Rel: August 2, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2024 ________________________
CL-2024-0048 ________________________
Nathan Wayne Jones
v.
Martha Dale Jones
Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court (DR-23-900039)
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
Nathan Wayne Jones ("the husband") appeals from a judgment
entered by the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him
from Martha Dale Jones ("the wife"). We reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand the case for the trial court to make those findings
necessary to comply with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(b). CL-2024-0048
The parties married on February 22, 2010. The husband filed a
complaint for a divorce on February 16, 2023. The wife filed an answer
and a counterclaim for a divorce on March 8, 2023. On October 4, 2023,
the trial court conducted a bench trial, and, on December 7, 2023, the
trial court entered a judgment of divorce. In the divorce judgment, the
trial court, among other things, awarded the wife $1,250 per month in
periodic alimony. The divorce judgment provides, in pertinent part:
"After considering the length of the parties' marriage, the age and the health of each party, the ability of each party to be self-supporting, the income of both parties, and the standard of living during the marriage, the [c]ourt hereby Orders [the husband] to pay to [the wife] the amount of $1,250.00 each month as periodic alimony."
On December 22, 2023, the husband filed a postjudgment motion in
which he argued, among other things, that the periodic-alimony award
violated Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57. On January 3, 2024, the trial court
denied the husband's postjudgment motion. The husband timely
appealed the divorce judgment to this court on January 19, 2024.
On appeal, the husband reiterates the arguments that he made in
his postjudgment motion. He first maintains that, pursuant to § 30-2-
2 CL-2024-0048
57(b)(1), the trial court could not have properly awarded the wife periodic
alimony without expressly determining that rehabilitative alimony was
not feasible. Alternatively, the husband contends that, if the trial court
properly awarded the wife periodic alimony, it erroneously failed to limit
the duration of the award in compliance with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(g)
("Except upon a finding by the court that a deviation from the time limits
of this section is equitably required, a person shall be eligible for periodic
alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the marriage, as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, with the exception that if a party is
married for 20 years or longer, there shall be no time limit as to his or
her eligibility."). We consider the first issue to be dispositive of this
appeal.
Section 30-2-57(a) provides:
"Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:
"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or her separate estate is insufficient to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
3 CL-2024-0048
"(2) The other party has the ability to supply those means without undue economic hardship.
"(3) The circumstances of the case make it equitable." 1
Section 30-2-57(b) provides:
"If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a) [of § 30- 2-57], the court shall award alimony in the following priority:
"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) In cases in which the court expressly finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good- faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith rehabilitation only enables the party to partially
1In his appellate brief, the husband argues that the evidence would
not support a determination that the wife proved a need for alimony as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(a)(1) however, that issue was not raised to the trial court and has not been properly preserved for appellate review. See Rieger v. Rieger, 147 So. 3d 421, 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). In his postjudgment motion, the husband did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proving that the wife lacked a sufficient estate to maintain the marital standard of living, which would have allowed this court to raise the noncompliance with § 30-2-57(a)(1) ex mero motu. See Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). 4 CL-2024-0048
acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage, the court shall award the party periodic installments of alimony for a duration and an amount to allow the party to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage ...."
Section 30-2-57(b)(1) provides that, after making those findings
required by § 30-2-57(a), a trial court should award the recipient spouse
rehabilitative alimony "[u]nless the court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible." "Rehabilitative alimony" refers to
" 'temporary financial support for a former spouse while the former
spouse undergoes vocational rehabilitation in order to restore or improve
his or her earning capacity and become self-supporting.' " Prakash v.
Pandey, 331 So. 3d 1158, 1172 n.15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (quoting
Seymour v. Seymour, 241 So. 3d 733, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)). An
award of rehabilitative alimony may not be feasible when the former
spouse cannot be rehabilitated, a good-faith attempt at rehabilitation has
failed, or vocational rehabilitation cannot fully enable the former spouse
to maintain the marital standard of living. See § 30-2-57(b)(2). A trial
5 CL-2024-0048
court may award periodic alimony only if it expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible for one or more of those reasons. Id.
As this court recently explained in White v. Jones, [Ms. CL-2023-
0511, Feb. 16, 2024] ___ So. 3d___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), when a court
violates § 30-2-57(b) by awarding periodic alimony without making an
express finding that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the judgment
must be reversed. "The general purpose of making specific findings of
fact is to allow the trial court 'to carefully review the evidence and to
perfect the issues for review on appeal.' " Id. at ___ (quoting Ex parte
Vaughn, 495 So. 2d 83, 87 (Ala. 1986)).
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Rel: August 2, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2024 ________________________
CL-2024-0048 ________________________
Nathan Wayne Jones
v.
Martha Dale Jones
Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court (DR-23-900039)
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
Nathan Wayne Jones ("the husband") appeals from a judgment
entered by the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him
from Martha Dale Jones ("the wife"). We reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand the case for the trial court to make those findings
necessary to comply with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(b). CL-2024-0048
The parties married on February 22, 2010. The husband filed a
complaint for a divorce on February 16, 2023. The wife filed an answer
and a counterclaim for a divorce on March 8, 2023. On October 4, 2023,
the trial court conducted a bench trial, and, on December 7, 2023, the
trial court entered a judgment of divorce. In the divorce judgment, the
trial court, among other things, awarded the wife $1,250 per month in
periodic alimony. The divorce judgment provides, in pertinent part:
"After considering the length of the parties' marriage, the age and the health of each party, the ability of each party to be self-supporting, the income of both parties, and the standard of living during the marriage, the [c]ourt hereby Orders [the husband] to pay to [the wife] the amount of $1,250.00 each month as periodic alimony."
