutional claim. (See Doc. 18). The court advised Plaintiff of the pleading deficiencies and 12 applicable law and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Id.). 13 Plaintiff timely filed a First Amended Complaint on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 20, “FAC”). 14 Plaintiff includes the names of various state court judges throughout his FAC, but 15 specifically identifies the following individuals as Defendants: 16 (1) Sergeant Matyshock, California Highway Patrol (“CHP”); 17 (2) Officer Pullen, CHP; 18 (3) Sergeant Rogers, Tuolumne County Sheriff’s Office (“TCSO”); 19 (4) Cassandra Jenecke, Tuolumne County District Attorney; 20 (5) Harry Elias, Judge (retired), Tuolumne County Superior Court; and 21 (6) John and Jane Doe. 22 (Doc. 20 at 3-4). 3 Plaintiff sues “all Defendants” in both their individual and official capacities. 23 (Id. at 4). Plaintiff qualifies this statement by adding “Judges and DA only declarational [sic] 24 ruling that they acted in violation of constitutional law.” 4 (Id.). Although not listed under 25 2 The Court awaited screening of the Complaint pending resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal to the Ninth 26 Circuit Court of Appeals. (Docs. 12, 17). 3 The Court cites to the page numbers as reflected on the Court’s Management Electronic Case Filing 27 system. 4 In an abundance of caution, the court construes these conflicting statements as Plaintiff seeking both 28 monetary damages and declaratory relief against the state judges and district attorney. 1 Defendants, consistent with Plaintiff suing ‘all” Defendants in both their individual and official 2 capacities, Plaintiff identifies the following entities as Defendants on the caption of his FAC: 3 (1) Tuolumne County Sheriff; 4 (2) Tuolumne County DA; 5 (3) Superior Court of Cali, Tuolumne; and 6 (4) California Highway Patrol. 7 (Id. at 1). The FAC asserts violations of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of 8 expression, Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, Eighth Amendment right to affordable bail, 9 and Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, the Supremacy Clause. (Id. at 4). 10 Liberally construed, the FAC alleges that various county and state officials, including 11 prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officers, conspired to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff for 12 comments he made on a podcast. In support, Plaintiff points to various court orders issued by 13 different state court judges over a one year period that, inter alia, affected Plaintiff’s custody 14 rights and child support payments and eventually resulted in his arrest and current pre-trial 15 detention. (See generally, Doc. 20 at 5-9). The FAC contains cryptic and vague allegations. 16 Nonetheless, the court accepts the following facts alleged as true. 17 On November 2, 2023, Defendant Sergeant Rogers contacted Sergeant Matyshock to 18 advise him that unidentified county judges had expressed “concerns” with comments Plaintiff had 19 made in a news article and on his podcast regarding a Maryland judge who was shot after taking a 20 child and a home away from a father. (Doc. 20 at 5). Plaintiff does not specify his exact 21 comments. (Id.). At some unspecified point afterwards, “CHP, TSO, state court judges, and 22 district attorneys” started a “campaign of harassment” against Plaintiff because of the statements 23 he made on his podcast. (Id). Plaintiff describes the harassment as unidentified CHP officers 24 attending Plaintiff’s family court proceedings and unidentified TCSO officers calling him in 25 connection with an investigation regarding “false claims” that Plaintiff had abused his son. (Id.). 26 Subsequently, on February 2, 2024, (non-defendant) Judge Hallie Campbell from the 27 Tuolumne County Superior Court took away Plaintiff’s custody and visitation rights to his son 28 based on a “false ‘at home’ drug test.’” (Id. at 5-6). Judge Campbell was later disqualified from 1 Plaintiff’s case. (Id. at 6). 2 In March of 2024, (non-defendant) Judge Beyersdorf was reassigned to Plaintiff’s family 3 law case and issued child support orders against Plaintiff that were “a gross overcharge.” (Id.). 4 Judge Beyersdorf was disqualified from the case due to engaging in an inappropriate personal 5 relationship with the mother of Plaintiff’s child. (Id.). 6 On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a federal suit against 25 parties, including state judges 7 claiming violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights concerning his child-custody 8 case. (Id. at 7).5 9 In July 2024, (non-defendant) Judge Siebert assumed “all” of Plaintiff’s state cases. (Id.). 10 Judge Siebert denied Plaintiff’s motions for disqualification and for change of venue, despite 11 Judge Siebert being named in Plaintiff’s other federal action. (Id.). 12 On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff was arrested at the Tuolumne County courthouse pursuant to 13 an arrest warrant issued by (non-defendant) Judge Beyersdorf. (Id.). Judge Beyersdorf issued the 14 arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s violation of an allegedly illegal restraining order. (Id.). Plaintiff was 15 arrested by eight officers and held for 12 hours after his arrest on the warrant. (Id. at 8). 16 Plaintiff continued to post about the alleged “corruption” in Tuolumne County on his 17 podcast, “Fatherly Freedom.” (Id.). On January 1, 2025, Plaintiff was arrested based on 18 allegations he threatened a judge and stalked various individuals that he named in his other 19 federal action. (Id.). Defendant Judge Harry Elias denied bail pending his trial of these charges. 20 (Id.). 21 Plaintiff asks, “for a preliminary injunction of all his criminal charges,” “release” from 22 pretrial detention, the return of all his unspecified equipment, $200,000.00 for the loss of equity 23 in his home, $18,000.00 for his truck that was repossessed, and a declaration that “the Judges and 24 DA acted unconstitutionally” and their impeachment. (Id. at 11). Additionally, Plaintiff requests 25 the Court to refer this case to a higher court if it cannot grant him his requested relief. (Id.). 26 //// 27 ////
