IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Nathan Maxwell, Dec 12 2025, 9:49 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
December 12, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1031 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable James B. Osborn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D21-2405-F5-15063
Opinion by Judge Foley Judges May and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 1 of 16 Foley, Judge.
[1] Nathan Maxwell (“Maxwell”) was convicted after a jury trial of Count I:
intimidation 1 as a Level 5 felony and Count II: pointing a firearm at another
person as a Level 6 felony. 2 Maxwell raises two restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for intimidation; and
II. Whether Maxwell’s convictions for Level 5 felony intimidation and
Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at another person violate the
protections against double jeopardy.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History 3 [3] In 2024, Terry Trent (“Trent”) spent his time working two different jobs, one as
a part-time Deputy Constable for the Center Township Constable Office and
the other as a part-time traffic director. One day, while working as a part-time
traffic director, Trent noticed a campground near the area where he was
1 Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A). 2 I.C. § 35-47-4-3(b). 3 We held oral argument on November 18, 2025, at New Albany-Floyd County Consolidated School Corporation. We thank counsel for their skilled presentations and extend gratitude to Senior Judge Vicki Carmichael, Leadership Southern Indiana, and the students of their Nexgen program for their hospitality. Nexgen is a youth leadership program consisting of high school juniors from Clark, Floyd, and Scott counties.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 2 of 16 directing traffic. Trent had been looking for campground space to rent for the
summer to spend time with his grandchildren and, therefore, decided to return
to the campground sometime.
[4] During the daylight hours of May 23, 2024, Trent returned to the campground,
which was located on West Southport Road, near the White River. Trent was
accompanied by his girlfriend, Misty Roberts (“Roberts”). When Trent and
Roberts arrived, the gate to the campground gate was locked. Trent backed his
black SUV into the campground driveway, to wait and see if they “could meet
with somebody that may go into the property there just to get some more
information[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 97. While waiting in the campground driveway,
Roberts exited the passenger side of the SUV with her four-pound dog.
Maxwell’s real property and residence abutted the campground property.
Roberts walked her dog on Maxwell’s property and driveway. See State’s Ex. 8,
Video 1 at 00:00–01:08; see also State’s Ex. 8, Video 2 at 00:00–00:40. Roberts
mistakenly believed that Maxwell’s driveway was the parking lot for the
campground.
[5] Maxwell was inside his home with his father, fiancée, and two children.
Maxwell’s fiancée notified him of an alert on their security system that
someone, which turned out to be Roberts, was on their property. Maxwell then
retrieved a handgun from his bedside table gun safe because they “weren’t
expecting anybody, and there was not . . . [a] package or anything like that
[they] expected to be delivered.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 194. Maxwell went outside with
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 3 of 16 his handgun in hand to confront Roberts. See State’s Ex. 8, Video 1 at 01:09–
01:22; see also State’s Ex. 8, Video 3 at 00:00–00:27.
[6] Maxwell confronted Roberts, yelled at her, and “was pretty pissed.” Tr. Vol. 2
p. 134. Roberts apologized and said she “didn’t know that [she] wasn’t
supposed to be there” and that she thought the home was the campground
office. Id. at 137. Trent, who was seated in the SUV, asked if “there was a
problem.” Id. at 103; State’s Ex. 1 at 01:48–02:00. Maxwell responded
affirmatively, and Trent exited the vehicle. As Trent was exiting the driver’s
seat of the SUV, Maxwell “racked a round into his firearms [sic] that he was
carrying.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 103; see also State’s Ex. 8, Video 3 at 00:18–00:32.
Trent walked around the rear of the SUV, and Roberts told Trent that she
observed Maxwell rack his firearm. Maxwell later stated that he “cocked back
[his] gun[]” because he saw that Trent had a weapon on his person, noticing
“the imprint of the weapon because [Trent] was wearing tight clothing[.]” Tr.
Vol. 2 p. 202. Once Trent walked around the rear of the vehicle, Maxwell was
mad, cussing, and said “you guys need to get off the property[.]” Id. at 104.
[7] Trent believed that he was on the campground’s property, not on Maxwell’s
property. After a brief discussion with Trent, Maxwell turned his back to Trent
and began walking back towards his home. See State’s Ex. 8, Video 3 at 01:03–
01:08. At that point, Trent said to Maxwell “you don’t have to be a dick about
it.” Id. at 205. Maxwell then quickly turned around, began to argue with
Trent, and “close[d] the gap” between them. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 214; see State’s Ex. 5,
Video 4 at 00:00–00:30. Maxwell’s father, who had also come outside,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 4 of 16 attempted to intervene, placing himself between Maxwell and Trent. He
encouraged Maxwell to “go on” and tried to walk him back to the home.
State’s Ex. 5, Video 4 at 00:20–01:15.
