Nathan Wesley McDonald v. State of Minnesota

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: February 5, 2024
• Docket: a230385
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0385

Nathan Wesley McDonald, petitioner, Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Filed February 5, 2024 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge

Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-19-1993

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schmidt,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief from a second-degree

murder conviction, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because (1) his guilty plea was invalid, and the district court should have allowed him to withdraw

it, and (2) he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in support of his postconviction petition.

Because appellant’s guilty plea was valid as a matter of law, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief without an evidentiary

hearing. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS

On August 1, 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Nathan

Wesley McDonald with second-degree intentional murder without premeditation under

Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018). The state’s complaint alleged that McDonald “shot

[LT.R.] multiple times” in his West Saint Paul apartment in July 2019. The complaint also

alleged that L.T.R. was in a relationship with McDonald’s sister, with whom he was living

until shortly before the murder. A few weeks after a “physical altercation” between L.T.R.

and McDonald’s sister, McDonald and others confronted L.T.R.; firearms were involved.

A few days later, L.T.R. was found deceased.

In December 2019, a grand jury indicted McDonald for first-degree murder under

Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a) and 609.05 (2018), which carries a mandatory life sentence, and

second-degree intentional murder under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), and 609.05.

Both counts alleged that McDonald aided and abetted his cousin, T.P., in murdering L.T.R.

At a hearing on August 19, 2020, McDonald appeared with his attorneys.

McDonald’s attorneys discussed reasons for pursuing plea negotiations, including the

mandatory life sentence if the jury found McDonald guilty of first-degree murder. The

prosecuting attorney described the state’s offer to dismiss the first-degree murder charge

2 and recommend a prison sentence of 367 months in exchange for McDonald’s guilty plea

to second-degree murder as alleged in the indictment. The district court stated, “Any

decision being made about accepting or rejecting [the state’s] offer [is McDonald’s]

decision alone,” and scheduled a plea hearing for two days later. Trial was set to begin

September 9, 2020.

At the plea hearing on August 21, 2020, McDonald’s attorney told the district court

that the parties had reached a plea agreement with terms as described at the August 19

hearing. The prosecuting attorney agreed. The district court asked McDonald if he

understood the plea agreement, and McDonald replied that he did.

The district court then asked if McDonald was ready to proceed, and McDonald

replied, “I can’t take the deal.” The district court told McDonald that the court would recess

so he could talk with his attorneys. The district court also asked whether a plea petition had

been prepared. McDonald’s attorney said that McDonald had signed a plea petition. The

court recessed proceedings.

After proceedings resumed, the district court asked McDonald if he was ready to

proceed. McDonald said, “Yes.” After being sworn, McDonald testified that he had signed

a plea petition after reviewing it line by line with his attorneys. McDonald’s attorney then

inquired about McDonald’s understanding of the charges, his communications with his

attorneys, and his trial rights. McDonald stated that he understood the charges against him,

that all of his questions about the charges had been answered, that he had enough time to

talk with his attorneys, and that he was satisfied with their representation and advice.

3 McDonald agreed that he understood his trial rights and that he was waiving those

rights, including any potential defenses, by entering a guilty plea. He stated that he

understood the maximum and minimum penalties for a conviction of intentional

second-degree murder as well as the possible life prison sentence if he went to trial and

was convicted of first-degree murder.

McDonald agreed that no one had made any threats against or promises to him or

his family to get him to plead guilty and that he was not making any claim of innocence.

McDonald stated again that he understood the rights he was giving up and wanted to

proceed. McDonald’s attorney asked whether he understood the state’s promise to

recommend a sentence of 367 months and dismiss the first-degree murder charge in

exchange for McDonald’s testimony at the plea hearing, his cooperation with law

enforcement, and his potential testimony against his codefendant T.P., who is McDonald’s

cousin. McDonald replied that he understood and that this was the parties’ agreement.

McDonald’s attorney then submitted the signed plea petition, and McDonald pleaded guilty

to second-degree murder as alleged in the indictment.