28 5 The Court takes judicial notice of Case No. 1:24-cv-00592-KES-BAM. (“Plaintiff’s other federal action”). 1 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 2 1. Governmental Immunity 3 “Governmental parties to a suit may claim not only immunity from liability, but immunity 4 from the suit itself.” Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1275 (9th Cir. 2026). Because 5 governmental immunities are immunities from suit, and are “conceptually distinct from the merits 6 of the plaintiff's claim,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985), the question of immunity 7 should be determined “at the earliest possible stage in litigation” and “long before trial,” Hunter 8 v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 228 (1991) (per curiam). This is consistent with statutory mandates 9 of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (b)(2) and § 1915(e)(2)(ii) that the court sua sponte screen out complaints 10 where defendants are entitled to immunity. 11 Here, several of the named Defendants, as well as the state judges mentioned in the body 12 of the FAC, are entitled to absolute or sovereign immunity: 13 A. State Court Judges 14 To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against any of the state court judges, judges 15 are absolutely immune from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity, even if 16 such acts are alleged to have been done maliciously, in error, or in excess of jurisdiction. See 17 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). 18 The test for judicial immunity turns on the nature of the act, not the correctness of the decision or 19 the motives of the judge. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. 20 Plaintiff specifically names Judge Elias as a Defendant who denied him bail pending his 21 trial on his underlying state charges. Plaintiff also complains in the body of his FAC that Judge 22 Campbell terminated his custody rights; Judge Beyersdorf “gross[ly] overcharged” Plaintiff for 23 child support, improperly issued a restraining order and an arrest warrant for him; and Judge 24 Siebert, after assuming Plaintiff’s state cases, refused to disqualify himself or grant his motion for 25 change of venue. (Doc. 20 at 6-8). These actions by each of these state court judges are 26 quintessential judicial acts. Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations of bias or improper personal 27 relationships are true, such claims do not overcome judicial immunity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 28 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously 1 and corruptly.”). Therefore, any claims for monetary relief against Judges Campbell, Elias, 2 Beyersdorf, and Siebert are barred. 3 Furthermore, in addition to judicial immunity, “state court judges cannot be sued in 4 federal court in their judicial capacity under the Eleventh Amendment.” Munoz v. Superior Ct. of 5 Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2024). Finally, the Ex Parte Young exception 6 “does not normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against state-court judges.” Whole 7 Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the state 8 court judges are subject to dismissal. 9 B. District Attorney 10 Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Cassandra Jenecke, 11 Tuolumne County District Attorney, she is entitled to immunity for actions that are “intimately 12 associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 13 430–31 (1976). This includes initiating prosecutions, presenting evidence, and appearing in 14 court. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125–29 (1997); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 15 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A prosecutor has absolute immunity for the decision to 16 prosecute ... [and] the decision not to prosecute.” Roe v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 583 17 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Additionally, “the prosecutor's motivation is irrelevant to the 18 immunity inquiry, even if [ ] the motivation was unconstitutional.” Gibson, 165 F.4th at 1281. 19 However, claims that a prosecutor acted as a complaining witness or fabricated evidence may fall 20 outside the scope of absolute immunity if the prosecutor personally attested to facts in an 21 affidavit. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129–31. 22 The FAC contains no allegations that Defendant Jenecke or any other prosecutor 23 personally executed a sworn statement or affidavit. (See Doc. 20). Indeed, other than listing 24 Jenecke under the list of Defendants, the FAC does not contain allegations against Jenecke. 25 Thus, the FAC fails to allege any viable claim against District Attorney Jenecke under Rule 8. 26 And even if the FAC contained allegations against District Attorney Jenecke stemming from 27 Plaintiffs’ current prosecution, which he believes to be fraudulent, such allegations would fall 28 within the scope of prosecutorial functions and be protected by prosecutorial immunity. See Van 1 de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (supervisory decisions related to trial preparation 2 are protected); Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (charging decisions are 3 immune). Thus, Plaintiff’s FAC is subject to dismissal against Defendant Jenecke. 