[8] As Maxwell’s father attempted to walk Maxwell back towards the home, Trent
began to reach into his left lower cargo shorts pocket to retrieve his wallet and
ID to show Maxwell he was a law enforcement officer. At that point, Maxwell
raised his handgun in the direction of Trent and told him to “get your hands out
of your pockets, dude, get your hands out of your pocket.” State’s Ex. 5, Video
4 at 00:30–00:38. Trent “proceeded to pull out [his] police ID.” Tr. Vol. 2 p.
105. Trent showed Maxwell his “police ID and [Maxwell] said he didn’t give a
– that [Trent] was a cop.” Id. Maxwell eventually lowered the handgun and
began to walk backwards toward the home. Maxwell’s father again attempted
to get Maxwell inside the home. Meanwhile, Trent returned to his SUV to
retrieve his cell phone to call 911. As Trent reached into the front passenger
seat of the vehicle, Maxwell again raised the handgun and aimed it at Trent.
See State’s Ex. 5, Video 4 at 00:55–01:10.
[9] After pushing his son towards the home, Maxwell’s father returned to speak
with Trent and Roberts to “figure out what was going on[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 108.
Maxwell’s father was very apologetic while conversing with Trent and Roberts.
However, while Maxwell’s father was speaking with them, Trent observed
Maxwell again pointing his firearm in their general direction. Trent was able to
call the police and waited for their arrival.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 5 of 16 [10] When officers arrived, Maxwell was sitting on the porch with his fiancée.
Maxwell’s handgun was sitting on an outdoor coffee table, “cleared[,]” with the
slide of the handgun “locked to the rear.” Id. at 168; see also Ex. Vol. I p. 40.
While on scene, the responding officers noted that Maxwell was “kind of
aggressive — passive aggressive.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 167.
[11] On May 28, 2024, the State charged Maxwell with Count I: Level 5 felony
intimidation and Count II: Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at another person.
The charging information stated:
Count I
On or about May 23, 2024, [Maxwell] did communicate a threat to commit a forcible felony, that is: Battery by Mean[s] of a Deadly Weapon, to [Trent], another person, by drawing or using a deadly weapon, that is: a handgun, with the intent that [Trent] be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out[.]
Count II
On or about May 23, 2024, [Maxwell] did knowingly point a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, at [Trent.]
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. A jury trial was held on March 6, 2025, and the
jury found Maxwell guilty of both counts. The trial court entered judgment of
conviction on both counts and scheduled a sentencing hearing for April 4, 2025.
At the sentencing hearing, Maxwell requested that the trial court vacate Count I
because it was unsupported by testimony at trial. The trial court disagreed,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 6 of 16 reasoning that “there was sufficient information in the trial for the jury to come
to the conclusion they did[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 15. The trial court sentenced
Maxwell to 1,095 days on his intimidation conviction with 365 days served on
Marion County Community Corrections (“MCCC”) and the rest suspended to
probation with a concurrent term of 365 days on MCCC for his pointing a
firearm at another person conviction. Maxwell now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency Evidence [12] Maxwell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for
intimidation. He argues that, to obtain a Level 5 felony conviction, the State
was obligated to prove he engaged in an act of intimidation where that act of
intimidation was independent of his use of a firearm. “Sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those
matters to the province of the jury.’” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237,
1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). “A
conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value
supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27
N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015).
[13] This case presents a question of statutory interpretation and “[w]e review
matters of statutory interpretation de novo because they present pure questions of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 7 of 16 law.” Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010) (citing Gardiner v. State,
928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 2010)). “Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is
to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Adams v. State, 960
N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012) (citing State v. Oddi–Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248
(Ind. 2008)). “The best evidence of that intent is the language of the statute
itself, and we strive to give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary
meaning.” Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d at 1248 (citing Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d
1045, 1047 (Ind. 2001)). However, “a statute is ambiguous when it allows more
than one reasonable interpretation.” Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind.
2016) (citing Adams, 960 N.E.2d at 798). “And if we conclude a statute is
ambiguous, then we resort to the rules of statutory interpretation to fulfill the
legislature’s intent.” Id. (citing Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind.
2016)). “The rule of lenity requires that penal statutes be construed strictly
against the State and any ambiguities resolved in favor of the accused[.]”
Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009) (citing State v. Turner, 567
N.E.2d 783, 783–84 (Ind.1991)).
[14] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4), “[a] person who
communicates a threat with the intent: . . . that another person be placed in fear
that the threat will be carried out . . .” commits intimidation as a Class A
misdemeanor. However, the offense is elevated to a Level 5 felony if “while
committing it, the person draws or uses a deadly weapon[.]” Indiana Code
section 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(c)
defines “[t]hreat” to mean “an expression, by words or action[.]”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 8 of 16 [15] Here, Maxwell reads the Level 5 felony intimidation statute to require proof of
two separate and distinct acts: (1) communicating a threat and (2) drawing or
using a deadly weapon “while” communicating the threat.4 Appellant’s Br. p.
