Nathan Hummel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 22, 2020
Docket19A-MI-3091
StatusPublished

This text of Nathan Hummel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Nathan Hummel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nathan Hummel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 22 2020, 10:52 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Nathan Hummel Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Westville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Nathan Hummel, April 22, 2020 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-MI-3091 v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J. Appellee-Respondent. Alevizos, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46C01-1912-MI-2857

Najam, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-3091 | April 22, 2020 Page 1 of 5 Statement of the Case [1] Nathan Hummel appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Hummel presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the

court erred when it denied his petition. We affirm and remand with

instructions.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On April 23, 2012, Hummel pleaded guilty to one count of dealing in a narcotic

drug, as a Class B felony (Count 1); two counts of robbery, as Class B felonies

(Counts II and III); and one count of disarming an officer, as a Class C felony

(Count IV). In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed that Hummel

would be sentenced as follows: fifteen years for Count 1, ten years for Count II,

ten years for Count III, and two years for Count IV. The parties further agreed

that “the sentences in Count II, Count III, and Count IV shall run

concurrently.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 14 (capitalization removed).

Thereafter, the Starke Circuit Court accepted Hummel’s guilty plea and

sentenced Hummel on each count pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.

The court then ordered that the “sentences imposed in Counts II, III, and IV

shall run concurrently” and that the “sentence imposed in Amended Count I

shall run consecutively to Counts II, III, and IV.” Id. at 16. Hummel was then

placed in a correctional facility in LaPorte County.

[3] On November 6, 2019, Hummel, pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the LaPorte Circuit Court. In his petition, Hummel asserted that his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-3091 | April 22, 2020 Page 2 of 5 confinement was illegal because “there was no consecutive language in the

plea” and that, “absent clear language to the contrary[,] the sentence for Count

I should run concurrently.” Id. at 19. In essence, Hummel asserted that his

sentence “violate[d] the express terms” of his plea agreement and that he “has

done the time legally expressed in his plea.” Id. at 20. The LaPorte Circuit

Court found that Hummel had stated “no claim for relief.” Id. at 22.

Accordingly, the court denied Hummel’s petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision [4] Hummel contends that the LaPorte Circuit Court erred when it denied his

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, Hummel asserts that he is being

“illegally detained” after the trial court made a “mistake of law” when it

ordered his sentence on Count I to run consecutive to his sentences on the other

counts because his plea agreement “is silent on the consecutive language.”

Appellant’s Br. at 5, 6. He further asserts that, had the court ordered his

sentence on Count I to run concurrent with the other counts as required by his

plea agreement, his aggregate sentence would have elapsed. Accordingly, he

maintains that he is entitled to an immediate release from custody.

[5] Indiana Code Section 34-25.5-1-1 (2019) provides that “[e]very person whose

liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of

habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered

from the restraint if the restraint is illegal.” The purpose of the writ of habeas

corpus is to bring the person in custody before the court for inquiry into the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-3091 | April 22, 2020 Page 3 of 5 cause of the restraint. Manley v. Butts, 71 N.E.3d 1153, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App.

2017). A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief only if he is entitled to his

immediate release from unlawful custody. Martin v. State, 901 N.E.2d 645, 647

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[6] Here, while Hummel claimed in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that his

confinement was illegal, his underlying argument was that the court did not

sentence him pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement. Thus, contrary to

Hummel’s assertion, the substance of his petition makes it clear that his petition

was, in fact, an attack on the validity of his sentence. Indeed, in his brief,

Hummel acknowledges that he is challenging the court’s imposition of

consecutive sentences. However, a petitioner “may not file a writ of habeas

corpus to attack his conviction or sentence.” Manley, 71 N.E.3d at 1156

(citations omitted). Rather, a petitioner who attacks the validity of his sentence

must file a petition for post-conviction relief. See id. Because Hummel’s

petition challenged the validity of his sentence, the LaPorte Circuit Court did

not err when it denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

[7] However, Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) provides that, if a petitioner

files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the county where the person is

incarcerated and challenges the validity of his sentence, “that court shall

transfer the cause to the court in which the conviction took place, and the latter

court shall treat it as a petition for [post-conviction relief] under this Rule.”

Because Hummel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where

he is incarcerated and challenged the validity of his sentence, the LaPorte

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-3091 | April 22, 2020 Page 4 of 5 Circuit Court was required to transfer his petition to the Starke Circuit Court

for it to be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we

affirm the LaPorte Circuit Court’s denial of Hummel’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus, but we remand with instructions for the court to transfer

Hummel’s petition to the Starke Circuit Court.

[8] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-3091 | April 22, 2020 Page 5 of 5

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Related

Martin v. State
901 N.E.2d 645 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2009)
James E. Manley v. Keith Butts
71 N.E.3d 1153 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2017)

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