4 C. Official Capacity Claims and State Agencies 5 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, 6 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public 7 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal 8 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against 9 a state, its agencies, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override. . . .” Dittman 10 v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of 11 Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted), cert. 12 denied, 538 U.S. 961 (2003) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or 13 injunctive relief against a state, ‘an arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.”). 14 Plaintif’s claims against the Tuolumne County Superior Court are subject to dismissal 15 “because the Superior Court of California has sovereign immunity as an arm of the state.” Munoz 16 v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Similarly, Plaintiff 17 claims against Sergeant Matyshock and Officer Pullen in their official capacity and his claims 18 against the California Highway Patrol are also subject to dismissal. “[W]hen state officials are 19 named in their official capacities . . . the action is deemed against the state.” See Kentucky v. 20 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Thus, any claims against Defendant Sergeant Matyshock and 21 Officer Pullen in their official capacity, and any claim against the California Highway Patrol, are 22 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 23 2. Rule 8’s Plausibility Standard 24 To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a 25 federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person 26 acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 27 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim 28 unless the facts establish either the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional 1 deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged 2 constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. 3 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). Further, while Rule 8’s pleading standard “does not 4 require detailed factual allegations, [ ] it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 5 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 6 A. No Causal Connection 7 As noted above, the FAC is completely devoid of any factual allegations relating to 8 Defendant Jenecke. The FAC is also silent as to California Highway Patrol Officer Pullen. (See 9 Doc. 20). Other than listing these individuals as Defendants, their names do not appear elsewhere 10 in the FAC. While Plaintiff attributes a “campaign of harassment” to “CHP, TCSO, State Judges, 11 and District Attorneys,” (Doc. 20 at 5), these allegations are not specific to any particular 12 defendant, let alone Officer Pullen or Defendant Jenecke. Further, this single allegation, in 13 addition to being vague, is wholly conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. While factual 14 allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 15 556–557. Therefore, the FAC fails to state any claim against Defendant Officer Pullen or 16 Jenecke. 17 The FAC suffers the same fate as to “John and Jane Doe – TBD.” (Doc. 20 at 4). 18 Plaintiff lists John and Jane Doe under his list of Defendants but the use of either term is absent 19 from the body of the FAC. Moreover, “the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not 20 favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). While 21 “situations may arise where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known prior to the filing 22 of a complaint,” id., a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual detail to allow the court to reasonably 23 infer that each defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, as 24 pled, the FAC alleges no facts of wrongdoing by any John or Jane Doe, let alone any information 25 from which one could later discern the identity of any of the unnamed individuals. “Plaintiff may 26 not sue Doe [D]efendants collectively based on speculative beliefs as to whether they exist, or 27 hypothetical allegations of what they may have done that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional 28 rights.” Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 2010 WL 4917160, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010). Thus, the 1 FAC fails to state any claim against either John or Jane Doe. 2 B. First Amendment 3 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 4 establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 5 speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 6 Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “The First Amendment prohibits 7 government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected 8 speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 139 (2019) (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 9 256 (2006)); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998). “[T]he law is settled that as a 10 general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual 11 to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 12 256. 13 The FAC contains one averment in support of Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise 14 claim: on November 2, 2023, Sergeant Rogers contacted Sergeant Matyshock after state court 15 judges raised concerns about statements Plaintiff made on his podcast that precipitated the 16 “campaign of harassment” against Plaintiff. (Doc. 20 at 5). This single statement is a “naked 17 assertion devoid of further factual enhancement” and is insufficient to state any claim against 18 either Defendant Rogers or Matyshock, let alone a First Amendment claim against either 19 Defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Notably, Plaintiff does not state what statements he made on 20 his podcast that he claims are protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, to the extent 21 Plaintiff attempts to infer that his First Amendment rights were infringed by the “campaign of 22 harassment” that included showing up at his court hearings and telephoning him in connection 23 with an investigation into allegations of child abuse, the issuance of adverse custody and child 24 support orders, issuance of a restraining order, or his eventual arrest, none of these averments 25 identify which particular defendant is accused of the wrongdoing. “Permitting parties to file 26 pleadings that do not tie factual averments against specific parties to individual causes of action 27 infringes Rule 8.” Gibson, 165 F.4th at 1290. 