On December 22, 2023, the husband filed a postjudgment motion in
which he argued, among other things, that the periodic-alimony award
violated Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57. On January 3, 2024, the trial court
denied the husband's postjudgment motion. The husband timely
appealed the divorce judgment to this court on January 19, 2024.
On appeal, the husband reiterates the arguments that he made in
his postjudgment motion. He first maintains that, pursuant to § 30-2-
2 CL-2024-0048
57(b)(1), the trial court could not have properly awarded the wife periodic
alimony without expressly determining that rehabilitative alimony was
not feasible. Alternatively, the husband contends that, if the trial court
properly awarded the wife periodic alimony, it erroneously failed to limit
the duration of the award in compliance with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(g)
("Except upon a finding by the court that a deviation from the time limits
of this section is equitably required, a person shall be eligible for periodic
alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the marriage, as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, with the exception that if a party is
married for 20 years or longer, there shall be no time limit as to his or
her eligibility."). We consider the first issue to be dispositive of this
appeal.
Section 30-2-57(a) provides:
"Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:
"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or her separate estate is insufficient to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
3 CL-2024-0048
"(2) The other party has the ability to supply those means without undue economic hardship.
"(3) The circumstances of the case make it equitable." 1
Section 30-2-57(b) provides:
"If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a) [of § 30- 2-57], the court shall award alimony in the following priority:
"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) In cases in which the court expressly finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good- faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith rehabilitation only enables the party to partially
1In his appellate brief, the husband argues that the evidence would
not support a determination that the wife proved a need for alimony as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(a)(1) however, that issue was not raised to the trial court and has not been properly preserved for appellate review. See Rieger v. Rieger, 147 So. 3d 421, 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). In his postjudgment motion, the husband did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proving that the wife lacked a sufficient estate to maintain the marital standard of living, which would have allowed this court to raise the noncompliance with § 30-2-57(a)(1) ex mero motu. See Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). 4 CL-2024-0048
acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage, the court shall award the party periodic installments of alimony for a duration and an amount to allow the party to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage ...."
Section 30-2-57(b)(1) provides that, after making those findings
required by § 30-2-57(a), a trial court should award the recipient spouse
rehabilitative alimony "[u]nless the court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible." "Rehabilitative alimony" refers to
" 'temporary financial support for a former spouse while the former
spouse undergoes vocational rehabilitation in order to restore or improve
his or her earning capacity and become self-supporting.' " Prakash v.
Pandey, 331 So. 3d 1158, 1172 n.15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (quoting
Seymour v. Seymour, 241 So. 3d 733, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)). An
award of rehabilitative alimony may not be feasible when the former
spouse cannot be rehabilitated, a good-faith attempt at rehabilitation has
failed, or vocational rehabilitation cannot fully enable the former spouse
to maintain the marital standard of living. See § 30-2-57(b)(2). A trial
5 CL-2024-0048
court may award periodic alimony only if it expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible for one or more of those reasons. Id.
As this court recently explained in White v. Jones, [Ms. CL-2023-
0511, Feb. 16, 2024] ___ So. 3d___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), when a court
violates § 30-2-57(b) by awarding periodic alimony without making an
express finding that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the judgment
must be reversed. "The general purpose of making specific findings of
fact is to allow the trial court 'to carefully review the evidence and to
perfect the issues for review on appeal.' " Id. at ___ (quoting Ex parte
Vaughn, 495 So. 2d 83, 87 (Ala. 1986)). The legislature enacted § 30-2-
57(b) to assure that a trial court would not award periodic alimony
without carefully considering and rejecting rehabilitative alimony as a
feasible remedy and to clearly apprise the appellate courts of its decision.
When a trial court fails to comply with § 30-2-57(b), this court cannot
assume that it considered and rejected the feasibility of rehabilitative
alimony; instead, this court must reverse the judgment and remand the
case to the trial court for it to make the necessary written
determinations.
6 CL-2024-0048
In this case, the trial court violated § 30-2-57(b). In the judgment
of divorce, the trial court stated that it had considered the length of the
parties' marriage, the age and health of the parties, the ability of each
party to be self-supporting, the incomes of both parties, and the standard
of living of the parties during the marriage, which are some of the
statutory factors relevant to an alimony determination, see § 30-2-57(d)
and (f), but the trial court did not specifically find that rehabilitative
alimony was not feasible, as required by § 30-2-57(b). By omitting that
finding, we can conclude only that the trial court improperly failed to
consider awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony.
We therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it awarded the wife
periodic alimony and remand the case to the trial court to fulfill its
statutory duty under § 30-2-57(b). On remand, the trial court shall
determine from its weighing of the evidence in the record the appropriate
form of alimony that the wife shall be awarded, shall make the required
findings of fact in support of its determination, and shall take any and
all other actions and conduct such further proceedings as are necessary
to comply with this opinion Because the trial court may determine on
7 CL-2024-0048
remand that the wife should be awarded rehabilitative alimony for a
limited duration, it would be premature for this court to address the
husband's alternative argument that the trial court erred in awarding
the wife periodic alimony for an indefinite period.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.