McDonald testified to a factual basis for his plea. He agreed that he and his cousin,

T.P., entered L.T.R.’s apartment in West Saint Paul on July 9, 2019, with a gun, that he

intentionally shot the gun “at least five times,” and that L.T.R. died as a result. McDonald

testified that he “inten[ded] to shoot [his] gun” at L.T.R. The district court found that

McDonald’s guilty plea was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his trial rights

and that McDonald’s testimony provided an adequate factual basis for second-degree

murder. The district court determined that McDonald was guilty of count two,

4 second-degree murder, and stated that count one, first-degree murder, would be dismissed

at sentencing.

At the sentencing hearing on September 18, 2020, the district court asked if

McDonald wanted to say anything before the sentence was imposed. McDonald responded

by apologizing to his family for his actions and then stated:

I’m innocent. I only took this deal . . . because of the lack of confidence my lawyers had in going to trial, and the pressure that was put on me when I tried to decline this deal, that I was scared and I feel like I’ve been railroaded. I feel bad for the loss of life, but it wasn’t by the hands of me.

The district court took a recess. After proceedings resumed, the district court stated that

there had been “extensive [plea] negotiations” in this case and that McDonald made “a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision” when he pleaded guilty. The district court

also stated that McDonald could claim he is not responsible, “[b]ut in my eyes,” McDonald

is convicted. The district court sentenced McDonald to 367 months in prison.

Almost two years later, McDonald petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking to

withdraw his guilty plea “because he asked to do so before sentencing, and it would have

been fair and just to allow plea withdrawal.” McDonald’s petition also argued that “the

plea was not intelligent and voluntary and therefore resulted in a manifest injustice”

because “the court placed [McDonald] in a room with his parents for a lengthy contact

visit, in which they persuaded him to plead guilty.” McDonald asked for an evidentiary

hearing and submitted two affidavits in support of his petition.

In McDonald’s affidavit, he attested that he met with his family “for hours” during

the recess at the August 21 plea hearing. His family hugged and “cried on [him] and told

5 [him] that [he] needed to take the plea deal for the good of the family.” They told him that

his sister was “depressed and suicidal” and that “the victim’s family [was] harassing them

and making death threats.” McDonald averred that he felt “extremely coerced by [his]

family, cornered, and mental[ly] abused,” which led him to accept the plea agreement, even

though he did not want to. McDonald’s mother attested in her affidavit that McDonald’s

attorney asked her and her husband “to talk to [McDonald] and get him to accept the plea

deal.” She also averred that they “did what his lawyers told [them] to do, and convinced

him to accept the plea deal.”

The district court denied McDonald’s petition and also determined that he was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The district court found that McDonald had “not alleged

facts sufficient to show he was threatened or coerced into entering the plea of guilty.” This

appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellate courts “review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an

abuse of discretion.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A

postconviction court abuses it discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary

or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or ma[kes] clearly

erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). When reviewing a district court’s

decision to deny postconviction relief, appellate courts review legal issues de novo and

factual issues based on the sufficiency of the evidence. Id.

6 I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McDonald’s postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea.

McDonald’s brief to this court argues that the district court abused its discretion

because it did not allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, as he requested in his

postconviction petition, even though the plea was invalid. The validity of a guilty plea is a

question of law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94

(Minn. 2010). A valid guilty plea “must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i.e.,

knowingly and understandingly made).” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).

McDonald does not contest the accuracy or intelligence of his plea on appeal, but he

contends that his plea was not voluntary. 1

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.”

Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93. The standard for plea withdrawal differs depending on whether

the defendant asks to withdraw a plea before or after sentencing. “In its discretion the

[district] court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if

it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2 (emphasis added). “At any

time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and

proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest

1 While McDonald’s postconviction petition also argued that his plea was not intelligent, he does not raise this argument on appeal. When an appellant’s brief does not address an argument raised in a petition for postconviction relief, that argument is forfeited. State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997). Accordingly, we do not consider whether McDonald’s guilty plea was intelligent, as the district court found during the plea hearing. We also note that McDonald’s postconviction petition did not challenge the accuracy of his plea.