8. In essence, Maxwell’s argument rests on his interpretation of the meaning of
“while” in relation to “while committing it, the person draws or uses a deadly
weapon[.]” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A).
[16] Maxwell contends that the term “while” in Indiana Code section 35-45-2-
1(b)(2)(A) denotes a temporal relationship requiring the State to prove that two
distinct and separate acts occurred at the same time. Maxwell argues that the
plain language of the statute and the structure of the Criminal Code support this
theory. However, we disagree with Maxwell’s interpretation of the statute and
conclude that the statute instead clearly and unambiguously allows for a
conviction under the circumstances at hand.
[17] When reviewing the statutory language as a whole, we note that to obtain a
conviction for the elevated Level 5 felony, the State was required to prove that
Maxwell, “while committing” the base offense of intimidation, drew or used a
deadly weapon. I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). “When we
interpret statutes, we give the words their plain meaning, considering the
statutory structure as a whole and avoiding interpretations that render any part
of the statute meaningless or superfluous.” Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526,
4 We note that Maxwell does not argue that there was insufficient evidence to prove any of the remaining elements of intimidation. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 9 of 16 536–37 (Ind. 2025) (citing ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62
N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)). Our Supreme Court in Turner declined to
consult a dictionary for its interpretation of a portion of the self-defense statue
set forth in Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) because its “meaning is so plain
that there is no need to walk through the[] dictionary definition[].” Turner, 253
N.E.3d at 537. Here too, we decline to consult a dictionary for our
interpretation of “while committing it” in Indiana Code section 35-45-2-
1(b)(2)(A) because its meaning is so plain there is no need to consult the
dictionary definition. Read in its entirety, “while committing it” denotes an act
contemporaneous in time with the underlying felony. I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A).
[18] The facts adduced at trial reflect that on at least two occasions during the
episode of criminal conduct, Maxwell drew and pointed a firearm in the
direction of Trent. Maxwell first pointed a firearm at Trent while Trent was
reaching into his lower left cargo shorts pocket and Maxwell also pointed his
firearm at Trent while Trent attempted to retrieve his cell phone from his
vehicle. See State’s Ex. 5, Video 4. Maxwell’s action of pointing a firearm at
Trent communicated a threat of harm and the use of the weapon was
contemporaneous in time with his threat, therefore, we conclude that the State
provided sufficient evidence to convict Maxwell of intimidation as a Level 5
felony.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 10 of 16 II. Substantive Double Jeopardy [19] Maxwell argues that his convictions for both Level 5 felony intimidation and
Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at another person violate principles of
substantive double jeopardy. We review double jeopardy claims de novo. See
Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020); see also Powell v. State, 151
N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). Our Supreme Court in Wadle developed a three-
step approach to analyze substantive double jeopardy claims. See generally
Wadle, 151 N.E.3d 227. Under Step 1, courts are tasked with examining the
statutory language of the offenses “[w]hen multiple convictions for a single act
or transaction implicate two or more statutes[.]” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. “If
the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment[s], either
expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an end
and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
[20] As to Step 1, Maxwell argues that neither pointing a firearm at another person
nor intimidation clearly permits multiple punishments. The State agrees with
Maxwell, conceding that “the statutes for intimidation and pointing a firearm
[at another person] do not expressly allow for multiple punishments.”
Appellee’s Br. p. 17. Upon review of the statutes at issue, we agree with the
parties. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A) (intimidation); I.C. § 35-47-4-3(b)
(pointing a firearm at another person). We therefore proceed to Step 2 under
Wadle.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 11 of 16 [21] Under Step 2, we are tasked with determining whether the offenses, either
factually or inherently, are included in each other. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248.
Maxwell does not argue, and the State concedes, that the Level 5 felony
intimidation charges are not inherently included in the Level 6 felony pointing a
firearm at another charge. Therefore, we assume for purpose of this appeal that
the intimidation charge is not inherently included in the felony pointing a
firearm at another charge and proceed to determine if they are factually
included in each other. See A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024).
Here, we begin by analyzing whether the offenses are factually included.
[22] “An offense is factually included when the charging information alleges that the
means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the
alleged lesser included offense.” Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 703 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Woodcock v. State, 163
N.E.3d 863, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.). “The Indiana Supreme
Court has recently clarified that ‘when assessing whether an offense is factually
included, a court may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging
instrument.’” Robinson v. State, 251 N.E.3d 1124, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)
(quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067). However, “where ambiguities exist in a
charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another .
. . courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant’s favor, and thus find
a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069
(internal citation omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 12 of 16 [23] Maxwell contends that “the facts as alleged in the charging information create
the presumption of a double jeopardy violation.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18. The
State charged Maxwell with Level 5 felony intimidation and Level 6 felony
pointing a firearm at another person as follows:
On or about May 23, 2024, [Maxwell] did communicate a threat to commit a forcible felony, that is: Battery by Mean[s] of a Deadly Weapon, to [Trent], another person, by drawing or using a deadly weapon, that is: a handgun, with the intent that [Trent] be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out[.]
On or about May 23, 2024, [Maxwell] did knowingly point a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, at [Trent.]
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. Specifically, Maxwell contends that both counts
include the same date and victim, and he argues that the term “drawing or
using a . . . handgun” can have more than one plausible interpretation.
Appellant’s Br. p. 18. Maxwell also asserts that the pointing of the handgun
described in Count II can also refer to the drawing or use of a handgun in
Count I, therefore, resulting in ambiguity. Here, the State concedes that, as
charged, it is ambiguous whether pointing the firearm was a lesser-included
charge of Level 5 felony intimidation. We agree and therefore construe the
ambiguity in favor of Maxwell, identify a presumptive double jeopardy
violation, and proceed to Step 3. See A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 13 of 16 [24] Under Step 3, if “a court has found that one offense is included in the other—
either inherently or as charged—the court must then (and only then) ‘examine
the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and
as adduced at trial.’” Id. at 1071 (emphasis removed) (quoting Wadle, 151
N.E.3d at 249). During this final step, the court’s inquiry focuses on the
defendant’s actions and whether they were “so compressed in terms of time,
place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single
transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d
733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).
[25] The facts adduced at trial reflect that Maxwell exited his home carrying a
firearm in hand. After a brief conversation with Roberts, Trent exited his
vehicle to discuss Maxwell’s grievances. However, at one point during the
conversation, Trent attempted to reach into his lower left cargo shorts pocket to
retrieve his ID, and Maxwell raised and pointed his firearm in the direction of
Trent. After Maxwell’s father convinced him to return to the home, Maxwell
briefly lowered the firearm. Trent then turned his back to Maxwell and went to
his vehicle to retrieve his cell phone. Maxwell again raised his firearm and
pointed it in the direction of Trent. At that point, Maxwell’s father had to push
his son towards the home. The entire interaction lasted approximately 90
seconds.
[26] The State argues that the encounter between Maxwell and Trent involved more
than one transaction, claiming that because Maxwell pointed the firearm at
Trent twice and “intervening events” occurred between the first and second
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 14 of 16 instance, each time Maxwell raised the firearm constituted a separate offense.
Appellee’s Br. p. 18. We disagree. While it is true that Maxwell pointed the
firearm at Trent at least two times, the entire confrontation lasted only
approximately 90 seconds. During those 90 seconds, Maxwell never stopped
arguing and conversing with Trent and remained only feet from Trent each time
he pointed the firearm at Trent. In addition, during final argument, the State
identified the same instances of Maxwell pointing the firearm at Trent in
support of both charges. As to Count I, the State argued “[o]kay. So we know
he made a threat by pointing the firearm twice.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 233. With
respect to Count II, the State argued “[a]nd of course, we have proven this.
You heard testimony that he pointed the firearm three times, we saw him do it
twice on video, and we know that is not reasonable, right?” Id. at 236. Based
upon the short duration of the confrontation, the singleness of its purpose, and
the quick succession of the two instances of Maxwell pointing his firearm, we
fail to discern any “intervening events” that would allow us to conclude that
Counts I and II constituted separate transactions. Appellee’s Br. p. 18.
[27] Therefore, we conclude that Maxwell’s multiple punishments for pointing a
firearm at another person and for drawing a firearm violate the prohibition
against substantive double jeopardy. Since Maxwell was convicted of two
felonies, intimidation as a Level 5 felony and pointing a firearm at another as a
Level 6 felony, we reverse “the conviction with the lesser penalty,” which is
Maxwell’s conviction for Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at another. Eversole
v. State, 251 N.E.3d 604, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 15 of 16 256), trans. denied. Therefore, we reverse Maxwell’s conviction for pointing a
firearm at another person as a Level 6 felony and remand with instructions to
vacate that conviction.
Conclusion [28] Although we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support
Maxwell’s conviction for intimidation as a Level 5 felony, we conclude that his
convictions for intimidation and pointing a firearm at another person violate
principles of substantive double jeopardy. We therefore affirm the conviction
for Level 5 felony intimidation while reversing and remanding with instructions
to vacate Maxwell’s conviction for pointing a firearm at another person.
[29] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
May, J. and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Carter R. Gallagher Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daniel H. Frohman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1031 | December 12, 2025 Page 16 of 16