28 Further, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to connect his comments regarding “corruption” in 1 Tuolumne County with his January 1, 2025, arrest, these allegations are also insufficient to state a 2 claim. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to link his speaking about corruption in Tuolumne 3 County with his arrest. Furthermore, without factual allegations showing the absence of probable 4 cause for his arrest and/or prosecution, Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable violation of the 5 First Amendment. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. at 252. 6 Here, the Court cannot infer a First Amendment deprivation by any Defendant from the 7 sparse and vague allegations in the FAC. The Ninth Circuit has unequivocally instructed that 8 “[i]t is not the job of the district courts to make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to support 9 the claim, or to imagine the claims that might fit the facts.” Gibson, 165 F.4th at 1289. As a 10 result, the 11 C. Monell 12 Municipal “[l]iability may attach . . . only where the municipality itself causes the 13 constitutional violation through ‘execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by 14 its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 15 policy.’” Ulrich v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 16 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Here, the FAC contains no factual allegations of an official custom or 17 policy which caused a violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, the FAC fails to state a 18 plausible claim against the California Highway Patrol, Tuolumne Sheriff’s Office, and Tuolumne 19 District Attorney’s Office. 20 D. Right to Speedy Trial 21 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 22 enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right is applicable to 23 state prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 24 223 (1967). To determine whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been violated, courts 25 apply the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), which 26 considers: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of the right, 27 and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 28 Plaintiff claims that he is confined in violation of his rights to a speedy trial and/or his due 1 process rights, may only be properly raised in a § 2241 habeas petition and is not cognizable in 2 this § 1983 action. Perron v. Walker, No. 321CV05572BJRJRC, 2021 WL 4060418, at *2 (W.D. 3 Wash. Sept. 7, 2021). Alternatively, “claims such as speedy trial and ineffective assistance of 4 counsel, if cognizable as constitutional claims, are more appropriately raised in his pending 5 criminal case, on direct appeal should he be convicted, or in state post-conviction relief 6 proceedings. Robinson v. Att'y Gen., No. 3:23-CV-00172-JMK, 2023 WL 6541804, at *3 (D. 7 Alaska Oct. 6, 2023). Additionally, as explained below, federal courts abstain from granting 8 injunctive relief in ongoing criminal prosecution, absent extraordinary circumstances. See 9 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1971). The FAC alleges no such circumstances. Plaintiff 10 does not allege facts showing he has been denied an adequate opportunity to address the alleged 11 constitutional violations in the state court proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff’s speedy trial claim fails to 12 state a claim upon which relief can be granted in this action. 13 E. Right to Bail 14 The Eighth Amendment forbids “[e]xcessive bail.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. However, it 15 does not guarantee a right to bail. See id.; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987); 16 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not provide 17 for an absolute “right to bail.”). Similar to a speedy trial claim, a pretrial detainee plaintiff 18 challenging a bail determination, must bring his claim via a § 2241 habeas corpus petition, not via 19 a § 1983 civil rights complaint. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951); Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 20 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, the FAC fails to state a claim based on excessive bail. 21 3. Younger Abstention and Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 22 Plaintiff asks the court to enter “a preliminary injunction of all criminal charges” and 23 order his release from pretrial detention. Federal courts may not interfere with Plaintiff’s pending 24 state criminal proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances which create a threat of 25 irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971). “Younger principles apply in 26 an action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the federal plaintiff brings a 27 constitutional challenge to a state proceeding when that proceeding is ongoing; the state 28 proceeding is of a judicial nature, implicating important state interests; and the federal plaintiff is 1 not barred from litigating his federal constitutional issues in that proceeding.” Gilbertson v. 2 Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004). Further, such irreparable injury must be “both great 3 and immediate.” Id. (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)). Essentially, the 4 Younger doctrine means that “‘only in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to 5 have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, 6 judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.’” Carden v. 7 Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83–84 (9th Cir.) (quoting Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764–65 (9th Cir. 8 1972)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980). Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege facts from 9 which the court can infer that his on-going prosecution was brought in bad faith, for harassment, 10 or under an unconstitutional statute. 11 Alternatively, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits the district court from reviewing the 12 state court’s custody and child support orders, and restraining orders. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 13 Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In 14 determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, the court assesses whether “claims 15 raised in the federal action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that 16 the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court 17 to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 18 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). If the answer is “yes,” then “the federal complaint must be dismissed 19 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. The courts have repeatedly found jurisdiction lacking 20 where “domestic relations problems” are indirectly involved in the determinative issues of the 21 case before the court. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 22 U.S. 174 (1988) (“Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear 23 disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.”); Moore v. County 24 of Butte, 547 Fed. App’x. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding plaintiff's claims challenging the 25 outcome of custody proceedings were properly dismissed). 26 While Plaintiff is not directly challenging his state court child custody case, and the 27 related orders, his claims allege that the state court proceedings regarding his custody rights and 28 child support payments are part of the pattern of harassment undertaken by various officials. 1 Courts in this district have held that federal claims arising from dissatisfaction with custody 2 proceedings, including allegations of false affidavits or judicial interference, belong in the state 3 courts. See Chima v. Perkins, 2025 WL 3182071, at *4; Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (“If 4 the constitutional claims . . . have independent merit, the state courts are competent to hear 5 them.”). Because California provides adequate procedures to challenge the legality of such 6 proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims and may abstain from hearing his 7 claims on this basis alone. 8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 9 Based on the above, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to 10 state any cognizable claim. The First Amended Complaint suffers from many of the same 11 pleading deficiencies that the undersigned identified and explained to Plaintiff in screening his 12 original Complaint. Plaintiff reasserted many of the same claims that were asserted in his 13 Complaint, including his claims against state court judges, prosecutors, and his speedy trial 14 claims. Despite being provided with guidance and the appropriate legal standards, Plaintiff was 15 unable to cure the deficiencies identified above. A plaintiff’s repeated failure to cure a 16 complaint’s deficiencies constitutes “a strong indication that the [plaintiff has] no additional facts 17 to plead.” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 18 and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff advanced some of these same 19 claims in his other federal action that was dismissed. See Case No. 1:24-cv-00592-KES-BAM. 20 Further, given that immunities apply to claims against judges and prosecutors and claims 21 asserting violations of speedy trial and bail are not cognizable in a § 1983 action, the undersigned 22 finds any amendment would be futile. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the district court 23 dismiss the FAC without further leave to amend. 24 ACCORDINGLY, it is RECOMMENDED: 25 The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) be dismissed under § 1915A for failure to state a 26 claim without further leave to amend and the Clerk be directed to close this case. 27 NOTICE TO PARTIES 28 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 1 | assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after 2 | being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 3 | objections with the Court. /d.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 4 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen 5 | (15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party 6 || wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its 7 | CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with 8 | specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by 9 | the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 10 | 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 11 | waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 | These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the 13 | Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 14 | of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 15 '© | Dated: _ March 2, 2026 Wh fareh Base 17 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA ig UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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