7 injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1 (emphasis added). McDonald contends that he

is entitled to relief under both standards, so we consider each standard separately.

A. McDonald is not entitled to relief under the fair-and-just standard.

In his brief to this court, McDonald argues that the fair-and-just standard applies

because “[a]t the sentencing hearing, and before he was sentenced, McDonald told the court

he was innocent, that he did not feel well advised, and that he felt uniquely pressured by

the contact visit with his parents during the course of the plea hearing.” In its order denying

postconviction relief, the district court determined that the fair-and-just standard did not

apply to McDonald’s request because “[a]lthough the [fair-and-just] standard would have

applied to a request to withdraw his plea before sentencing . . . [McDonald] never made

such a request.”

It is true that McDonald asserted his innocence during the sentencing hearing. But

neither he nor his attorneys moved to withdraw his plea before the district court imposed

the sentence, even though the district court took a recess immediately after McDonald’s

statements about his innocence and being “railroaded.” Accordingly, given that McDonald

did not request to withdraw his plea before sentencing, the fair-and-just standard does not

apply. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.

B. McDonald is not entitled to relief under the manifest-injustice standard.

McDonald argues that his plea was involuntary and that he should be allowed to

withdraw it under the manifest-injustice standard. “[M]anifest injustice exists where a

guilty plea is invalid.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). In denying

McDonald’s petition for postconviction relief, the district court determined that McDonald

8 did not allege “facts sufficient to show he was threatened or coerced into entering the plea

of guilty” and thus did not demonstrate that his plea was not voluntary.

McDonald makes two arguments. First, he argues that “the parental involvement in

this plea agreement was akin to a ‘package deal’ which courts treat with great care and

skepticism” and which requires district courts to inquire to ensure the plea is voluntary.

Second, he contends that the government or the district court coerced him into pleading

guilty. We consider these arguments in turn.

1. McDonald’s plea agreement was not a “package deal.”

A “package deal” is a “contingent plea agreement involving more lenient sentences

for [the pleading defendant’s] co-defendants.” State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Minn.

1994). For example, in Danh, the defendant’s plea agreement provided “more lenient

sentences for three co-defendants, including [the defendant’s] younger brother,” if the

defendant pleaded guilty. Id. The supreme court has stated that

“[p]ackage deal” agreements are generally dangerous because of the risk of coercion; this is particularly so in cases involving related third parties, where there is a risk that a defendant, who would otherwise exercise his or her right to a jury trial, will plead guilty out of a sense of family loyalty.

Id. at 542. When parties proceed with a package deal, “the state must fully inform” the

district court, which must “conduct further inquiries” to determine voluntariness. Id.

McDonald argues in his brief to this court that he pleaded guilty out of a sense of

family loyalty. We are not persuaded to apply the caselaw on package deals because there

are key differences between the plea agreement in this case and a package deal. In Danh,

if the defendant pleaded guilty, his codefendants, including his younger brother, received

9 more lenient sentences. Id. at 540-41. The defendant in Danh initially rejected his plea

agreement but decided to plead guilty after a private meeting with his younger brother. Id.

at 541.

In contrast, McDonald’s plea agreement did not directly benefit any members of his

family. McDonald’s codefendant was his cousin, and in the plea agreement, McDonald

promised to testify truthfully in subsequent proceedings, including those involving any

codefendants. But McDonald’s plea agreement did not directly affect his codefendant’s

sentence. Accordingly, McDonald’s guilty plea was not a package deal under Danh, and

the district court did not have an obligation to make further inquiries about voluntariness.

2. McDonald was not otherwise coerced into pleading guilty.

McDonald’s brief to this court also argues that his plea was involuntary because,

during the meeting with his family, he “felt coerced into pleading guilty to protect his

family.” A plea is involuntary if it is the result of improper pressure or coercion. Raleigh,

778 N.W.2d at 96. Courts must consider all relevant circumstances to determine whether a

guilty plea was voluntary. Id. “[T]he government may not produce a plea through actual or

threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”

State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted); see also Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (same).

The parties agree that McDonald was not threatened with any actual or threatened

physical harm. McDonald asserts that his parents “convinced him to plead guilty at the

behest of his attorneys, by explaining to him that he needed to plead guilty to protect them

10 from harassment, death threats, and his sister’s depression and suicidal ideation.”

McDonald contends that this was coercive and overcame his will.

Neither McDonald’s nor his mother’s affidavit asserts that the government coerced

McDonald. To the contrary, McDonald’s affidavit states that L.T.R.’s family threatened

McDonald’s family and that McDonald’s family coerced him to plead guilty. The

statements and actions of McDonald’s family and L.T.R.’s family do not establish

government coercion under Brady and Ecker because the families are not government

actors.

McDonald’s brief to this court alludes to “the judicial actors in the hearing room,”

including the district court, “plac[ing] McDonald alone in a room with his parents, who

convinced him to plead guilty.” But McDonald did not raise this argument in his petition

for postconviction relief. “It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first

time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447

(Minn. 2005). Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument for the first time on

appeal.

Even so, we note that McDonald provides no record evidence that the state or the

district court arranged the meeting between McDonald and his parents during the plea

hearing. McDonald’s mother’s affidavit avers that McDonald’s attorney asked

McDonald’s parents to talk to McDonald and “get him to accept the plea deal.” Yet,

McDonald makes no claim that his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty.

Also, the plea-hearing transcript reflects that, after the recess, McDonald’s attorney

asked him whether anyone had threatened McDonald or his family to “get” him to plead

11 guilty. McDonald indicated that no one had done this. He also agreed that no one had made

promises to “get” him to plead guilty. Since McDonald does not allege facts showing

coercion by the government, the district court correctly determined that McDonald was not

entitled to postconviction relief.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing.

An appellate court reviews “the ultimate decision by the postconviction court to

grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Caldwell v. State,

853 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 2014). A district court must hold a postconviction evidentiary

hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show

that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022). In making

this decision, “a postconviction court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and

construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d

417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “[I]f material facts are in dispute which

have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction and which must be

resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits, the court must schedule an

evidentiary hearing.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (quotation

omitted).

McDonald argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request

for an evidentiary hearing because, looking at the facts he alleged in the light most

favorable to him and assuming that his family coerced him into pleading guilty, an

evidentiary hearing is required to determine whether his plea was voluntary.

12 We disagree. As stated above, a plea is involuntary if the government produces the

“plea through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion.” Ecker,

524 N.W.2d at 719. Even if we accept as true each of the facts asserted in McDonald’s

petition and accompanying affidavits, McDonald did not assert that the government

threatened him or mentally coerced him to produce a guilty plea. Therefore, the district

court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.

III. McDonald is not entitled to any relief based on the arguments in his pro se supplemental brief.

In his pro se supplemental brief, McDonald argues his actual innocence and asserts

that his guilty plea was invalid because it was inaccurate. We reject these arguments for

two reasons.

First, McDonald relies on affidavits submitted for the first time with his pro se

supplemental brief, including an affidavit by T.P. that recants earlier statements and states

that McDonald was not present for L.T.R.’s murder. The record on appeal includes

“documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if

any.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. The court of appeals “generally will not consider

matters outside the record on appeal or evidence not produced and received in the district

court.” MacDonald v. Brodkorb, 939 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. 2020). Additionally, “[i]t is

not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal.” Kucera

v. Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966). Because the affidavits submitted along with

McDonald’s pro se supplemental brief were not filed with the district court, we do not

consider them.

13 Second, neither of McDonald’s pro se arguments was raised in district court in

support of plea withdrawal. We generally will not consider matters for the first time on

appeal after the denial of postconviction relief. Azure, 700 N.W.2d at 447. Because

McDonald did not assert actual innocence or contend that his guilty plea was inaccurate in

his petition for postconviction relief, we decline to consider either issue.

Affirmed.